a.rawlings: Ecopoetic intersubjectivity

a.rawlings at Swartifoss, Iceland.

In a recent essay, “Learning the Grammar of Animacy,” Robin Wall Kimmerer, a botanist who is a member of the Potawatomi tribe (one of the Ojibwe or Anishinaabe peoples of North America), recounts being stunned when she learned of the word puhpowee from an ethnobotanical study on traditional Anishinaabe uses of fungi. In that word, which translates as “the force which causes mushrooms to push up from the earth overnight,” Kimmerer “could see an entire process of close observation in the damp morning woods, the formulation of a theory for which English has no equivalent. The makers of this word understood a world of being, full of unseen energies that animate everything.”[1] The essay describes her subsequent efforts to learn the Anishinaabe dialect Bodéwadmimwin or Potawatomi, a threatened language with only nine remaining fluent speakers in her tribe. Doing so proves extremely difficult, because that language differs so profoundly from English. Where English is noun-based, Potawatomi is seventy percent verbs. Moreover, in Potawatomi, both nouns and verbs are classified as either “animate” or “inanimate”: “Pronouns, articles, plurals, demonstratives, verbs … are all aligned in Potawatomi to provide different ways to speak of the living world and the lifeless one. Different verb forms, different plurals, different everything apply depending on whether what you are speaking of is alive.”[2]

The difficulties of learning were so great that Kimmerer was on the verge of giving up the frustrating struggle until a revelatory moment when she encountered the verb wiikwegamaa, which means “to be a bay.” She recalls:

In that moment I could smell the water of the bay, watch it rock against the shore and hear it sift onto the sand. A bay is a noun only if water is dead. When bay is a noun, it is defined by humans, trapped between its shores and contained by the word. But the verb wiikwegamaa — to be a bay — releases the water from bondage and lets it live. “To be a bay” holds the wonder that, for this moment, the living water has decided to shelter itself between these shores, conversing with cedar roots and a flock of baby mergansers.[3]

This language, she recognizes, is “a mirror for seeing the animacy of the world, the life that pulses through all things.” Potawatomi extends the grammar of animacy (not to be confused with the arrogance of at least some forms of anthropomorphism) not only to humans, nonhuman animals, and plants, but also to rocks and “mountains and water and fire and places.” In every sentence, its speakers are reminded of their kinship with all that the language establishes as the animate world. Currently, in teaching her ecology students, Kimmerer takes a bilingual approach, using both “the lexicon of science and the grammar of animacy.” She explains, “Although they still have to learn [the plants’] scientific roles and Latin names, I hope I am also teaching them to know the world as a neighborhood of nonhuman residents, to know that, as ecotheologian Thomas Berry has written, ‘we must say of the universe that it is a communion of subjects, not a collection of objects.’”[4] Kimmerer makes clear that she’s not advocating that we all learn Native American languages, but she does urge a transformation in conception and attitude that would allow us all to speak the grammar of animacy from our hearts. Internalizing that grammar, she suggests, “could well be a restraint on our mindless exploitation of land”; by enabling us to “[walk] through a richly inhabited world of Birch people, Bear people, Rock people, beings we think of and therefore speak of as persons worthy of our respect, of inclusion in a peopled world,” it would give us access to other perspectives and sources of wisdom.[5]

Currently environmental thinkers in a number of fields are working to reconceptualize and refigure the human relation to nonhuman life forms so as to better understand nonhuman modes of intelligence, perception, and communication; to correct anthropocentric biases; and to more accurately reflect species interdependencies.[6] A political hope behind these efforts is that such perspectival adjustments may help humans live in less destructive and more mutually beneficial relation to the rest of the biosphere. Because Anglophone experimental poetics for the past century has involved developing perspectives and poetic techniques designed deliberately to resist habitual ways of thinking and of ordering perception, contemporary ecopoets with experimental inclinations in North America, eager to push language in unaccustomed directions, see themselves as having a role to play in this interdisciplinary exploration. Although often basing their belief that language is inherently connected to perception and thought in constructivist understandings that emerge from poststructuralist theory, these poets seem very like Kimmerer in investing themselves in using the powers of language to initiate what Forrest Gander calls “a reorientation from objectivity to intersubjectivity.”[7]

Joan Retallack, for instance, in her essay “What is Experimental Poetry and Why Do We Need It?,” observes that “The human imagination has always done a brilliant job of occupying the ‘empty spaces’ of alterity.” She proposes that having inherited “a monodirectional dynamic of voluble us and silent them,” poets need to find “a reciprocal alterity” by engaging in the “hard work of acquiring accurate [scientific] knowledge” and combining that with an experimental stance which may free us from our anthropocentric preconceptions. “The very word ecopoetics,” Retallack suggests, “may be seen as an experimental instrument that creates a new order of attention to the possibility of a poetics of precise observations and conversational interspecies relations with all contributing to the nature of the form.”[8] We might well debate the extent to which such reciprocity is possible, since it’s not clear how much we humans are capable of hearing nonhuman voices, but approaches to language that foster the kind of attitudes Kimmerer locates in a “grammar of animacy” may bring us closer to the respectful and equitable connection Retallack envisions.

As much of the work recently collected in The Arcadia Project: Postmodern Pastoral or published in the online journal ecopoetics makes evident, Retallack is not alone in seeing experimental poets as having important work to do in seeking what she calls “correctives to ‘nature’ narratives of segregation, dominance, and nostalgia” which “[fail] to acknowledge ‘them’ as inextricably intertwined with ‘us.’” Angela Rawlings, a Canadian poet and performance artist who publishes as a.rawlings, would seem to take a similar view, and it is her 2006 book Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists that I will examine in this essay, to demonstrate some of the ways in which experimental poetics — in their alternative approaches to poetic subjectivity, emphasis on the materiality of language, and resistance to the conventional regulations of thought encoded in standard syntax and other conventional literary structures — might be helping shift our sense of human/nonhuman relations away from the anthropocentric and might enhance our sense of kinship and interdependence with other life forms.

In a.rawlings’s book this shift is enacted through extraordinary attention to and representations of embodied sensation. There is a relevant passage in J. M. Coetzee’s novel Elizabeth Costello in which the title character, objecting to the implication in Descartes’s assertion “Cogito, ergo sum” that “a living being that does not do what we call thinking is somehow second-class,” offers the following: “To thinking, cogitation, I oppose fullness, embodiedness, the sensation of being — not a consciousness of yourself as a kind of ghostly reasoning machine thinking thoughts, but on the contrary the sensation — a heavily affective sensation — of being a body with limbs that have extension in space, of being alive to the world.”[9] Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, I believe, works to create just that kind of sensation for a body that may be human and/or may be lepidoptoral, as the lines between these species often blur. The text fosters biocentrism not just in what it suggests about common somatic experiences shared by human and nonhuman species but in what it does to language itself: in highlighting the physicality of both sounding and reading words, and in making language evidently participate in the processes of the biosphere — processes of predation and consumption, of metamorphosis and decay, of reproduction, development, and evolution.

Even as I make those claims, I wish to acknowledge that what constitutes anthropocentrism and what biocentrism may not be easy to discern, and that the latter may remain an ideal that humans cannot fully achieve. Certainly, the act of blurring distinctions between human and nonhuman animals, dependent as it is on imagining nonhuman experience, may itself involve anthropocentric human projection; Kate Soper wisely cautions against valuing such blurring for its own sake.[10] Yet one can persuasively argue, as Val Plumwood does, that anthropocentrism is rightly understood as distinct from “epistemic locatedness”: she contends that the latter, which is inescapable, does not preclude empathy or the overcoming of a narrow restriction of ethical concern to the self.[11] Plumwood asserts, “to the extent that anthropocentric frameworks prevent us from experiencing the others of nature in their fullness, we not only help to imperil ourselves through loss of sensitivity but also deprive ourselves of the unique kinds of richness and joy the encounter with the more-than-human presences of nature can provide.” Harmonizing with Retallack (and, I think, pointing to what a.rawlings enacts), Plumwood proposes that we “need a reconception of the human self in more mutualistic terms as a self-in-relationship with nature, formed not in the drive for mastery and control of the other but in a balance of mutual transformation and negotiation.”[12]

Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello asserts “there is no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves into the being of another. There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination.”[13] This character, a novelist like her creator, claims she can think her way “into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an oyster, any being with whom I share the substrate of life”;[14] she asserts that Ted Hughes does that in some of his animal poems, which she says don’t inhabit another mind but rather another body.[15] Her mention of a bat is part of her attempt to refute the contrary view of Thomas Nagel in his widely known philosophical essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”[16] Nagel points out that because our own experience as humans provides the basis for our imagination (Plumwood’s “epistemic locatedness”), its range is limited. I can imagine “only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves” but not what it is like for a bat to be a bat, Nagel argues. He sensibly reasons that the experience of any species has “a specific subjective character, which it is beyond our ability to conceive,” and that “if extrapolation from our own case is involved in the idea of what it is like to be a bat, the extrapolation must be incomplete.”[17] Granting that, I would suggest that perhaps our necessarily partial imaginings can nonetheless help us see the world differently. In a footnote, Nagel himself admits,

It may be easier than I suppose to transcend inter-species barriers with the aid of the imagination. For example, blind people are able to detect objects near them by a form of sonar, using vocal clicks or taps of a cane. Perhaps if one knew what that was like, one could by extension imagine roughly what it was like to possess the much more refined sonar of a bat. The distance between oneself and other persons and other species can fall anywhere on a continuum.[18]

Plumwood, like Costello, is less daunted by species difference. Noting that many ethical theories regard moral reasoning itself as requiring “some version of empathy, putting ourselves in the other’s place, seeing the world to some degree from the perspective of an other with needs and experiences both similar to and different from our own,” she argues that human-centeredness is “no more inescapable than any other form of centrism,” such as ethnocentrism or androcentrism.[19] In thinking about establishing ethical relations to the nonhuman world, she advocates breaking down the human-nature dualism that “configure[s] the world rigidly in terms of human and other” rather than “expand[ing] the category of privilege to take in a few of the more human-like non-humans.”[20] Issues of (un)ethical relations to nonhuman animals, as we will see, enter into Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, but they are not its central concern; rather, the kind of respectful and reciprocal engagement with other life forms based in — or taking place through — the body that Costello proposes, and that aligns with both Plumwood’s and Kimmerer’s senses of how we may move forward in addressing the current ecological crisis, is central to a.rawlings’s exploration of interspecies identifications.

As I will demonstrate shortly, in Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists a.rawlings does generate species blurrings and “mutual transformations” between Homo sapiens and Lepidoptera, yet she also maintains her readers’ respect for the differences between butterflies or moths and humans. Respect for difference is made easier by her not having chosen to “think with” (in Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman’s punning phrase) one of the charismatic megafauna, by not choosing a species that is large-brained, readily imagined as neotenic, frequently linked to a particular human trait (as is the case with the “sly fox,” say), or even associated with aspects of animality recognized — and often deplored — in the human.[21] With the exception of the monarch butterfly, the order of Lepidoptera hasn’t much caught the popular environmental imagination, and this, along with the marked differences between insect and mammalian anatomy, makes the creatures’ alterity easier to respect than might otherwise have been the case. Conversely, generating a sense of what Kimmerer speaks of as kinship may be correspondingly difficult, yet through an intense collaging that prevents clear separation of human from lepidopteral experience, a.rawlings manages it. By revealing correspondences and overlaps between human experience and admittedly presumed or imagined, even if scientifically informed, butterfly experience, a.rawlings challenges some of the ways in which we Western humans set ourselves apart from other animal life; through its densely disjunctive, highly sensory techniques, her work fosters the appreciation of connectedness and commonalities among life-forms that a grammar of animacy conveys.

Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists is a dazzlingly metamorphic volume that manipulates visual images and text to explore embodiment and various forms of eroticism; the life cycle of Lepidoptera; the practices of lepidopterists (particularly the collection and mounting of specimens); the stages of sleep; the study of sleep and sleep disorders; and the analysis of literary texts. According to an interview, it was prompted by a.rawlings wondering: “if a poet writes poems during sleep, how might a lepidopterist work while she sleeps? What effect does intimate examination of insects have on long-term information processing and subconscious behaviour?”[22] It originated, then, from speculations on human consciousness, but more specifically on the human as it may be affected by intimacy with the nonhuman.

In this book sensory experience is foregrounded — suggesting how much consciousness, at least in sleep, is a somatic phenomenon — and not just through the book’s verbal/semantic content but also through its reliance on visual forms of communication. Visual elements, then, are one means by which the work very evidently calls upon not just cogitation, but, as Elizabeth Costello puts it, the sensation of being. On the cover appears what I have identified as a Northern Pearly-eye butterfly (Enodia anthedon) whose body aligns with the spine of the book so that one set of wings folds over each cover.

Front cover from Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, © a.rawlings (words), Matt Ceolin (illustrations), published by Coach House Books, 2006. Reprinted with permission from Coach House Books.

This is the first of more than a dozen images that appear in the book, all by a.rawlings’s collaborator Matt Ceolin, most of which represent butterflies or moths either dead or in various life stages.

First page from Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, © a.rawlings (words), Matt Ceolin (illustrations), published by Coach House Books, 2006. Reprinted with permission from Coach House Books.

Page 19 from Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, © a.rawlings (words), Matt Ceolin (illustrations), published by Coach House Books, 2006. Reprinted with permission from Coach House Books.

These images invite attention to lepidopteral bodies. Additionally, there are three images of jars and bottles that would be part of the lepidopterist’s equipment, including a stoppered bottle containing a butterfly specimen; one image of a book opened to a schematized image of a butterfly with labeled parts; and another image that presents a similar schematized drawing without representing a book.

Page 51 from Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, © a.rawlings (words), Matt Ceolin (illustrations), published by Coach House Books, 2006. Reprinted with permission from Coach House Books.

Page 95 from Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, © a.rawlings (words), Matt Ceolin (illustrations), published by Coach House Books, 2006. Reprinted with permission from Coach House Books.

These visuals remind the reader that Western humans have typically sought knowledge of Lepidoptera by killing them so that they can be collected, categorized, and either dissected or preserved.

More experimentally, the text is arranged in remarkably various eye-catching visual arrangements. Sometimes these provide a kind of scoring of the breath in the tradition of projective verse, and sometimes spatial arrangement coupled with variation in font highlights the juxtaposition of different kinds of discourse; but much of this visual variety turns pages into object of visual art whose visual meaning — beyond an insistence on the absence of a standard arrangement — is difficult to discern. Some page designs in which appear not just words but letters or letter combinations or keyboard symbols suggest concrete poetry, as when facing pages look like open butterfly wings. Thus, on four pages associated with “Bruxism,” “a parasomnia where the sleeper grinds or clenches her teeth,”[23] near mirrorings of text create a wing-like design made of bold face and regular typeface words, and of clusters of letters with isolated consonants scattered at the edges. It’s appropriate to “bruxism” that these are mostly the “dental” consonants t, d, n, l, made with the tongue against the teeth.[24] The words on the left-hand pages are disjointed fragments of English — mostly nouns and adjectives, perhaps from dreams or nightmares — on the right, equally disjunct parts of Latin names for species of moths or butterflies (68–71).

Page 70–71 from Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, © a.rawlings (words), Matt Ceolin (illustrations), published by Coach House Books, 2006. Reprinted with permission from Coach House Books.

These wing-like textual designs might be considered a crude example of a.rawlings using language as bioform, making pages into butterflies — though we might equally well read this as highlighting the textually mediated character of our knowledge of butterflies, the distance between representation and the living animal. In a more compelling instance of displaying language as part of the biosphere, a tightly curled caterpillar of text gradually uncurls and moves to the right over a few pages. In the process its letters modulate from reading “count by slumber” to “faint bystander” to “pant by number” to “cunt by umber” (that last term evoking the umber moths) to — when the text is flat — “ti ur tor foknur” (where “tor” as anagrammatic “rot” seems potentially significant) so that this textual creature doesn’t just crawl, it develops in the process of its own motion through space and time.

Page 25 from Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, © a.rawlings (words), Matt Ceolin (illustrations), published by Coach House Books, 2006. Reprinted with permission from Coach House Books.

Page 27 from Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, © a.rawlings (words), Matt Ceolin (illustrations), published by Coach House Books, 2006. Reprinted with permission from Coach House Books.

Elsewhere letters progressively vanish from the text, leaving tattered remnants of words as if eaten out, again giving material language a kind of organic life as it participates in processive change. Retallack in her essay adapts John Cage’s thinking to propose as one experimental ecopoetic strategy “adopting nature’s manner of operations,” and the practices I have just described can be understood as linguistic versions of just that. Even when analogues to biological processes are less clear, as when recognizable words are suddenly replaced by illegible clusters of letters which may or may not be anagrammatically decipherable, language in this book tends to be a markedly unstable, rapidly evolving material — and the visual qualities of this text contribute crucially to that animation. A readily visible textual instability is key to what makes this book difficult to process in conventional ways, and its asking us to see and experience the lepidopteral in unfamiliar ways is, I think, fundamental to the poem’s experimental attempt to reposition humans and human epistemology in relation to the life-forms humans have categorized as Lepidoptera.

Like the visual elements, sounds also enrich the sensory quality of a reader’s experience of Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists. For instance, in sounding those dental consonants just mentioned, the reader is forced to be much more aware of tongue and teeth than in usual reading experiences. a.rawlings often employs conventional techniques like alliteration and assonance in ways that heighten readers’ consciousness of their own embodiment. In her hands, even such traditional poetic devices serve unsettlingly to defamiliarize human somatic experience and to blur its distinctions from that of the moth or butterfly. A brief example: “wood nymphs spin and hang crude cocoons // we hold our slow high flight” (15). Here’s a more extended example, the lower half of an unbroken page:

                   our wings                                                       our breath

             heavy as              wails, our                   wet

        soul, sail, th                gall of th ‘th,’th ‘of’ of th ‘of’ or th ‘th,’ th

             ways lips hug proboscis                                   th vulva, yes, th vulva 

      water is fire            protrusion                        velour

                                         penetration                     vellum

                                       chrysalistalization dark valium

                                           row of fine-lipped, of

                                up    tubular, a

                                     thin                                                             (65)


Clearly, the echoing and modulating sounds — for instance, of proboscis, protrusion, and penetration (which could be read downward in immediate succession), or of vulva, velour, vellum and valium — give these lines a sensual richness on the tongue. But beyond that, partly through the progression and dissolution of sound patterns as well as through its visual design, the passage enacts a shift from what seems a clear distinction between species — “our wings” (which belong to butterflies and not humans) on the left-hand side of the page, “our breath” (produced by humans and not butterflies) on the right-hand side — to a confusion of bodies. Either breath or wings could be heavy and wet, and both have associations with the soul (as the soul passes — or flies — from the mortal body with its last breath), though a term like “wails” would seem to designate sounds not, to our knowledge, made by insects. The line of “of”s and “th”s could sound like either panting breath or the movement of air with a fluttering of wings. The insect’s alliteratively stressed protruding proboscis penetrates flowers, but the human vulva might also be the entryway of penetration, while the lips here seem human as well, whether associated with the mouth or with female genitalia. Perhaps these lines suggest an analogy between the butterfly’s pleasure in feeding and the human’s pleasure in sexual penetration. Perhaps they point to commonalities between the objectified position of the female in a patriarchal order and that of the butterfly in an anthropocentric one. Going further in their imagining, perhaps these lines attempt to bring sensually alive for us the experience of an insect feeding, sticking that thin proboscis up the velvety softness of a tubular flower.[25] Certainly, a first-person plural that is not appropriative but inclusive (a useful distinction Retallack offers) is created here, one that acknowledges a commonality of embodiment, hunger, and desire, but does so within a context of recognizing also mutual alterity. Flying remains quite fundamentally different from breathing, and vice versa.

That sound plays an important role in this poem’s blurring of the bodies and bodily experiences of butterflies or moths and humans is evident from the book’s opening pages. The first four pages of verbal text (that is, the pages that follow immediately after the dedication “To Northern Ontario,” a page of translucent vellum, and one with a small drawing of a Northern Pearly-eye), contain only the phrase “a hoosh a ha,” which is repeated different numbers of times and arranged differently on each page to map varying rhythms and increasing speeds with which the phrase is articulated. To designate those syllables a “phrase” is misleading since they seem closer to a sounded breath or breaths, inhalations and exhalations. a.rawlings’s 2007 performance of those pages (designated “Prologue”) at PennSound is eerily ambiguous in its humanity/inhumanity. While her voice dominates, one hears multiple voices, male as well as female, and the sounds, including some squeaks, don’t strike the ear as necessarily human.[26] “A hoosh a ha” might well mimic the sounds butterfly or moth wings make as they move through the air, as heard by ears or other hearing organs finely tuned enough to register their being raised and lowered. (As hearing organs, Lepidoptera have tympanal membranes on their wings. They are sensitive to sounds made by predators — birds in the case of butterflies, which are active in the day, and bats in the case of moths, which tend to be nocturnal.) In a.rawlings’s recorded reading, those pages take on a highly sexualized character, as if the being “hoosh”ing were approaching and then reaching orgasm before subsiding into stillness. Perhaps, though, one could imagine the sounds to register the gathering of more and more butterflies who, once assembled, come to rest. The Northern Pearly-eye does gather in large groups, particularly in the cooler, northwestern-most portion of its range.

Let me briefly recap my argument so far: In considering visual and aural elements of Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, I have demonstrated that they generate a reading experience that requires of the reader a degree of sensual and somatic involvement unusual even in poetry, which is widely viewed as the literary genre in which the material qualities of language play the largest part, for instance through rhyme and meter. This emphasis on embodied experience draws readers toward aspects of our being we share with nonhuman animals (or sometimes plants, as might be suggested, for instance, by reference to the scent of honeysuckles as “honeysuckle sweat”) and away from the rational cognitive functions traditionally thought to distinguish the human. I have argued, too, that the insistently dynamic or metamorphic character a.rawlings gives to both sounded words or letters and their visual arrangement also contributes to her unsettling of conventional distinctions between human and nonhuman species, perhaps even — in giving an unusual life to letters — between the biotic and nonbiotic realms.

Metamorphosis — particularly multistaged metamorphosis — also provides the basis for the book’s structure, and exploring this structurally embedded thematic further will allow me to more fully develop my argument about the poem’s creation through poetic experimentalism of a grammar of animacy that imaginatively approaches reciprocal alterity.

The book has six sections, in each of which a lepidopteral life stage is explicitly linked with a stage of human sleep or a category of sleep disturbance: for instance, the first section is “EGG — INSOMNIA,” the next “EGG, LARVA — DYSSOMNIA,” the third “LARVA — NREM,” and so forth.[27] Each page announcing a new stage includes a typographic symbol or combination of symbols; one effect of these is to foster more inclusive thinking about languages by signaling that communicative systems need not involve words.

Page 49 from Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, © a.rawlings (words), Matt Ceolin (illustrations), published by Coach House Books, 2006. Reprinted with permission from Coach House Books.

Four of the poem’s sections — all except the ones titled “LARVA, PUPA — REM” and “IMAGO — AROUSAL” (the imago being the adult winged form of Lepidoptera) — contain pages where the name of a sleep stage or disorder, such as “sleep spindles,” “apnea,” or “somnambulism,” appears in small capital letters on the lower outside corner near the page number. According to the description on the book’s back cover, “sleep is read here through the life cycle of a moth.” While a.rawlings presumably authorized that statement and while it accords with her description, quoted earlier, of the origin of the work, it does not accord with my readerly experience. The book does not seem to me to be more about sleep than it is about moth life; the two are thoroughly intertwined so that the book is about both, and also about their construction in language and their examination by science. Sleep seems to me where humans come closest to the kind of metamorphosis butterflies undergo rather than, say, the gradual development from infancy to adulthood. When we sleep, without our choice our brains and bodies enter distinct states with different modes of experience or consciousness. The book’s structure, then, emphasizes the analogous ways in which humans and butterflies undergo change through successive bodily transformations not subject to cognitive control. And in fact, after I shared with the author an earlier version of this essay that made these claims, she responded, “Yes, I approved the back-cover copy. However, I thought I’d mention that I am in agreement with your experience of the book. My experience writing it was that there was no intended hierarchy of one subject over another. Indeed, it could be said that sleep is read through the moth’s life cycle, but the inverse is equally valid — the moth’s life cycle can be read through sleep.”[28]

The experience of reading Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, certainly fascinating and stimulating, is unsettling and at times quite disturbing as well. The back cover identifies the book as “an erotic nightmarescape.” That disturbance is provoked partly by what is presented in the book’s content, which is what the anonymous blurber seems to have in mind: horrifying evocations of moths caught in one’s throat, for instance. But it is also produced by the unpredictable ways “words breed” (81), suggesting uncontrolled genetic modifications. More generally, discomfort arises because the reader’s orientation is so precarious, and any sense of cognitive mastery so ephemeral.[29] Beginning with the very first lines after the (“ah hoosh a ha”) prologue, the reader has to accept or in some way accommodate a condition like the illogic of dream narrative. Here are those opening lines:

We descend on a field by a lake. a hoosh The lupin, sleep, the fog. a ha Fireflies, silent moths. We bury our legs in sand. Sound through the sand is dormant. We desire sleep to enter, virginal.

We stretch our feelers toward a warm body. a a Slowly, hands fog-damp spin plants, form air-filled hollows, breath cocooned, fur soft and blurred, heavy even heavenly. hoosh Soft like quiet. ha

Soft like we quiver (14)

The first-person plural speaker might well, at least initially, be lepidopteral, but the perspective seems to me ambiguously human as well. Perhaps the writing moves between the two species’ experiences, perhaps it joins them, but certainly the reader’s impulse to separate human neatly from Lepidoptera is effectively thwarted. Once the reader relinquishes the quest for categorization, she or he can appreciate that whether the legs in sand or the desire for sleep belong to one species or both, the bodies with hands and/or feelers occupy the same dreamily fog-filled field and possess a similar soft vulnerability. They share not only the natural environment of this summer evening in (if the dedication locates the work) Northern Ontario but also a desire for a change in somatic state to involve both sleep and sexualized bodily contact.

Similarly, the page that follows begins with the clearly human action and predominantly human perspective of “Slow light touch of hand on wing, scales brush off like butterfly kisses” (the anthropomorphizing name we give to the human act of brushing one’s eyelashes against another’s skin), but shortly, when “we tongue our shell, our conch,” “we” seems to speak also for larvae eating the eggshells from which they emerged and then acquiring nutrition from plants “with tongue buried deep in the suckle the honey” (15). The we subsequently becomes even more intensely indeterminate with the eroticized language that accompanies “the story’s arousal”:

we are taut while we thrust against the inner wall. Sleep is bruised or screams or none comes but we desire, we feel the full hot flesh of our wing swipe grass, scrape sand, we push ourselves out of ourselves, into our sound our hand our sweet wet hot our path, mourn, rake, master or muster. Glisten, swell come and the story’s arousal, twenty eyes unblink when the sun’s awake and even when it’s not the brain speaks, screams, swells and huge battened eyes of a hundred hungry mouths, no moths, wait this will move. (16–17)

As the first-person plural pronoun gathers in the reader as well, s/he is drawn into an experience that seems both the human progress toward the “sweet hot full the electricity” of orgasm and the compound-eyed moth’s effortful emergence from an earlier stage of itself, the pupa.

If we readers cannot distinguish human from butterfly desire or human from butterfly arousal here, and if we have to acknowledge that both are present, then we no longer have the hierarchical vantage implicit in an anthropocentric perspective. If, prompted by this dense weave of words — the text’s grammar of animacy — we have imaginatively entered a state where human and lepidopteral experiences, equally defamiliarized, interpenetrate without our losing awareness that there also exist significant differences between insects and mammals, we may be approaching something like the potentially conversational mode of reciprocal alterity that Retallack was envisioning.

This is a remarkable achievement that avoids problematic perspectives common in conventional nature poetry representing animals, but before closing I want also to contemplate its ecopoetic limits and perhaps limitations. I noted earlier that in its focus on somatic commonalities between humans and insects, Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists draws readers away from the rational realm that, most would agree, humans do not share with moths. The sensory experiences a.rawlings invokes often involve primal activities such as eating or sex or moving between involuntary stages of being, and they often assume a violent cast. Consequently, a.rawlings may be playing into some very old, derogatory thinking about animality. It’s hardly news that both humans and nonhuman animals have sexual drives in common; one could even see the work, particularly through its violence, as reinforcing traditional problematic linkages of the animal with “lower” functions. For the most part, I’d say that is not the case, because the “higher” functions do enter this animalized text through alphabetic language, and that realm is rendered thoroughly metamorphic and material. a.rawlings’s reinforcement of how much we humans are our bodies even in such an “elevated” and distinctively human trait as our ability to invent sign systems, moreover, supports environmentalist thinking to the extent that environmentalism requires recognizing our embodied dependence on and embeddedness in ecosystems. In most of this volume, a.rawlings’s presentations are too mobile, too multifaceted and multiperspectival, to allow any sense of the human apart from the dense linguistic environments she creates in which plant, human, and nonhuman animal bodies as well as alphabetic ones are dissected, joined, pinned, caressed, torn, transformed, and thoroughly entangled. The reader experiences a harsh realm of richly various biorhythms where myriad changing life forms come in contact and interact in ways often full of desire.

Yet it’s also true that through her presentation of the work of lepidopterists, which I’ll now examine, a.rawlings at points maintains a dualistic perspective that separates out and rejects the rational mind. For me, this undercuts some of the valuable integrative and expansive work done by Wide Slumber. Beginning in the section that follows the passages I examine above (all in the EGG — INSOMNIA section), a.rawlings introduces a contrasting perspective: that of the nondreaming lepidopterist, visually distinguished by the use of italic font.[30] She incorporates what appear to be selections from a set of instructions for those seeking the kind of epistemological control that is expressed in tidy taxonomies. Inserted into the poem in documentary fashion are instructions for how to “collect, kill, and mount specimen[s]” (23), such as

Manipulate wings simultaneously to avoid twisting body.
Pin wings to mounting board.


Pin wings near large veins to avoid tears.
Place paper over wings to prevent curling while drying.


Keep mounted specimen in low-moisture condition to prevent mould.
Avoid direct sunlight to prevent fading.
Store in tightly closed box with insecticide to prevent dermestid beetle larvae
and book lice from feeding on body parts.

These passages associate lepidoptery and scientific investigation with a fixing that is counter to the processes of life and of ecology, a common complaint about scientific “objectivity.” Not only do those collecting specimens engage in killing live creatures, but they then deliberately remove those creatures’ bodies from the cycles of decay and of nourishing other species in which they would otherwise participate. a.rawlings makes these implied, familiar judgments more interesting by implicating the reader in analogous processes. Poetry critics, the text warns us, can enact a similar destruction. Paralleling those who “Pinch thorax between thumb and forefinger. / Slide specimen into envelope; store in box with insecticide (23) are those who wish to “Collect, sort and frame text Pinch meaning between morpheme and phoneme Slide meaning into envelope; store in box with semanticide (42). In presenting this common popular critique of literary study and paralleling it with a critique of the science of lepidoptery, a.rawlings puts at least certain forms of intellectual activity at odds with the pleasure in Costello’s “sensation of being.”

On the facing page, which has as its sleep term in the bottom corner “restoration,” a.rawlings offers a set of italicized instructions that return us to the alternative approach taken by the bulk of her poem. Notably, though perhaps not murderous, these instructions have their own violence. They involve forcefully manipulating the text so that it becomes an active medium that does things, or they involve doing things to the text that defamiliarize and reveal it more truly:

Force a pen through the body of the text.

Translate texts simultaneously to twist meaning. Pen words on bed frame.
Pen anagrams on mirror.

Pin words near vowels to avoid tears. Place paper over words to curl while drying.
Watch text uncurl dusk.

Place punctuation under lamp to increase integrity. (43)

(Tears as in ruptures on the left-hand page may become tears as in liquid released in weeping on the right, an example of the kind of fruitful multiplicity or fluidity of meaning this writing generates.) It would be reductive, then, to suggest that the experimental writer’s activities are positioned in simple opposition to the scientist’s. Still, the scientist, at least as specimen collector, is the one presented as invested in knowledge at the expense of life.

One way to understand later pages that list fragmented Latin names for butterflies, or pages that turn lists of lepidopteral pupae or larvae into a kind of rhythmic chant (“tiliae larva nd smerinthus ocellata larva nd hemaris fuciformis larva nd cerura vinula larva nd notodonta dromedaries larva nd ptildontella cucullina larva” [86]), is to see a.rawlings forcing her pen through the body of lepidoperists’ foundational text: Linnaean classification according to classes, orders, genera, and species. In a similar gesture, she performs transformative twists on the line “Welcome to the Centre for Sleep and Dream Studies,” gnawing away at its words to reveal other possibilities they contain: “Welcome to th // Enter. Sleep nd ream. elcm” (24). 

Page 24 from Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, © a.rawlings (words), Matt Ceolin (illustrations), published by Coach House Books, 2006. Reprinted with permission from Coach House Books.

Opposing herself to the dissective activity of much science, but not denying destructive aspects of her own practices, a.rawlings uses scientific terms for productive verbal and conceptual metamorphosis; as the text reports at one point: “spit words split worlds.” There’s a feminist dimension to this activity as well: there are clear suggestions in the text that women and their bodies are labeled, collected, violently pinned, and in several senses mounted (“does th vahlvã speak / how does th vulvaw speak” the text asks [62], evoking Gayatri Spivak’s subaltern). Women are another Other whom the book challenges us to perceive more fully and more fluidly. Yet here again, the text does not escape reliance on a predictable problematic binary, in this case one that identifies the fluid and multiple as feminine and the rigidly rational as masculine; to the extent it does so, it threatens the egalitarian spirit essential to both animacy and the creation of reciprocal alterity. The text’s ecopoetic value and, I think, its emphasis, however, remain in tapping — through the altered states of dream, of sexual arousal, perhaps of drugged consciousness and also through intellectually vibrant play with several languages and bodies of knowledge — those kinds of somatic understanding that would be available, albeit somewhat differently, to both men and women. Wide Slumber invites using that understanding or knowledge to experience the animal other from an inevitably incomplete but still radical within-ness that also gives voice to specifics of difference.

At the beginning of the “LARVA, PUPA — REM” section of Wide Slumber is a striking pair of facing pages that combine visual images with brief text. On the left “so we dream the same” appears above a sharp image of the left wings of a Northern Pearly-eye, the other half of its body dissolving in a watery wash; on the right an image of a specimen trapped in a stoppered killing bottle appears above the line “do we dream the same.” Clearly, when human dreams are of power and domination, they differ chillingly from those of butterflies. On a later page, a similar pattern repeats: “do we have plans for them” appears above an image of a dead moth on its back, and below in bold, “no we have plans for us” (79).

Page 79 from Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists, © a.rawlings (words), Matt Ceolin (illustrations), published by Coach House Books, 2006. Reprinted with permission from Coach House Books.

Replacing “them” with “us” is crucial, and it is the fundamental gesture of the shift from standard English to a grammar of animacy like that offered by Potawatomi — or by much of Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists. In recognizing interspecies community, we have to face that our destruction of the world around us constitutes our own destruction as well.

Imaginative and linguistic play that defamiliarizes human experience and its representation and in the process also expands our thinking to include an interspecies “we” is only that: imaginative and linguistic play. a.rawlings makes no pretense of offering her readers actual cross-species communication. Rather, as I read it, her text gives readers valuable practice in a kind of imaginative identification that resituates the human, opening conceptual channels that may yield less destructive plans for all kinds of species. To apply such perspectives beyond the textual and imaginative realms will require interdisciplinary collaboration; it will depend, that is, on challenging and expanding but not shutting off rational faculties. I have no wish to champion the approaches to scientific understanding a.rawlings critiques. Yet it seems to me unfortunate that Wide Slumber, even as it with remarkable inventiveness encourages interspecies identification, discourages interdisciplinary human communication by at least partially reinforcing easy stereotypes of scientists as destructive to life and uninterested in the intersubjectivity this book so fascinatingly explores.



1. Robin Wall Kimmerer, “Learning the Grammar of Animacy,” in Braiding Sweet Grass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge, and the Teachings of Plants (Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions, 2013), 49.

2. Ibid., 53.

3. Ibid., 55.

4. Ibid., 56.

5. Ibid., 58. David Abram offers a similar view of what language might do when he proposes that “the power of language remains, first and foremost, a way of singing oneself into contact with others” — and for him those others include all kind of entities in what he terms “the animate earth.” Abram continues, “language’s primary gift is not to re-present the world around us, but to call ourselves into the vital presence of that world — and into deep and attentive presence with one another.” David Abram, Becoming Animal: An Earthly Cosmology (New York: Pantheon, 2011), 11.

6. An example of this last would be the recent uptick of interest in microbes in the human body and of microflora and microfauna in crop-growing soils. Michael Pollan, in calling attention to the multitude of microbial species that crucially help make up each of our bodies, popularizes some of this research. See, for instance, “Some of My Best Friends are Germs,” New York Times Magazine (May 15, 2013).

7. Forrest Gander and John Kinsella, Redstart (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2012), 11.

8. Joan Retallack, “What Is Experimental Poetry and Why Do We Need It?,” Jacket 32 (April 2007). All quotations from Retallack derive from this essay.

9. J. M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello (New York: Penguin, 2004), 78.

10. See Kate Soper, “Humans, Animals, Machines,” New Formations 49 (Spring 2003): 99–109, for some sensible cautions against exaggerating the value of anti-dualist perspectives or valuing the transgression of boundaries for transgression’s sake. Soper claims that it is anthropocentric not to recognize the extent of the failure of reciprocity between the human and other creatures, and urges respect for the abyss between us.

11. Val Plumwood, Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason (London: Routledge, 2002), 133.

12. Ibid., 142.

13. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello, 80.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 96.

16. Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 435–450. Costello claims Nagel’s “denial that we can know what it is to be anything but one of ourselves … [is] tragically restrictive, restrictive and restricted” (76). Her focus is on the powers of human sympathy, not on the nature of the animal, beyond its being, like the human, an embodied living soul.

17. Nagel’s essay is a refutation of philosophical reductionism as a viable approach to the relation of the mind to the brain, or the mind-body problem. He argues that conscious experience is a widespread experience among species, and that it has a subjective character that is not captured by any of the existing reductive analyses of the mental. He uses bats, as a species recognizably alien to the human, as an example to demonstrate the divergence between subjective and objective conception. He argues that our human ability to extrapolate the inner life of a bat from our own case is limited so that “we believe that bats feel some versions of pain, fear, hunger, and lust, and that they have other, more familiar types of perception besides sonar. But we believe that these experiences also have in each case a specific subjective character, which it is beyond our ability to conceive” (439). The subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, not rendered more accessible by a shift to greater objectivity. Acknowledging that at present we have to rely on the imagination to try to think about the subjective character of experience, Nagel proposes that philosophy should attempt “to form new concepts and devise a new method — an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination” with a goal of at least partially describing “the subjective character of experiences in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of having those experiences” (449).

18. Nagel, “What Is It Like,” 442.

19. Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 132, 134.

20. Ibid., 170, 168.

21. Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman, Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

22. Here is a.rawlings’s full response to the interviewer’s question, “What made you make the connection between moths and sleep disorders?”:

Several coincidences converged … A first connection: the dictionary. On an early November day during my undergrad, I procrastinated writing an essay by thumbing through my dictionary. I was delighted to discover words new to me, mellifluous words that begged to be spoken aloud. I copied down these words: lepidopterist, littoral, macrocarpa, maquette, marram, parasomnia. Around this time, I was in contact with a high school friend of mine. Matt Ceolin was working on his masters in visual art at University of Windsor, and we took the notion to collaborate on a text-and-art project. Matt had a fascination with insects (his final ocad project, entomechology, consisted of 200+ life-size insects handmade from metal and acetate and mounted in barn-board boxes), and I was fascinated, at the time, with sleep and dream studies. The phrase “wide slumber for lepidopterists” occurred during a free-writing session and rattled around in my head for a week. The subjects intersected. What happens when a person obsessed with a subject dreams at night; does the subject matter affect how they think, how they dream, how their bodies process information? I’d been toying with this question for a while, in terms of my own tendency to write poems while dreaming. If a poet writes poems during sleep, how might a lepidopterist work while she sleeps? What effect does intimate examination of insects have on long-term information processing and subconscious behavior? A ’pataphysical question cropped up, too … What happens when you breed the vocabularies and ideas of two disparate subjects together (in my case, lepidoptery and sleep/dream studies)? What does the spawn of incompatible bedfellows resemble? From that perverse breeding, Wide slumber for lepidopterists was born. (“Coach House Books asks a.rawlings a few things about Wide slumber for lepidopterists”; ellipses in original.)

23. a.rawlings, Wide Slumber for Lepidopterists (Coach House Books, 2006), 98. Page numbers for subsequent quotations from this book appear in parentheses in this essay.

24. Thanks to some of my grad students for this insight. Though I no longer recall exactly who pointed this out, these were the wonderful members of a class on contemporary ecopoetry and ecopoetics I taught at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in fall 2010; our joint study of this book was my first extensive encounter with this text.

25. The Northern Pearly-eye that is pictured in the text, unlike many butterfly species, almost never feeds on flowers. A shade-loving butterfly found in wooded areas, it feeds on sap, dung, and mud.

26. In response to my questions about the production of the sound recordings sent to her after I had completed an early draft of this, a.rawlings wrote to me as follows:

To answer your questions, WSfL was imagined first as a visual object. I spent nearly six years crafting the page-bound version of the book. The performed version came once the book was published, and I spent about nine months with it (and working with a team of arts interdisciplinarists to bring the book from page to stage). We staged a “rough draft” of the performance (an hour in length) at Toronto’s Harbourfront Centre in November 2006. Beyond that, I adapted some of the more “sound-poetry” performance strategies to the reading that I’ve since given probably over 300 times in the last five years. This includes the breathy, throat-singing-esque “a hoosh a ha” and the insectile clicks and hisses and buzzes of “xxx y zzz thorax cervix.”

I don’t necessarily always work this way (text first, then performance). One of my current projects has the text partially penned and then performance edging around it (which then can impact the rewriting of the text and also generate new texts from the performance).

As for the recordings on PennSound, they’re comprised solely of my voice, edited using GarageBand to give an approximation of what I’d done in a few performances when working with multiple people. “Prologue” takes the first four pages of WSfL (pps. 7–10) and overlaps them. “Egg 0 Insomnia” features the first segment (pps. 14–17) with just a hint of “deep slumber” (pps. 40–41) and “bruxism” (pps. 68–71). “Apnea” combines the prologue (pps. 7–10) with apnea (p. 24) as its centerpiece and some more ephemeral “singing” sounds which I imagine run throughout this overall quite sound-oriented book. (Email to the author, July 4, 2011.)

My thanks to a.rawlings for allowing me to quote from that correspondence.

27. The book’s thematic investment in staged metamorphosis is marked even via the visual symbols used to identify supplementary sections like the glossary, appendix, and colophon, since these represent the moon at different stages.

28. Email to the author, July 4, 2011. She continues, “I can understand a certain amount of ‘false advertising’ perhaps evident in the back-cover copy at this juncture (and also with the ‘you, you, you’ that peppers the copy when the book has been carefully written solely with ‘us’).” This book is hardly unusual in having the language of the back cover (e.g., “Pattern your breath on the sound of moth wings, magnified and frenzied, as you fight for sleep …”) more designed to draw in readers than to represent the text with accuracy.

29. My perspective here will not be shared by all readers. The only article published to date on this book, Erin Gray’s insightful “‘The good sentences of sleep’: Parasomnia and ’Pataplay in Rawlings and Legris” (Open Letter 13, no. 9 [Summer 2009]: 153–65) focuses on how the text represents sleep as “a sensuous practice and a source of knowledge rather than a passive state of withdrawal” (154). Our readings coincide in Gray’s claim that “sleep is placed at the centre of this interspecies and interdiscursive confrontation in order to interrupt the commonly-held epistemic division between observer and observed” (156), but Gray reads quite differently than I do in terms of a human-focused narrative that “illustrates the violence of sleep disturbances”: “Wide Slumber could be characterized as the transcripted result of a Lepidopterist’s visit to the sleep specialist. But rather than replicate the dry rhetoric of clinician-speak, Rawlings filters the language of sleep science through the unconscious remains of a day spent as laboratory head rather than rat.” Gray sees the Lepidopterist’s body becoming “entrapped in the violence of dyssomnia” (157). For me, the volume has less narrative coherence and is less human-centered, while its violence is as much a potential inherent in language as it is a quality of sleep disturbance.

30. Retallack insists (and I value this insistence) on the importance of gaining knowledge about other species, presumably in large part through the tools of science, as essential to pursuit of a two-way otherness. And here she and a.rawlings at least in some ways part company. The book’s warning against rational science, the most accessible part of the text, is also the most conventional. Where a.rawlings’s project seems to me most interesting is not in its warnings to avoid semanticide but in the strategies it uses to create all sorts of potentially meaningful arrangements of words identifying species and body parts and food sources, its creation of a different kind of ecology.

'It Wasn't a Dream, It Was a Flood'

Approaching realness in Frank Stanford

Frank Stanford is an anachronism in late twentieth-century poetry. Like many of his southern contemporaries, much of his work is driven by a narrative impulse — his poems nearly always have stable, embodied speakers; they tend to use fairly normative syntax; they generally feel grounded in a particular geographic location; and they’re concerned with identity, memory, and depicting external action. However, Stanford also seems to have internalized many of the ideas of his postmodern contemporaries: most significantly, his work is characterized by an attention to the artifice of language, exhibiting an understanding that linearity seeks to project a false order on human experience.

Previous reviews and articles have been quick to typify Stanford’s work as surreal — for example, Lorenzo Thomas refers to Stanford as a “swamprat Rimbaud […] [a] redneck surrealist.”[1] This distinction is unsurprising, given that his poems utilize disjunctive, associative leaps, and they do seem to concern themselves with repressed violence and sexual desire. However, to refer to Stanford as a surrealist — to relegate his work entirely to the world of the imagination — is to overlook its ontological uncertainty, which is ultimately what makes his poems distinctive. Stanford’s work doesn’t seamlessly fit into easy distinctions of realism or surrealism; rather, it blurs the lines between lived experience and the imagination, seeking to complicate the binary between “real” and “unreal.”[2] Stanford adheres to narrative tropes while simultaneously questioning this fundamental tenant of narrative — a sense of dominant realness. This is precisely what makes his work subversive, and it also distinguishes him from many other significant narrative poets in the second half of the twentieth century — such as Philip Levine, for example, who claimed that in his ideal poem, language transparently represents reality: “no words are noticed. You look through them […] just see the people, the place.”[3]

For Stanford, form is never a static container for content. Through his formal choices, his narrative poems project a refracted vision of existence; like Schrödinger’s cat, they permit multiple visions of reality to simultaneously exist. By defying a singular depiction of narrative “realness,” Stanford’s work functions as what Lyn Hejinian refers to as an “open text”: it resists the hierarchy of poet over reader, undoing the text’s status as a monolithic object, and ultimately, encourages reader engagement.[4] By examining Stanford’s work — both in terms of his specific formal choices, as well as the macrostructures which inform his epic poem, The Battlefield Where the Moon Says I Love You — I hope to explore the ways in which Stanford simultaneously subverts and adheres to notions of narrative realism.

Metaphor and refracted narrative

When Stanford compares one object to another, the purpose is not to make the original object more emphatic, or cement its status as real; rather, his metaphors tend to follow the Miltonic tradition of the epic simile, in which “the local action or scene is extended cosmically.”[5] That is, they push the reader in a different direction entirely, expanding outward. But unlike Milton, Stanford often does not return to the original tenor, and thus destabilizes our sense of a singular reality. For example, in the opening lines of “The Singing Knives”: 

Jimmy ran down the road
With the knife in his mouth
He was naked
And the moon
Was a dead man floating down the river[6]

In this passage, it’s nearly impossible to make the leap from tenor to vehicle that metaphors typically demand. Since the moon is in the sky, the narrator is presumably describing a reflection of the moon in the water. However, a reflection of the moon would be stationary, not floating downriver. Whereas metaphors typically make the vehicle subordinate to the tenor, Stanford doesn’t place importance on one image over the other. The metaphor doesn’t seek to help us more fully visualize the image of the moon, but rather, invites us to imagine a dead man literally floating — thus gesturing towards a different narrative thread, and a different vision of reality altogether. In effect, the “real” (i.e., the moon that the narrator initially observes) is given no more primacy than the imagined object (the dead man in the river). Later on in the poem, Stanford compares the moon to dead fish, further destabilizing our sense of realness. It’s as though the artistic act of comparison — the imaginative work of invention, of dreaming — is more significant than unpacking the meaning of the comparison itself. 

When Stanford’s metaphors function most effectively, they echo his tendency to resist a singular narrative route. That is, they gesture towards a fragmented reality wherein separate narratives can occur simultaneously. In one particularly climactic scene in The Battlefield Where the Moon Says I Love You, an undertaker forces Francis, the young narrator, to lie down inside a coffin. In this moment, Stanford enacts a tapestry of metaphor and dream sequence where it’s impossible to distinguish the vehicle from the tenor:

the coffin was like a boat in the pocket of the watery harbor of sleep

 I saw what was left of the light and their fingers crawl

 from under the lid of the boat

 the lame negro had bored out two holes for the plaque

 and I looked out into the night from my portals

 and I heard the harbor master death call lad overboard

 dead wings crisp as the biscuits in the pockets of a man on the run

 I dreamed I was wading in deep water

 I kept reaching down in the mud

 until I found something heavy

 it was the black tennis shoe of the drowned child

 the moonlight was coming through both portals

 I had to shut my eyes[7]


Here, Stanford introduces at least three different overlapping narratives: 1) the scene where Francis is placed inside the coffin, 2) the metaphor of the coffin as a boat in a harbor, and 3) the dream where Francis finds a shoe in the water. Interestingly, we don’t merely shift from one scene to the next, but rather, the instances blur into each other. For example, when the narrator tells us, “I looked out into the night from my portals,” we imagine Francis on a metaphoric ship (with “portals” being read as a pun on “portholes”), but we can just as easily imagine him looking through the holes in the coffin. Two narratives are seemingly occurring simultaneously, and neither of them are given ontological primacy. This is further complicated when the third narrative emerges: “I dreamed I was wading in deep water.” The initial scene with Francis lying in the coffin doesn’t last long enough for him to fall asleep, so perhaps “I dreamed” is merely meant to be a rhetorical gesture. But it’s also possible that this line is meant to occur within the boat scene — and if Francis is in fact dreaming while he lies on the metaphoric boat, the scene where he wades in the water is operating at two levels of remove from the initial “reality” of the coffin scene that Stanford presents. When the narrator tells us that “the moonlight was coming through both portals,” we are again invited to imagine both the coffin and the metaphoric ship. The “porthole”/“portal” pun is significant: it embodies Stanford’s tendency to foreground form, revealing the materiality and malleability of language. Like the pun itself, which refracts into multiple meanings, Stanford effectively creates a portal for the reader, establishing narrative as a mode of transit between disparate visions of reality.

The scene in the coffin is, ultimately, a continuous metaphor. Francis symbolically enters a liminal space — he’s in the void of death while maintaining his status as a living body, and the separate narratives of dream and reality are permitted to blur and intermingle. However, Stanford’s willingness to mix metaphors — to force the reader to question what is literal and what is symbolic — sets him apart from the vast majority of American narrative poets in the second half of the twentieth century. For the most part, many post-WWII narrative poets use continuous metaphor in a relatively predictable way: the poem serves to depicts an external scene — one which is narrative, which is quasi-cinematic in its attempt to visually render reality — and at a certain point, the narrative becomes symbolically evocative, gesturing towards some kind of internal development or revelation. In James Dickey’s “Cherrylog Road,” the narrator waits to meet a woman in a junkyard of abandoned cars. Over the course of the poem, the external thread — what actually happens, in a literal sense — runs parallel to the internal, figurative thread. But in several moments of poetic affect, it gestures towards “deeper” symbolic meaning, and the two threads begin to veer towards each other. The junkyard becomes “more” than just a junkyard — it becomes evocative of death and decay, of the eventual ruin of youthful energy and independence. However, the literal action never fully collapses into the figurative meaning; after all, this would threaten the sense of “realness” that the narrative action establishes, revealing the artifice of language. Thus, Dickey — whose early work is often oriented around these notions of narrative realism — establishes a clear hierarchy between the internal and external, the real and unreal.[8] Indeed, Dickey argued that the quality of a poem was in direct accordance to its sense of realness:

A great deal of poetry has nothing whatever to do with reality: that is, anybody’s reality. It is a verbal construct merely. The good or great poetry, though, has something to do with reality […] The poem should come of reality and go back into it. But it should impose itself on fact.[9]

Dickey’s claim rests on a singular conception of reality, and he establishes a clear binary between reality and the “verbal construct.” Thus, it’s the job of language — and narrative — to define what is real. At least by this definition, narrative creates ontological hierarchies, establishing closure. Stanford’s willingness to dismantle these hierarchies is what distinguishes his poetry from more traditional narrative approaches. By questioning the definition of “realness,” Stanford is effectively shaking the foundation that allows most narrative poetry to conceive a sense of order. Rather than seeking closure, his writing is closer to the vein of Hejinian’s “open text.” It is generative, “unfinished,” demanding reader engagement; rather than reaffirming a singular narrative or establishing a hierarchy, Stanford creates a narrative that challenges a dominant sense of realness, sprawling outward. 

Anaphoric violence

One of the most recognizable formal features of Stanford’s work is his strong use of anaphoric, end-stopped lines. Though this strategy can be found throughout the body of Stanford’s work, it is most prominent in The Battlefield Where the Moon Says I Love You, as well as in his collection The Singing Knives. Typically, these lines are comprised of declarative statements with a simple subject/verb construction (e.g., “I rode the hog / I hugged his neck / I stabbed him seven times”).[10] On a surface level, these anaphoric lines provide a rhythmic pulse and a sense of sonic cohesion, pulling the reader down the page. But more significantly, they serve to “stall” the momentum — the repeated pronoun interrupts the narrative flow as we begin each new line, our focus returning to the subject. From “The Snake Doctors”:

I knelt in the prow with the knife in my mouth

 I looked at myself in the water

 I heard someone singing on the levee


 I was buried in a boat

 I woke up

 I set it afire with the taper

 I watched myself burn

 I reached in the ashes and found a red knife[11]


On one hand, the content of these lines is suggestive of action — of drama and violence. But at the same time, the repetition of “I” induces a sense of stasis, establishing the speaker as a stationary subject; the narrative seems to simultaneously move and sit at a standstill. This tension is further enhanced by the lack of narrative linearity between some of the lines. If traditional narrative movement progresses cinematically, then Stanford’s anaphoric constructions evoke a kind of montage: each line briefly depicts a different startling image, and though we can find some continuity between them, the narrative action doesn’t necessarily play out in a seamlessly linear way.

Distinct from Philip Levine’s vision of a narrative poem that transparently depicts reality, Stanford foregrounds his formal gestures. After all, these lines are not cloaked in complicated syntax, but rather, are stripped down to the basic elements of narrative (character and action), and of a sentence itself (subject and verb). The use of anaphora is, ultimately, a rhetorical tool, and Stanford does not attempt to convince us otherwise. The repetition of “I” can either function as an exaltation of the subject, or as an obliteration. In one sense, it serves as a constant reminder of the poet’s individual agency to perceive, to describe. But through the act of repetition, the anaphora also enacts an evisceration of the author’s ego — it strips the “I” of its meaning, reducing it to a rhetorical stand-in, or perhaps establishing an open medium for experience into which the reader can project the self. (In an anaphoric list near the end of The Battlefield Where the Moon Says I Love You, Stanford seems to gesture in this direction when the narrator tells us, “I forgot I was I” [307]). In either case, Stanford’s anaphoric repetition creates an open text by drawing our attention to the materiality of language—we’re reminded of how it functions not only as a signifier, but as a sonic utterance. In effect, Stanford returns us to the act of making. Rather than presenting a “closed” narrative, Stanford depicts the artistic process in flux.


Stanford’s tendency to resist a dominant narrative plays itself out on a larger scale in his epic poem, The Battlefield Where the Moon Says I Love You. The poem is narrated entirely by a twelve-year-old white boy, Francis Gildart (a kind of alter-ego for Stanford himself), and for the most part, it can be divided into lyric and narrative sections. The narrative elements of this poem — where the external action primarily occurs — mostly take place around the Mississippi Delta, and are often concerned with Francis’ interactions with African American laborers. By virtue of specificity — being rooted in a specific time and place, with a recurring set of characters — these episodes approximate a kind of “realness” relative to the rest of the poem. However, the narrative scenes frequently descend into dream and memory, and it is often difficult to determine what is and is not “real.” More significantly, since the digressions are given as much narrative weight as the seemingly “real” scenes, it is sometimes difficult to decide what’s thematically important.

For example, in one of the earliest episodes of the poem, Francis spends several hundred lines describing his past encounter with Count Hugo Pantagruel, a sideshow performer that Francis met at the circus. The two engage in a pastoral call-and-response singing contest, and the performer shares stories of his revenge against two high school boys who taunted him. The scene is fairly typical of the line that Stanford continually walks between real and unreal: the scene is odd, certainly, but as readers, we don’t yet have a reason to believe that the episode is necessarily imagined or untrue. The narrative then cuts to a scene where Charlie B., the Francis’ family driver, gives Francis a letter from the circus performer. Upon reading the words, Francis enters a mythic, stream-of-consciousness digression:

I thought my eyes would burn holes through the paper Charlie B.
asked me if I let a fart there was that smell I didn’t I closed my eyes I
heard that music I was a dead lion I was a black stallion I disappeared
under the water I was made sure of death the icebergs the wagging tongues (18)

At some point in this lyrical run, Francis remembers that he needs to go to school the next day, and then recalls an instance on a school field trip where he engages in a pseudoerotic encounter with a schoolteacher while swimming in a lake. The two participate in a brief call-and-response passage (not unlike the prior interaction with the circus performer), and the scene suddenly takes a mythic turn — Francis describes her as “a mermaid but with legs / instead of fins,” and it’s revealed that the teacher won’t be returning back to school with Francis and the other students:

she said it’s time to go she wouldn’t be going back on the bus

 she kissed me on the lips it was a french one like falling underwater her lips

 and all the time the moon was behind her hair when she left

 that summer I sent her the drawings of the ships they called me teacher’s pet

 we got a letter and a clipping that summer she drowned in Mississippi

 Charlie B. threw some cold water on me he fanned me with the letter from the freak (21)


In this moment, Stanford breaks some of the most basic rules of cause and effect in narrative: the memory of the encounter with the schoolteacher has very little narrative consequence, the scene isn’t intrinsically necessary to the development of the poem’s “plot,” and the schoolteacher never returns for the rest of the poem. The entire moment is quickly undercut when we return to “reality” — Charlie B. wakes Francis up, and we’re brought back to the primary narrative that Stanford previously established (Francis’ friendship with the sideshow performer). But despite the fact that the scene with the schoolteacher seemingly comes out of nowhere, it amounts to a reimagining of a familiar epic trope: the moment when an otherworldly external force imparts wisdom to the hero. It feels like a pivotal scene in the early stages of The Battlefield Where the Moon Says I Love You, but it doesn’t fit seamlessly into the progression of the narrative.

For more traditional narrative poets, the discursive signal — i.e., the descent into dream or memory — often sets up an expectation that the digression will have some kind of narrative consequence, directly affecting the narrator in the present. The dream sequence is not meant to truly convey an alternate reality; by momentarily deviating from the “real” and then returning to it, the poet is in fact enforcing a singular, dominant depiction of “realness” that exists in stark contrast to the dream. Stanford uses familiar digressive narrative cues — he tells us “I closed my eyes” (18) right before he descends into the dream sequence — but the dream does not reaffirm a singular realist narrative. (In fact, most of the seemingly “real” scenes in The Battlefield Where the Moon Says I Love You are just as unusual as the flights into dream and memory.) Stanford does not present a “completed,” commodified representation of reality, but rather, an open text that denies ontological primacy to any singular narrative thread. We, as the readers, are expected to determine what is and is not important.

The Battlefield Where the Moon Says I Love You defies narrative causal relationships in other ways, as well. For example, a narrative scene will often reach a moment that triggers a digression, leading the narrator into a dream sequence, and the dream sequence will funnel out into a different narrative scene that isn’t necessarily related to the first one. In one passage, early on in the poem, several hundred lines are devoted to describing Francis’ friendship with Mr. Rufus, an elderly farmer. The scene develops some important tensions that remain constant throughout the book (in particular, the greedy, exploitative tendencies of white characters), but the episode ends abruptly with Mr. Rufus’ death. Francis describes burying Mr. Rufus, and respecting his final wish that he fly his flag at half-mast:

I done it right just like he said he wanted the flag flowed at half mast

 down by the river so I done that too he would a really liked that when the

fishermens all took off they hats when they come in of a evening he’d a really

got a kick out of that I can tell you I bet you never even heard of Abraham’s knife

there was only one guy worth a shit who worked in the orphanage

he had an oboe and when this boy put hisself outen his misery the guy

had the decency at least to play Kindertotenlieder on the gramophone (44–45)


The death of Mr. Rufus feels like a climactic moment in the narrative, but instead of reaching some kind of resolution, Stanford quickly digresses into a memory that is only tangentially related. Shortly after these lines, Francis tells us, “I beheld death with my own / eyes there passed the night” (45), and then rapidly shifts into a fairly long list in which he describes his dreams. Some of the statements seem purposefully symbolic or hypothetical (e.g., “[my dreams] like a stolen car coasting down the road with its lights off” [45]), and others statements briefly segue into micronarratives that feel comparatively “real” — for example, “my dreams like red dice you can’t throw down / like somebody’s older sister in Memphis who leaves a crack / in her bedroom door and lets you watch her undress” (46). However, the dream sequence doesn’t mention Mr. Rufus, and refuses any obvious ruminations about the significance of his death. Francis spends several lines personifying his dreams as “dogs” — “with their howling like splices of rope with muddy feet tracking things up / they kill everybody’s chickens they run up side of the big house” (47) — and then the dream sequence eventually funnels out into an 800-line episode wherein a character named BoBo tells a long story about trying to catch a catfish, but is bitten on the leg by a vicious dog. The only obvious sense of continuity between this episode and the dream sequence is the reference to a dog, and by this point, the narrator seems to have entirely forgotten Mr. Rufus. As is often the case in Stanford’s work, associative logic — that is, internal logic, dream logic — takes precedence over the logic of an external narrative.

It’s worth noting that despite the fact that The Battlefield Where the Moon Says I Love You abandons traditional narrative logic, much of the poem is oriented around the act of storytelling itself. Stanford continually alludes to a variety of other epics (particularly Beowulf), and the episode with BoBo is an obvious parody of Moby Dick, evocative of Stanford’s clear desire to simultaneously adopt and reinvent narrative archetypes. If the “traditional” narrative poem presents a singular pathway, The Battlefield Where the Moon Says I Love You presents a web that moves outward in all directions. Not only does Stanford encourage reader engagement, forcing us to triangulate his ruptured narrative logic with our own experiences, he gestures towards the interconnected fabric of literary tradition. In the same way that his use of metaphor pushes towards a refracted, multiplex narrative, each allusion provides an opportunity for the reader to spiral down a disparate narrative pathway. Furthermore, the BoBo episode is a metanarrative — initially, BoBo is the one telling the story, sitting in a store while Francis listens. (Again, with storytelling itself as the subject matter.) Interestingly, towards the end of the passage, the episode ceases to be a “nested” narrative, and the initial narrative frame is abandoned; Francis becomes the narrator, and appears as an active character in BoBo’s story. The episode becomes part of the dominant narrative of The Battlefield Where the Moon Says I Love You, and we never return to the scene in the store where BoBo originally began telling the story. The significance of this development is clear: in Stanford’s work, narrative can never be confined to a frame, but rather, is a mythic entity that always becomes larger than the singular storyteller.

An open narrative

At its best, Stanford’s work is capable of serving as a conduit between disparate aesthetic camps. While his poetry is clearly influenced by modes of postmodern thinking (e.g., it seeks to enable the reader, it rejects binaries, it challenges the notion that language can transparently depict reality, etc.), it isn’t intransitive in the fashion of many of Stanford’s aesthetically radical contemporaries. Additionally, it still achieves Dickey’s claim that poetry should “have something to do with reality.” Stanford’s poetry does not abandon narrative altogether — it only seeks to disrupt the hierarchies that prioritize one narrative over another. As a result, his work has the ability to reveal narrative poetry’s potential within a contemporary context — a context which has been permanently altered by the rise of mass media and the legacy of postmodernism, which can no longer abide by the notion of a “universal” cultural narrative.

In calculus, one can approach infinity, but never reach it. Stanford approaches realness in a similar way. Unlike “traditional” narrative poets who view realness as a static, accessible concept, Stanford’s poetry pushes in a narrative direction, gesturing towards the real, while simultaneously acknowledging that reality is limitless.



1. Lorenzo Thomas, “Finders, Losers: Frank Stanford’s Song of the South.”

2. Stanford himself refuted the “surrealist” label. In an interview, he describes these allegations of surrealism as “miscarriages of imagination, misconceptions of reality — due to the lack of perception of it.” Matthew Henriksen, “‘Keep an Eye on the Moon, Your Poetry’: Towards a Biography of the Poet Frank Stanford,” Fulcrum 7 (2007): 366.

3. Marjorie Perloff, Radical Artifice: Writing Poetry in the Age of Media (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 43.

4. Lyn Hejinian, The Language of Inquiry (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 43.

5. Philip Hobsbaum, “The Criticism of Milton’s Epic Similes,” Studia Neophilologica 36, no. 2 (1964): 220.

6. Frank Stanford, The Light the Dead See (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1991), 3.

7. Frank Stanford, The Battlefield Where the Moon Says I Love You (Barrington: Lost Roads Press, 2000), 102. All subsequent references to this work are cited by page numbers in the text.

8. Interestingly, Dickey and Stanford mutually appreciated each other’s work. Stanford claimed that “some of [Dickey’s] poems are among the best written” (See interview with Irving Broughton, reprinted from The Alsop Review). In a blurb, Dickey described Stanford’s work as “rough-cut, vital, primitive in the best sense, the poetry of Frank Stanford forces us to make essential encounters. There are few poets who can do this, but I challenge anyone to read Stanford’s work and remain unchanged.”

9. James Dickey, Sorties (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), 98.

10. Stanford, The Light the Dead See, 26.

11. Ibid., 27.

The severity and sympathy of Ezra Pound

A newly translated 1928 letter to René Taupin

Blustering, condescending shorthand. Unflinching, self-righteous conviction. These hallmarks of poet Ezra Pound’s prose can be found throughout the seemingly impossible volume of his private correspondence. His jumbled and effusive style can be daunting to would-be readers. One such letter, written in 1928 to academic and critic René Taupin, had until now been even more elusive to English-speaking readers, as Pound wrote it in Taupin’s native French. The letter has been previously published, in its original French, in Letters of Ezra Pound: 1907–1941.

This author’s new translation, which follows this essay, illuminates the poet’s views on modernism, the general concept of intellectual influence, and other curiosities from his early twentieth-century vie litteraire. The letter was prompted by Taupin’s analysis of Imagism, the avant-garde movement Pound, an American expatriate, had helped found in London after the dawn of the new century. Taupin, then chairman of romance languages at Hunter College, asserted that Imagism was almost inseparable from earlier French Symbolists (an argument which would culminate in his 1929 book, The Influence of French Symbolism on Modern American Poetry). For Pound, Taupin’s assertions belittled what he believed to be the unique accomplishments of his own literary movement.

Pound’s letter to Taupin serves as his rebuttal. Due to Pound’s scattered, almost stream-of-conscious writing style, passages of the letter are dissected here to better follow his logic, beginning with his opening:

Of course, if you permit an inversion of time, in some Einsteinian relativity, it would seem likely to you that I’d received the idea of the image from the poems of Hilda Doolittle, written after that idea was received. See the dates of the various books.

To lay the base for his argument, Pound painstakingly makes a case for a less direct influence on Imagism from modern French writers, asserting that he and his cohorts arrived at their conclusions more or less independently. He describes trademarks of his own style as “[v]ery severe self-examination  —  and intolerance for all the mistakes and stupidities of French poets.”

Pound goes on to trace the general flow of poetic innovation from French writers of the late nineteenth century through Symons, Baudelaire, and Verlaine. “Certainly progress in the poetic technique,” he admits. But it is from Arthur Rimbaud that Pound traced the origin of modernist writing, a fact in general consensus today.

That which Rimbaud reached by intuition (genius) in some poems, created via (perhaps?) conscious aesthetic  —  I do not want to ascribe him any unjust achievement  —  but for all that I know. I’m doing an aesthetic more or less systematic  —  and could have named certain poems of Rimbaud as example. (Yet also some poems of Catullus.)

And it is certain that apart from some methods of expression  —  Rimbaud and I have but a point of resemblance. But almost all of the experimentation, poetic technique of 1830-up to me  —  was made in France.

Experimentation perhaps, but not progress, continues Pound in signature frankness.

Since Rimbaud, no poet in France has invented anything fundamental. There were interesting modifications, almost-inventions, mere applications.

Pound pointedly disassociates himself from direct French influence, positing instead shared influence from earlier achievements, going all the way back to the ancients. Here he begins to question the theoretical limits of poetic influence between the two languages.

With all modesty, I think I was already oriented before being familiar with the modern French poets. That I took advantage of their technical inventions (Like Edison or any other man of science benefits from discoveries). There’s also the ancients: Villon, the Troubadours.

It is likely that France has learned from Italy and Spain. England from France but that France cannot absorb anything or learn from the English.

Does one English language exist to express the lines of Rimbaud? I’m not saying a translator capable of this, but if this language exists? (As a means)  —  and since when?

Of that balance, you must find the right relationship  —  at least on the technical side.

Not to completely dismay the reader with an endless list of indictments, Pound does at points rein in his rhetoric. He concedes that the seed of the French modernists must be somewhere present, albeit faintly, in his own work and that of the Imagists. To punctuate, he makes reference to an idiom from Taupin’s native French.

But indeed: the idea of the image must be “some thing” of the French symbolists via T. E. Hulme, via Yeats, via Symons, via Mallarmé. As bread owes something to the wheat winnower, etc. So much happening in between.

I believe that the influence of Laforgue (from Eliot) or Maupassant on America often came second, third, fifteenth hand.

Justifying any blatant offence at his bald treatment of French literature, Pound inserts a postscript mid-message, as though he thought perhaps at that point to give it a rest before continuing.

P.S. I think that my severity toward the reputation of French literature is preferable to the effusions of Francophiles or parasites who seek to pass of bad French poets as top rung. We build a more stable glory by aspiring to introduce solid authors (as many as the number they ram in, thrown there into puddles, swells, etc.).

Thus Pound finds, or perhaps seeks, common cause for a higher caliber of contemporary letters. For all Pound’s pains to set the record straight, a reader risks losing sight of his more benevolent excuse for anything borrowed, consciously or otherwise, from other writers. At these points, the poet reveals himself in a manner often lost in his blunt tirades: as an American genuinely concerned by the state of arts and letters in his homeland.

Sometimes we pick up, or are suddenly “influenced” by an idea  —  other times fighting against barbarism, we seek support  —  arming ourselves with the prestige of a civilized man, and recognized, to fight American imbecility.

I have quoted Gourmont, and I just gave a new version of Confucius’ Ta Hio, because I find there formulations of ideas that appear to me (potentially) useful for civilizing America.

Finally, the poet transcends the argument in question, pontificating more universal truths regarding intellectual influence and the spread of ideas. It would take someone like Pound, who in fact saw himself on a sort of literary crusade against decadence, to distinguish deliberate association with just cause as being nobler than even unconscious imitation. As he explains to Taupin, “I rather revere good sense over originality.”

Full translated text: A letter from Ezra Pound to René Taupin

Vienna, May 1928.

Dear Sir: Of course, if you permit an inversion of time, in an Einsteinian relativity, it would seem likely to you that I’ve received the idea of the image from the poems of H.D., written after that idea was received. See the dates of the various books.

I have written and published so much on the subject — and I cannot write without a typewriter.

In 1908–9 in London (before the debut of H.D.): circle T. E. Hulme, Flint, D. Fitzgerald, me, etc. Flint, much French-ified, never arriving at condensation.
 {concentration/ having center} French Symbolists > the “90’s” in London.

Contemporary meaning ~ equivalence

Technique of T. Gautier in “Albertus.”

Beside all that, I have printed material. See Pavannes et Divisions and Instigations. Can one be the cause? — here now or in Rapallo in July?

English poetry (the same language < French roots Consider elements of the language: “Anglo-Saxon”
 Latin (church  —  law) Prin.

2nd French 1400

Scientific Latin
 greek. . “
 French influence on me  —  relatively late.

Reports French > English. via Arthur Symons etc. 1890. Baudelaire, Verlaine, etc.

F. S. Flint special number Poetry Review, London in 1911 or 1912. Strong difference between Flint: (tolerance for all the mistakes and stupidities of French poets.) Me  —  Very severe self-examination  —  and intolerance.

Would-be “Imagists”  —  “bunch of groups” too lazy to support severity of my first “Do not’s” and of the 2nd clause of the manifesto “Use no superfluous word”

Certainly progress in the poetic technique. — France leading the way. Gautier “Albertus” England 1890–1908. That which Rimbaud reached by intuition (genius) in some poems, built in (?? maybe) conscious aesthetic — I do not want to claim an unfair glory — but for all that I know. I’m doing an aesthetic more or less systematic — and I could have named certain poems of Rimbaud as example. (But also some poems of Catullus.)

And it is certain that apart from some methods of expression — Rimbaud and I have but a point of resemblance. But almost all of the experimentation, poetic technique of 1830-up to me  —  was made in France.

Actually “poets,” that’s another matter. There was Browning (even Swinburne), Rosetti, E. Fitzgerald, who interested themselves more in topics on the matter of new expression than in the processes of expression.

You have in Poetry, Chicago, (1912, I believe) my first citation of contemporary French. The era of unanimism.

With all modesty, I think I was oriented before being familiar with the modern French poets. That I took advantage of their technical inventions (Like Edison or any other man of science benefits from discoveries). There’s also the ancients: Villon, the Troubadours.

You will find in my The Spirit of Romance, published 1910, that which I Knew before addressing French moderns.

It is likely that France has learned from Italy and Spain. England from France and that France cannot absorb anything or learn from the English. (? Problem —  not dogma.)

Another dissociation to make: sometimes we learn, or suddenly “influence”
 an idea  —  other times fighting against barbarism, we seek support — arming ourselves with the prestige of a civilized man, and recognized, to fight American imbecility.

I have quoted Gourmont, and I just gave a new version of Confucius’ Ta Hio, because I find there formulations of ideas that appear to me useful for civilizing America (tentative). I rather revere good sense over originality (that of Rémy de G., that of Confucius).

To return to the subject: I hardly believe the French poetry must have been rooted by a good English or American poetry, but the technique of French poets was certainly in a state to serve in the education of poets of my tongue  —  from the time of Gautier until 1912.

Of the essential poets, having this preparation, it occurs time and again in Gautier, Corbiere, Laforgue, Rimbaud. Since Rimbaud, no poet in France has invented anything fundamental.

There were interesting modifications, almost-inventions, applications. (See Instigations or my number of Little Review on French Poets.)

I think Cocteau, who you glorify as metteur-en-scene and neglect as very good minor poet, did something to free the French language of its cuffs (Poésies 1920). That’s for the French language —  utterly useless for us who write in American —  Meaning: invention of local utility.

Perhaps you will be an instrument of thought. If you ask yourself the question.

Does one English language exist to express the lines of Rimbaud? I’m not saying a translator capable of this, but if this language exists? (As a means)  —  and since when?

Of this balance, you must find the right relationship — at least on the technical side.

If you’d like, you can send me your study before printing it and then I could indicate the differences of view, or the errors (if any would be there) of fact, minor chronology, etc.

P.S. I think that my severity toward the reputation of French literature is preferable to the effusions of Francophiles or parasites who seek to pass of bad French poets as top rung. We build a more secure glory, by wanting to introduce solid authors (as many as the number they ram in, thrown there into puddles, swells, etc.)

I think Eliot, whose first poems showed influence of Laforgue, has less respect for Laforgue than the respect I have for Laforgue.

Gautier I have studied and revere. What you take as influence of Corbiere is probably directly influenced by Villon.

[Villon] by Tailhade superficially

[Tailhade] by Jammes !! I hope not.

As for the sonnets? Catullus, Villon, Guido Cavalcanti, some Greeks who were not Pindar, some Chinese.

Und ich überhaupt stamm aus Browning. Why deny his father?

Symbol?? I have never read “the ideas of symbolists” on that subject.

In my youth I had maybe received some idea received from the Middle Ages. Dante, St. Victor, God knows who, revisions via Yeats (the latter full of unknown symbolism  —  via Boète, French symbolism, etc.)  —  but I do not how to uncover the traces.

I recall nothing of Gourmont’s on the subject of the “symbol.”

My reformation:
 1. Browning  —  devoid of superfluous words
 2. Flaubert  —  the precisely correct word, presentation or observation
Metric reform more profound  —  as of 1905 we began, before knowing French moderns.

I “launched” the Imagistes (anthology Des Imagistes; but I must be dissociated from the decadence of Imagistes, beginning with their subsequent anthologies (even the first of these anthologies)).

But indeed: the idea of the image must be “some thing” of the French symbolists via T. E. Hulme, via Yeats, via Symons, via Mallarmé. As bread owes something to the wheat winnower, etc. So much happening in between.

But also to Catullus (not Mendès)  —  Q. V. Catullus  —  who had a strong concept net from the preceding several thousand years.

But my knowledge of French modern poets and my propaganda for these poets in America (1912–17–23) came in a general sense after the inception of Imagism in London (1908–13–14). I believe that the influence of Laforgue (from Eliot) or Maupassant on America often came second, third, fifteenth hand.

Rhetoric of the everyday

Lorine Niedecker’s 'Lake Superior'

“Looking Out to the River,” Lorine Niedecker, Blackhawk Island, WI, March 1966 (image courtesy of the Fort Atkinson Historical Society).

In “Lake Superior,” a poem of historical rumination on the Great Lakes region, derived by Lorine Niedecker from a 1966 vacation journal, there is a brief critical turn amidst appreciations of the landscape and compact accounts of seventeenth-century explorer Pierre-Esprit Radisson, who called Lake Superior “a laborinth of pleasure.” Niedecker draws the reader’s attention to “Iron the common element of earth” as well as “basalt the common dark / in all the Earth.” She features the commonwealth as a geologically coherent reality: “In every living thing,” she writes, “is stuff that once was rock // In blood the minerals / of the rock.” But her salvo, a judgment of human actions on the wild depiction of that landscape, darkens the mood of the poem, and shifts the scale from natural processes of land formation, observed in vivid descriptions of retreating glaciers and “peaks of volcanic thrust,” to that of moral consternation. The brief segment I refer to is simply called “Wild Pigeon,” and it goes like this:

Did not man
       maimed by no
mash the cobalt
       and carnelian
                            of that bird[1

“That bird,” the now-extinct passenger pigeon, enters the poem as an attitude of explicit irony, judging the features of what Niedecker called a commonwealth next to shared mineral distinctions of the region. The mood, more precisely, indicates a morose acknowledgement of human intrusion on natural processes that include millions of years of earthy, geological compression.

I want to discuss this poem because I’m interested in how mood and emotion so often inform or prepare judgments, offering stances toward the world. The language game of Niedecker’s poetry, to borrow Ludwig Wittgenstein’s term for the uses of language in ordinary contexts, takes the experience of the everyday as ground for attention. The Objectivist tradition of writing inspired by William Carlos Williams, Louis Zukofsky, and others, along with contemporary authors like Lyn Hejinian and Joanne Kyger, continues this use of poetry as a “language of inquiry” into the everyday experiences that compose society. The mundane and our many moods in it sustain frameworks of attention in rhetorical encounters that underlie values, or that challenge us to amend certain attitudes or worldviews. Rhetoric, far from being a mere use of figures and tropes as it is often assumed, shapes inquiry and determines modes of truth seeking. By truth I mean the dynamic actions that make the world known. Poetry, similarly, in this Objectivist mode, and in Niedecker’s exemplary “Lake Superior,” shows how individual values and beliefs can be contained within the larger criteria of history and natural science.

Niedecker delivers an enthusiastic concentration of language on objects of everyday experience. Her work suggests not only the temporal and spatial scales that defined the geographic regions of her investigation; it also shows how attitudes, enthusiasms, values, beliefs, and worldviews can be conveyed in everyday language. So much of our communication is informed by phatic utterances, gestures, confirmations or denials of feeling, and occasions to disclose worldviews by way of specific attitudes. Poetry, as Walter Jost argues, “makes evident a way of life.”[2] And a way of life often can be messy, unstable, careless, even as in some of the best poetry we find evidence of persuasion, challenge, and acknowledgement of new positions toward the world. A kind of critical flexibility is required to purchase a hold on any given poem. An author like Niedecker challenges us to measure our personal interests and concerns within what Douglas Crase calls the “evolutional sublime,”[3] a temporal scale that is vast, and in which the meaning of our beliefs and values remains to be discovered.

Niedecker also affords an opportunity to consider the guiding force of mood in everyday experience. I take mood as an extensive presence of an attitude, or conveyance of a belief system or worldview that connects more largely to pathos. From neuroscientific studies we discover that emotion, broadly, can be defined as “episodic, relatively short-term, biologically-based patterns of perception, experience, physiology, action, and communication that occur in response to specific physical and social challenges and opportunities.”[4] Martha Nussbaum in her recent work on political emotions refers to “cognitive appraisals” as important disclosures of emotive capacities, and she considers how they are shaped, invited into participation through the emotional experiences of public life.[5] Nussbaum looks closely at literature and other arts to understand political emotions because poetry is especially important as a mode of inquiry; it accepts the necessity of mood to make sense of experience. Mood establishes a particular kind of bond between author and reader. It conveys how we accept more dominant attitudes or worldviews, or how we deny their influence on our lives. Emerson, as far back as 1832, observed how moods “attend me through every sentence of my writing, & determine the form of every clause.”[6] If, as Jeffrey Walker argues, “rhetorical transactions are immanent in the way things are,” it is often our feelings that first inform how we respond to, and give body to, the various worldviews we encounter.[7]

In his essay “Thinking of Emerson,” Stanley Cavell describes how “moods must be taken as having at least as sound a role in advising us of reality as sense experience has.” Mood negotiates “the ways in which human experience is always already mediated by interest, value, and physical embodiment.”[8] The significant presence of mood in the physicality of experience shifts attention from metaphysical ideals to “everyday life, and the medium of its appearance in ordinary language.”[9] Whether we use terms like Wittgenstein’s “language games” or Kenneth Burk’s dramatistic notion of situated discourse, ordinary uses of language often are shaped by compelling moods that can determine spontaneous forms of judgment expressed in the many facets of the everyday.[10] Quotidian experience, moreover, consists of concepts, arguments, evaluations, and decisions that are negotiated in a practical discourse (phronesis) that often “shows forth,” Jost’s translation of “epi-deixis.”[11] Such showing forth in poetry can instruct attitudes and guide judgments in the condensed play of intellect and mood that heightens understanding of rhetoric’s practical uses.

So how does Lorine Niedecker discover a particular kind of language game in her poem “Lake Superior”? Her interest in geology, history, and geography enables a “showing forth” of Lake Superior that does more than merely document a vacation: it examines cultural and regional history, reflects on relationships between human perspective and geologic time, and enacts judgments that clarify positions established by guiding moods of travel. Such moods are established through objective encounters with “great granite / gneiss and the schists,”[12] and by her reading of Pierre-Esprit Radisson (“long hair, long gun // Fingernails pulled out / by Mohawks”).[13] Niedecker’s relation of the road trip detours from the high modernist investment in “epiphanic events”: instead, her writing compels curiosity, deepening a reader’s capacity for observing the “the centrality of ‘attunement’ and ‘voice’” in an experience of the ordinary.[14] This shift from the modernist notion of epiphansis, a unique and personal manifestation, toward epideixis indicates Niedecker’s rhetorical appreciation for the persuasive and tactile delivery of poetry: the focus is not located in the profound experience of the individual, but on the persuasive social presentation and invitation to a community of readers who encounter the domain of individuality established through poetry.

In this attunement, Niedecker uses what Kenneth Burke called a “qualitative formal progression.”[15] That is, her writing proceeds by way of echo, compression, foreshadowing, and densely refined sequences of linguistic exchange. Lake Superior and its environs mediate a profound discovery between the poet and her words, and between the industrial stresses of 1966 with the abundance of life forms that had proliferated throughout the region. She writes:

Iron the common element of earth
in rocks and freighters

Sault Sainte Marie — big boats
coal-black and iron-ore-red
topped with what white castlework

The waters working together
Gulls playing both sides[16]

Niedecker’s language, like the mineral world, shifts, hardens, transforms. A sense of the impermanence and constantly changing features of landscape pervade “Lake Superior” with what Lyn Hejinian describes as “the measure of felt thought.”[17] A sense of fluidity navigates Niedecker’s attention to land as well as words, and human activity moves through the larger duration of this geologic time. The Canadian Shield on the north side of Lake Superior reveals some of the most ancient rock to be seen in the world. Three-million-year-old granite is exposed there. On this the French traders and Friars established European ways of plunder and prayer. Niedecker does not praise these acts as heroic deeds; nor does she critically revise the ventures of France in the New World: instead, she observes the features of religion and statecraft as they absorb into these geological realities. She writes:

Through all this granite land
the sign of the cross

Beauty: impurities in the rock


And at the blue ice superior spot
priest-robed Marquette grazed
azoic rock, hornblende granite
basalt the common dark
in all the Earth

And his bones of such is coral
raised up out of his grave
were sunned and birch bark-floated
to the straits[18]

Later in the poem, Niedecker moves attention from historical activity to the action of language use, following etymological next to geological nomenclatures. She writes

Ruby of corundum
lapis lazuli
from changing limestone
glow-apricot red-brown
carnelian sard

Greek named
kicked up in America’s
you have been in my mind
between my toes

Niedecker’s love of rock is evident in the accompanying journal she kept of her 1966 vacation. The mood is more matter-of-fact, and conveys the curiosity and liveliness of travel. “The agate,” she says in an early entry, “was first found on the shores of a river in Sicily and named by the Greeks. In the Bible (Exodus), this semiprecious stone was seen on the priest’s breastplate.”[20] Between her poem and the accompanying journal, we can see how Niedecker’s communicative practice cohered as if it were a kind of sedimentation: her everyday is absorbed with history, science, literature, and language. In her enthusiasms for place and words we encounter judgments and attitudes that inform our own relationships to notions of commonwealth, and what we value in our personal holdings as well as our public surroundings.

Let me conclude with Davida Charney’s observation of how poetry conducts relationships and performs personal crises in public.[21] If, as Jost argues, there is “an ‘epideictic’ rhetorical disclosure that underlies all argument and that invites us to identification in the first place,”[22] then poets like Niedicker, and the authors of the Psalms Charney discusses, perform strategies of discovery and embody relationships between persons and the environments that give them shape. The strength of the persuasive appeal is carried through dominant moods and attitudes that orient language to worldviews that may instruct future actions in the world. If nothing else, we are readied by our attunement to poetry to bear words and judgments that enhance our capacities with what Burke called “equipment for living.”[23] Niedecker’s exemplary poem to a regional landscape provides insight into the importance of epideictic discourse that gives shape and shows forth “truths” and values that distinguish our convictions and enlarge our abilities to experience the possibilities of discovery belonging to the everyday.



1. Lorine Niedecker, Collected Works (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 232–35.

2. This statement is from notes taken during a presentation by Walter Jost (Sixteenth Biennial Rhetoric Society of America Conference, San Antonio, TX, May 23, 2014).

3. Douglas Crase, “Niedecker and the Evolutional Sublime,” in Niedecker, Lake Superior (Seattle/New York: Wave Books, 2013), 28.

4. Dacher Keltner and James. J. Gross, “Functional Accounts of Emotions,” in Cognition and Emotion 13, No. 5 (1999): 468.

5. Martha C. Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 17.

6. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Journals and Letters,” in Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 17.

7. This statement is from notes taken during a presentation by Jeffrey Walker (Sixteenth Biennial Rhetoric Society of America Conference, San Antonio, TX, May 23, 2014).

8. Stanley Cavell, “Thinking of Emerson,” in Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003), 11.

9. Walter Jost, Rhetorical Investigations: Studies in Ordinary Language Criticism (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 101.

10. For more on Burke’s notion of dramatism and its significance for rhetorical studies, see Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960 [1945]). 

11. Jost, Rhetorical Investigations, 167.

12. Niedecker, Collected Works, 236.

13. Ibid., 232.

14. Jost, Rhetorical Investigations, 101.

15. Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968 [1931]), 124–25.

16. Niedecker, Collected Works, 232.

17. Lyn Hejinian, The Language of Inquiry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 133.

18. Niedecker, Collected Works, 233.

19. Ibid., 234.

20. Lorine Niedecker, “Lake Superior Country, a Journal,” in Lake Superior, 7.

21. I take this insight from statements presented by Davida Charney (Sixteenth Biennial Rhetoric Society of America Conference, San Antonio, TX, May 23, 2014). See also Charney’s book chapter “Taking a Stance toward God: Rhetoric in the Book of Psalms” in Jewish Rhetorics: History, Theory, Practice, ed. Michael Bernard-Donals and Janice W. Fernheimer (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2014), 1–15.  

22. Jost, Rhetorical Investigations, 110.

23. Kenneth Burke, “Literature as Equipment for Living,” in Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 293–304.

Introducing PennSound Italiana

Curated by Jennifer Scappettone

The twenty-one poets represented on PennSound Italiana.

After many months of planning and labor, we are delighted to launch a new sector of PennSound: PennSound Italiana, devoted to contemporary Italian poetry. We seek over the course of this ongoing project to offer a broad sense of the field, filling in the substantive gaps in global access to Italian poetry (as both written and sonic text — even within Italian borders), and expanding awareness of its range of practitioners, with an emphasis on marginalized and experimental voices of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It is an effort — a unique one, in our reckoning — to “liberate” the spectrum of Italian poetry for as broad a public as possible through audio and video recordings, given that the publishing industry and the translation market are endangered and/or blinkered enough to condemn a significant swath of both historical and contemporary innovation to oblivion. As such, this live archive extends the task of PennSound writ large.

Some highlights of the first edition, to whet the curiosity of listeners:

Five episodes of “Con l’ascia dietro le spalle: 10 anni senza Amelia Rosselli” (“With the hatchet at our backs: Ten years without Amelia Rosselli”), produced by Andrea Cortellessa, and containing rare interviews with Rosselli and with other poets and critics, including Antonella Anedda, Biancamaria Frabotta, Emmanuela Tandello, and Lucia Re;

Salnitro (Saltpeter), a historic 1976 sound poem produced in the studios of RAI by Milli Graffi, member of the Tam Tam group and current editor-in-chief of the experimental literary journal Il verri. Of this piece, Graffi writes, “I understood what my sound poem could be when I listened to Schwitters’ Ursonate recited by Giuliano Zosi: half an hour of uninterrupted pressurized vocalizations, strongly rhythmical, and exemplary. For me, it was the path of the first avant-garde, and one had to depart from there. An absurd tercet of hendecasyllables came to my mind in a flash, and I prepared a rigorous plan of fragmentation, defined on every page of the score with tempos and directions for vocal execution … Invited to take part in the Audiobox broadcast directed by Pinotto Fava, I realized the eighteen minutes of Saltpeter in the RAI studios of Rome in three days of rehearsal with the technologies of that time. From that point, using the cassette that RAI gave me, I composed Saltpeter by improvising with my live voice and redoubling the effect by overlaying it onto the voice recorded on cassette. With the lights out, I had an animated play of liquids that Giovanni Anceschi had given me, and which made for a good “saltpeter” effect, projected onto a screen at my back. I dressed all in white to become an integral part of the imaginary grotto.” 

Soundscapes by Tommaso Ottonieri and electronic musician Martux-M that were published with Le strade che portano al Fùcino, a 2007 collection of prose poetry charting the plains of Telespazio, a multinational satellite services company based outside of Rome that “covers the whole space market value chain,” in acts of code-twisting between globalized standard Italian and dialect;

Di colpo la parola smarrimento” (“Suddenly the word disorientation”), from Sicilian poet and historical novelist Maria Attanasio’s Amnesia del movimento delle nuvole (Amnesia of the Movement of Clouds), with “en-face” recordings from Carla Billitteri’s translation published by Litmus Press in 2014;

book,” a poem composed in English from Marco Giovenale’s Anachromisms, winner of the 2013 Ahsahta Press Chapbook Prize;

Sonata n. 2 per Graphemium, a video composition by Laura Cingolani, poet, musician, singer, performer, and gutsy heir of the neo-avant-garde (executed with the help of Daniele Salvati, electronic musician and sound researcher): Laura writes that “Each grapheme typed in on the keyboard of the PC is associated with a note: the text is literally played, and each execution can be carried out with a different sound, timbre and instrument”;


Lettere alla reinserzione culturale del disoccupato (with a pun on Letters toward and Letters to the cultural reinsertion of the unemployed), based on the 2013 book by Paris-based author/editor Andrea Inglese: “field recordings” made in various cities, and mixed by Stefano Delle Monache.

We hope that providing the sounds of these texts to a greater public — including a public that is not conversant in Italian — will enable an altered state of listening for what exceeds the contours of understanding defined by national languages — and seduce listeners into the concord (or discord) of tuning. Such states are made possible in a space between bodies that Antena founders Jen Hofer and John Pluecker ask us to inhabit critically and expansively in their “Manifesto for Ultratranslation”: “Moments of untranslatability lead directly to untranslation, undertranslation, overtranslation, an excess, extranslation, a lack, a limit, an excrescence, an impropriety, distranslation, retranslation, multitranslation, a mistake, a conflict, dystranslation. An understanding of the potential in not understanding.”

Subsequent editions of PennSound Italiana, already underway, will include historic recording sessions by Giulia Niccolai and Paul Vangelisti; work by contemporary poets Antonella Doria, Angela Passarello, Laura Pugno, Giovanna Frene, and Michele Zaffarano; and new unpublished poems by Milo De Angelis, with translations by Susan Stewart and Patrizio Ceccagnoli. Stay on the line for these and other exciting developments!