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The old brick city by the Atlantic

John Wieners's Boston haunts

John Wieners at the Beacon Hill Burger King, 1997. Photo by Jim Dunn.

For almost thirty years, John Wieners lived meagerly and humbly in the same apartment in Beacon Hill; 44 Joy Street, Suite 10 as he called it. Joy Street, originally called Belknap Lane, named after the Colonial Apothecary, Dr. John Joy, with its history of livery stables, was his home. Wieners became somewhat more reclusive in his later years, but he was still a fixture on the streets of Beacon Hill, seen often trudging tragic-comically through the streets with his bag draped around his shoulder, and a cigarette in his hand, carrying himself with a certain muted elegance. The sad fact of these last eight years is that chance sightings and encounters with the man in his world, in this world, can never happen again. Beacon Hill, a neighborhood that has changed drastically since his death, seems not to notice or to care that a great poet was ever among them or even more poignantly that he has left.

Like a ghost, Wieners can be glimpsed in the emptiness of specific places left behind. There are many places to me where I can conjure up a spark of his spirit just by walking his Beacon Hill streets.

One of the first places Wieners and I met for lunch was at the John W. McCormack Federal building cafeteria at One Ashburton Place across from the State Capitol at the top of Bowdoin Street. The cafeteria was on one of the higher floors of the building and was easy to access by elevator. In the ten years I knew Wieners, we only visited it a few times, but the memory of that lunch is very clear. I asked him if he missed Black Mountain College and North Carolina. He casually remarked, “One does not fully appreciate the landscape of a place until they have long left it.” That line has stayed with me particularly through the years. He also maintained that he once worked at the McCormack Cafeteria bussing the tables. Whether it was true or metaphoric never mattered to me. He wistfully remarked “They don’t bus these tables anymore.” There were other cafeterias where we would lunch; a state administration building in Government Center, and the Massachusetts General Hospital cafeteria to name a few.

After lunch we stood on the landing behind the McCormack building where Federal Employees stood blankly around us enjoying cigarettes in the afternoon sun. I made a comment that amused him and he casually remarked, “My cheekbones get high from you.” I told him that was such a great line I would like to use it in a poem. He dismissively changed his tone, replying “Oh, I wish I never said that.”

Once a week we would meet together to share the same routine. First, we would visit the lobby of Massachusetts General Hospital. Wieners’s cousin Walter had set up a disbursement plan for a stipend of cash to be delivered by a male nurse, Brian, who was close friends with Walter. Wieners and I would wait patiently each week in the busy lobby of MGH amidst the flow of humanity, for Brian to arrive with an envelope. Often we’d have lunch in the hospital cafeteria. A few times we would walk up the steps of the original MGH building to visit the Ether Dome.

The Charles Plaza located at the bottom of Joy Street was Wieners’s lifeline to his weekly goods; cigarettes, percogesic pills, and his meager supply of weekly groceries. At that time, the Plaza had a Burger King, a CVS drugstore, a Brigham’s, and a Stop & Shop supermarket. We would walk across Blossom Street to Charles Plaza to have lunch at the Burger King. Wieners would always order the same thing — a plain hamburger, french fries and a coke. On the hamburger he would put nothing except multiple packets of salt. We’d sit down to a fine Burger King meal amidst the lunchtime crowd of Beacon Hill. Once, a publisher and admirer of Wieners planned on meeting him for lunch. The publisher showed up on Joy Street with a single rose as a gift and offered to take Wieners anywhere in the city for lunch. He suggested Harvard Gardens. Harvard Gardens, which figured prominently in Wieners’s poem “Chophouse Memories,” where he sat reading poetry in the humid summer evening of Beacon Hill, as Frank O’Hara and Jack Spicer wept in the “incipient rain and electric-charged air.” It has been a Beacon Hill institution for over forty years. Wieners had gone there many times throughout the years, but he never went there in the time I knew him. Wieners thought about the publisher’s offer for a moment and deferred making a decision until we crossed over Cambridge Street. Wieners suggested since we were so close to Charles Plaza we should just go to Burger King. The publisher was deflated. He insistently reiterated his intention to buy lunch anywhere Wieners desired in the city. I knew where we were going from the moment we stepped out onto the street. The three of us sat in the Burger King. The publisher was baffled and mortified that his date with Wieners’s was less than he dreamed it would be. I sat there next to Wieners, the awkward third wheel of the date. Wieners presided over the impaired proceedings, answering questions courteously, completely content to be exactly where he was.

We’d also visit the CVS pharmacy for three specific items that were more important to him than sustenance. He would pick up, religiously every week, a pack of Kool cigarettes, a box of Percogesic pills, and a Primatene Mist inhaler. The Percogesic pills were over-the-counter pain relievers. For some reason Wieners had to have a refill of that specific brand every week. The Primatene Mist inhaler helped him breathe but it probably gave him a kick as well. He would stand outside the drugstore with a cigarette in one hand and the Primatene Mist inhaler in the other. After each drag on his cigarette, he’d immediately take two puffs on the inhaler, which would always make me laugh. “They kind of cancel each other out, don’t they?” I asked him. “No, not all.” was his curt response. If the store was out of Percogesic pills or Primatene Mist, we would walk down Cambridge Street to the “Phillips” as John called it. It was another CVS pharmacy on Charles Circle across from the Old Charles Street Prison. Before it was a CVS it was a local independent drugstore and Wieners continued to refer to it by its former name. The Phillips CVS, in particular, played a vital role in Wieners being properly identified after his death. Wieners had no identification on him when he suffered his debilitating stroke in the Blossom Street parking lot located right behind the hospital. What he did have in his pocket was a receipt for his weekly purchases. Through the dogged pursuit of a social worker at the hospital, she was able to trace Wieners CVS savings card number on the receipt back to his apartment, and ultimately to his cousin Walter, whose name was on Wieners’s apartment lease. Luckily, his family and friends were notified just in time to say goodbye before he passed away. But, not before he laid unidentified for five days in the intensive care unit in a coma, assumed indigent and homeless by the hospital staff.

Just around the corner from the Phillips CVS, is the Phillips playground. Along with the Myrtle Street Playground, this was Wieners’s favorite place to stop off and enjoy a cigarette. Phillips playground is a two level playground on the north slope of the Hill surrounded by a metal fence, somewhat hidden between buildings. Wieners would sit on the bench with his head cocked, smoke slowly escaping his lips as Beacon Hill nannies ushered children to the lower level structure. We’d sit in silence for thirty minutes or more sometimes until I’d have to make the move and break the spell. Close to the Myrtle Street playground, Rollins Place was another secret location John liked to duck into for a smoke and some afternoon meditation. Rollins Place is one of the most interesting courtyards in Beacon Hill. It is a hidden cul-de-sac with a garden and paved courtyard consisting of six single-family townhouses with a unique faux Greek Style white mansion at the end of the alley. Wieners loved to linger in the cool shadows of the courtyard on a summer day.

Wieners favorite window in the back room of his apartment overlooked the rooftop of the African Meeting House, located on a dead end off Joy Street called Smith Court. This street had been the epicenter of Black culture in the 1800s. Wieners knew well the secret alley behind the Meeting House that lead up the hill and out onto Russell Street. The alley was rumored to have been part of the Underground Railroad during the Civil War. Nearby, Wieners participated in Steve Jonas’s poetry magic evenings in the sixties with poets Joe Dunn, Carol Weston, Rafael Gruttola, and others.

Down the hill on Joy Street towards Cambridge Street is 78 Joy Street, the home for many years of poet and Wieners supporter Jack Powers. Wieners would rely heavily on Jack’s good graces throughout his life on Beacon Hill. Jack would always feed Wieners or give him smoke money while persuading Wieners to read at some Powers sponsored reading in return. Jack was a conduit for reunions with old friends such as Allen Ginsberg, Peter Orlovsky, Ed Sanders, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, and Herbert Huncke; when they were in town. Powers also worked tirelessly to book paid readings for Wieners, often paying him out of his own pocket. Powers was a lifeline for Wieners on the Hill. It was through Jack that I first got to know Wieners.

A particular venue for many Wieners readings in the nineties was the Old West Church on Cambridge Street. The historic church dates back to the Revolutionary War and is where the phrase “no taxation without representation” was first coined. Sadly, many of Wieners’s readings there were sparsely attended but he would always read diligently whether there were ten people or 100 people present, some readings much more compelling than others.

Another notable church in Wieners lore is the Charles Street Meeting House on 73 Charles Street. The church was known in pre–Civil War times as a stronghold of the anti-slavery movement where Frederick Douglas, William Lloyd Garrison and Harriet Tubman gave fiery speeches. In 1953, during Hurricane Hazel, Wieners happened upon a reading by Charles Olson at the Meeting House where he was so taken with Olson’s reading he soon followed Olson to Black Mountain College. The modern day Meeting House is a disappointment to those who go there to see the church where this historic reading took place. The church was sold in 1979 and was renovated into a flower shop on the first floor and office space on the upper floor. It stands next to the firehouse made famous in the TV series, Spencer for Hire. Wieners and I visited the Meetinghouse only once, standing at the elevator bank momentarily then we were gone.

Driving through Boston I’d often catch a glimpse of Wieners in front of the Boston Public Library. As I got to know Wieners, I realized why I’d always see him outside the library. The Glad Day bookstore was a long-standing gay bookstore right across the street from the BPL. Whenever Wieners would get paid by check for a reading or for residuals from a publisher, he’s go to the Glad Day to get his checks cashed. The owner of the Glad Day, John Mitzel, was an old friend of Wieners who would always front Wieners money without any expectation of restitution.

Once, while driving Wieners back from the Glad Day bookstore en route to the supermarket, we averted a near tragedy on Bowdoin Street; right next to the State Capitol and the McCormack Building. As we drove down the Hill, I signaled to proceed to the right to grab an open parking spot. As I cruised over to the spot, I heard a crash and saw a biker come hurtling over the hood of my VW. Wieners put his hand over his mouth and let out an “Ooooh.” I maintained my cool and got out to see if the biker was all right. The biker was laid out in front of the car, sprawled on the street. I asked him if he was hurt and if he needed an ambulance. He cursed and told me to turn around and put my hands on the car. I first thought he was a bike messenger but then noticed his blue shorts and shirt and realized that I had hit a Boston Police Officer on bike patrol. Wieners and I sat in the car as three cop cars came and went. Each cop glared at us with angry disgust. After waiting nearly an hour I asked the officer if they could at least let Wieners go. They reluctantly released him when they realized he would not be a reliable witness. He draped his bag around his shoulder, took his rubber band from his ponytail, put it around his wrist, and went ambling down the hill to the Stop & Shop. After two hours of being held and questioned, I was finally, miraculously let go without even a ticket. I caught up to Wieners at the Stop & Shop, pushing his cart down the aisle as if nothing happened.

The one time we actually went inside the Boston Public Library together was to see the original version of A Star Is Born. We sat in the darkened basement of the BPL watching James Mason and Judy Garland. Wieners was rapt and attentive during the entire movie. I was less so. I dozed off several times during the movie, once even jarring myself awake from my own snoring. As we walked out, I felt like Peter in the Garden of Gethsemane. I half apologized for going catatonic during a movie that obviously meant a lot to him. “That’s alright” he said, “Jimmy Mason makes you groggy.”

There are a few places I never visited with Wieners although I tried to persuade him to go with me. The first place was the Boston Athenaeum. I was a member in the late 1990s and I thought he would enjoy going back there since he had told me stories of going there years prior. I often tried to cajole and persuade him into going to the Athenaeum with me. He would initially agree and then subtly his enthusiasm would dissipate until he was resolute in his decision not to go. In fact, I rarely ever saw Wieners on the Robert Lowell/General Hooker/Boston Brahmin/Boston Common south slope side of Beacon Hill unless we were driving through the neighborhood.

I also tried to get him to visit the Common Fountain with me, since his “Ode to a Common Fountain” was among my favorite poems of his. But I couldn’t even get him to stroll the Common with me, let alone get him to stand before the great fountain of his youthful dreams. The other place that he was interested in visiting with me was Saint Anthony’s Catholic Church off Summer Street near Downtown Crossing. I worked near the church and we had made grand plans to attend the Sunday Service but we were not able to make it happen, for whatever reason. Sadly, the only time Wieners and I were in church together was at Saint Gregory’s in Dorchester at his funeral, which was more poignant and touching than I could have imagined.

I am often referred to as Wieners informal caregiver in the later years of his life. The truth is I gave him no more care than any friend would have. If anything, he showed as much or even greater care for me than I for him. Robert Creeley echoed this feeling: “We are not taking care of John any more than he is taking care of us, if you hear me. We need him very much. We need what his poems can say.” Towards the end of his life, his world and the neighborhood he lived in became a place where it was increasingly harder for Wieners to have an independent life on his own terms, given the challenges of mental illness and poverty he had to manage every day. Beacon Hill is no longer a place where a poet such as Wieners can live independently. Every time I walk the streets of his neighborhood, I am reminded of him, and of his generosity, his grace, his indomitable spirit, and his love for his hometown of Boston. Although we no longer have Wieners, we have his poems. His voice echoes and his spirit remains alive to me in the streets that ribbon behind the state capitol on the bohemian side of Beacon Hill, where so much has changed.

Noone bears witness

Rachel Zolf. Photo by Brian Adams.

I am here today[1] to make a claim for the “Noone” who “bears witness for the / witness.”[2] Negation is never as it seams in Paul Celan. Yes and no are unsplit neighbors housed in abrasive proximity in the noem. That alien traumatic kernel of Das Ding in the Nebenmensch adjoins and hystericizes me, yet also wakes me to the both/and that exceeds and opens thought. As the pure products of America go crazy, Noone arrives to witness and adjust, Noone can drive the car.[3]

Giorgio Agamben, via Primo Levi, posits the “living dead” Muselmann figure (or figuren) of the Nazi camps as the “complete witness” to the disaster, the witness who can’t speak and bear witness, the subject who literally undergoes catastrophe. Thus, “the witness, the ethical subject, is the subject who bears witness to desubjectification.”[4] The “author,” whose etymological origins include vendor, one who advises or persuades, and witness, is also always coauthor. “The survivor and the Muselmann, like the … creator and his material are inseparable; their unity-difference alone constitutes testimony” (150). The survivor’s testimony is adjoined to the one who cannot speak, the “Noone” — or, via another translation of Celan’s Niemand, “Nobody” — suspended in a third realm between life and death.[5] The unsaying is always present as a remnant in the saying, as “the human being is what remains after the destruction of the human being” (Agamben, Remnants, 134).

For Agamben, “poets — witnesses — f[ind] language as what remains, as what actually survives the possibility, or impossibility, of speaking” (161). Speaking for myself, I do not trust the poet as direct transparent witness; I do not trust the “modest witness” as ethnographic fieldworker. I do not trust the speech of “I was here,” so I am entitled to speak. Always-authored testimony has its roots in the master’s testes.

But I do sort of trust Noone, the polyvocal, multifocal, desubjectified or maybe just “bad” subject[6] who bears witness for the witness who bears witness to the Muselmann’s catastrophe. I do think there is a way that poetry can partially reclaim the gaze of the witness from an intersubjective non-triangulating “third” or more remove,[7] without succumbing to colonization. Perhaps not incidentally, the presently absent Muselmann is German for Muslim, and catastrophe in Arabic is nakba, the term Palestinians use for the “ethnic cleansing” they endured in 1948: “If you do not want to talk about Odradek, Gregor Samsa and the Muselmann, then shut up about your love for a neighbor.”[8] The transcendental ethical two (me and you, reader-writer, reader-text, writer-text) tends to founder on the shoals of the spiraling out political three. No one, no two, but peut-être a futurity of three or more, in an act of imagination that brings together present absences, absent presences and so-called “present absentees.” Borrowing from Lacan, “It’s only because we can count to three that we can count to two.”[9]

Near the end of Agamben’s argument on the Muselmann’s unsaying speech, he makes a concomitant argument for interstitial knowledges in time:

In the concept of the remnant, the aporia of testimony coincides with the aporia of messianism. Just as the remnant of Israel signifies neither the whole nor a part of the people, but rather, the non-coincidence of the whole and the part, and just as messianic time is neither historical time nor eternity, but, rather, the disjunction that divides them, so the remnants of Auschwitz — the witnesses — are neither the dead nor the survivors, neither the drowned nor the saved. They are what remains between them. (163–64)

I’d like to posit this liminal space of what remains as precisely where the multifaceted Noone of innovative, avant-garde, whatever-you-want-to-call-it poetry can do its interruptive, interrogative work, burrowing in the gaps between calcified knowledges to release and circulate what I call the “mad affects” that can both hinder thought and set it alight. Something like chips of Walter Benjamin’s messianic Jetztzeit — “now-time” — that flash up as unarchived, effaced remembrances of suffering that interrupt and reorient this time. Or Jacques Derrida’s profane “messianic hope … without content”[10] that can manifest itself as an urgent injunction to act in the present, much as democracy or justice à venir may never come. Maybe it will, peut-être it won’t.[11]

To offer one slant anecdote, I went to Palestine-Israel for the first time in January 2009 for a research trip that ended up coinciding with that horrific war on Gaza. Yet, I deliberately did not write about my direct experiences on that trip. Instead, I used collage, disjunction, parataxis, dissonance, and other aspects of form in an attempt to engender “mad affects” within other people’s Orientalist and thanatourist narratives and other people’s first-person testimony. As Shoshana Felman writes, “The more a text is ‘mad’ — the more, in other words, it resists interpretation — the more the specific modes of its resistance to reading constitute its ‘subject’ and its literariness.”[12]

It is of course not new to use artifice to generate unreadable effects and affects in an attempt to shift the molecules in the brain — modernist avant-garde and post-structuralist “language” and “languagey” poetries have toyed with this process masterfully by way of “fragmentation, quotation, disruption, disjunction, agrammatical syntax, and so on.”[13] But, much as I’m not interested in neoliberal notions of what’s new in poetry, there is another element that emerges with the author’s attempt to witness and persuade and sell by adjoining her/himself to the Muselmann’s impossible speech; or to that of the homo sacer not considered human enough to be sacrificed, but whose bare life can be extinguished at will. There is poetry/performance from Juliana Spahr, M. NourbeSe Philip, Laura Elrick, Kaia Sand, Jordan Scott, kari edwards and others that enacts this “speaking silence” through affective gestures, that attempts to conjure the deracinated spectre or golem of the Noone and stick her/his “‘Oriental’ agony” (Agamben, Remnants, 70) to you like shame, instead of evacuating the desubjectified subject on the altar of the language game. Speech happens at the threshold of the human and the inhuman, at the hyphen adjoining I and Thou, but it indeed may be mad and indecipherable: “Odradek is the form which things assume in oblivion.”[14] The text reaches a limit, but perhaps better to go there than stand by and deny we have responsibility as authors. Or pretend we’re not authors at all.

The Noone is someone, many ones, a social “structure of feeling”[15] that can be powerful when harnessed. I feel this with my compatriots on this panel, a common politics and sociality that are part of what keep me going. As I struggle to write these ten minutes, Israeli troops have killed at least nine unarmed people and wounded scores of others on a humanitarian ship carrying ten thousand tons of food, medicine, building supplies and toys to Gaza. Can poetry do anything about a tragedy like this? No. And again I wonder what the hell’s the point. But I still feel called to fail well in the catachrestic effort to listen to what is unsaid and beyond knowledge in the testimony of the witness who bears witness for the Muselmann’s “bare, unassigned and unwitnessable life” (Agamben, Remnants, 157). “They crowd my memory with their faceless presence,” writes Levi.[16] Like the Guantanamo detainees risking US national security by shamelessly scratching thousands of lines of poetry onto Styrofoam cups with their fingernails. “No more sand art, no sand books, no masters.”[17] In 1982, after the massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon, Emmanuel Lévinas was asked if the Palestinian was not the consummate other to the Israeli. Lévinas demurred, saying that’s not what he meant at all, that the other was neighbor, who could be kin, but was at least a friend vis-à-vis a discernible enemy. Perhaps, as Slavoj Žižek suggests, in an effort to transcend the friend-enemy binary we should restore the grotesque face to the faceless Muselmann neighbor, whose infinitely vulnerable call is neither legible nor audible, but can only be hauntingly felt, an infinitely unreasonable impress-ion on and in me, engendering a set of mad affects that I can’t turn away from, that stick to my bones. In Arabic, shahīd means martyr and witness, as in witness to the truth. Unthinkable truth of living experience — there is no certitude in testimony, and the poem is untranslatable. The two can only be created by passing through the three.

During a suicide bombing, the body, in an act of sublime necropolitics, becomes the ballistic weapon, and the primary target isn’t the victim/enemy but the witness who must attempt to make meaning from shards of bodies melding in a precarious we. In Latin, the roots of testimony are not only the master’s testis but terstis, the one who is present as a third. Psychoanalysis and philosophy sometimes tell us that subjectivity is witnessing as response-ability, however impossible a task; and the intersubjective third is a mental space where responsibility begins.[18] Perhaps the truly radical call, beyond reason or recognition, is to witness that alien thing in the excessive neighbor beside me and you — Freud’s strange Zug (a trait, but also a line or mark or remnant) in the Muslim’s absent present face. That punctum, the accident that pricks, wounds me, can render me capable of renaming a body grievable, as Judith Butler has called us to do. If “negation is at the heart of testimony”[19] — Celan’s no-poem, the noem, is also noesis, the heady nous, and even yes, nous, the impossible we. Noone is an interpenetrative many. In the same bony ash-strewn poem that contains “Noone / bears witness for the / witness” the speaker stands “at the threeway,” the impossible fork in the path, and calls out in apostrophe to “you threeway / hands.” Much as witness and testimony and experience and feeling and presence and even Celan may be bad words in our hallowed post (Post)-modernist/structuralist/breakfast cereal circles that may sometimes include Reznikoff but not Forché and friends, perhaps “something / is given off” within us, a response-ability to the mad address, an impossible handshake “in isolate flecks” as “No one” madly adjusts the gears.[20] As the consummate formalist Victor Shklovsky said, facing the dearth of aesthetic options after the Russian Revolution, “There is no third path and that is the one we’re going to take.”[21]


A version of this essay previously appeared in
Canadian Literature.

 


 

1. This is a slightly revised version of a paper I gave at the Rethinking Poetics conference at Columbia University, New York, June 12, 2010, on a panel titled Affective Economies and Prosodies, with Jeff Derksen, Lisa Robertson, and Chris Nealon. I have preserved the markers that frame this piece as an oral performance for a specific time and audience.

2. Paul Celan, “Ashglory,” in Paul Celan: Selections, trans. Pierre Joris (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 104–105.

3. See William Carlos Williams, “To Elsie,” in Selected Poems (New York: New Directions, 1985), 53–55. Also, Das Ding (the Thing, la Chose) and Nebenmensch (a fellow human being, the one next to and adjoining me, the neighbor) are terms theorized by Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan.

4. Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 44, 151. Hereafter cited in text.

5. Celan, “Ashglory,” in Breathurn, trans. Pierre Joris (Los Angeles: Green Integer, 2006), 193.

6. For more on the “bad subject,” see “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” in Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 181.

7. Please note the “or more.” I am not proposing a “third way.”

8. Slavoj Žižek, Eric L. Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard, The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 7.

9. Ibid., 71. Citation comes from Jacques Lacan’s Les non dupes errent, December 11, 1973, but recontextualization in The Neighbor is important.

10. Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac, eds., Derrida and the Time of the Political (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 15.

11. The liminal doesn’t have to be “between.” It can be threshold, window, gate, whatever failed projective metaphor you choose.

12. Shoshana Felman, Writing and Madness (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003), 254.

13. Juliana Spahr, The Transformation (Berkeley: Atelos, 2007), 49.

14. Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” in Selected Writings, Volume 2, Part 2: 1931–1934 (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999), 811.

15. Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 131.

16. Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz and The Reawakening: Two Memoirs, trans. Stuart Wolf (New York: Summit Books, 1986), 90.

17. Celan, Poems of Paul Celan, trans. Michael Hamburger (New York: Persea Books, 1972), 217.

18. See Kelly Oliver, Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), and Jessica Benjamin, “Beyond Doer and Done to: An Intersubjective View of Thirdness.” Also, see Bracha Ettinger on the transjective in The Matrixial Borderspace (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).

19. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 54.

20. Williams, “To Elsie,” 53–55.

21. This is Jacqueline Rose’s paraphrase of Shklovsky in The Question of Zion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 14.

On the art of Susan Stewart

In the summer of 2007, I had occasion to be in London for Blind Light, the Hayward Gallery’s retrospective of British sculptor Antony Gormley. The work from which the exhibition took its title — a rectangular glass-walled “room” with doorlike openings at either end and a ceiling fitted with vapor generators and uniform sources of high-intensity white light — involved visitors in an uncanny perceptual exploration. From outside, the boxed and glowing cloud revealed no sign of the exhibition-goers moving within, until here and there a silhouetted hand or elbow floated into view as it approached the glass. Once inside, the visitor experienced an almost complete loss of spatial reference. The vapor’s efficient scattering of light made sight beyond a few inches impossible. Proximity to other persons or to the perimeter could not be judged; the contours of one’s own body became invisible. Sound was attenuated by the density of the fog and the steady breath of the vapor generators. Only proprioception and the ear-brain system’s balance mechanisms remained to orient the visitor, and, absent visual and auditory cues, even these were not always reliable. Despite the brightness hanging in the air, the distant senses — sight and hearing — were as useless as they’d be in a black box. Blind Light, indeed.

The sole exception to this sensory muffling occurred when, moving within the cloud, one person encountered another. A face, or occasionally a shoulder, emerged from the surrounding whiteness only inches away — much closer than the usual bounds of personal space in our culture — and often at the instant that the two bodies touched (thus activating one of the proximate senses). The work’s conditions created, at least to the prepared mind, a kind of dramatic heightening of the intimacy implied by any face-to-face encounter.

Blind Light, along with many of Gormley’s other works, is an eloquent investigation of the subject-object division. His sculptures often begin with his own body (via plaster casts), not as an object of contemplation or a vehicle for biographical narrative, but as a starting point for exploring the boundaries of the human person. Through manipulation of scale, positive/negative space, and a variety of other devices, he tests those boundaries against the natural world as well as the social and built worlds, inviting us to consider the implications of the relationships created across, and represented by, those boundaries. The devices — encounters in a glowing cloud among them — force us to attend to the role of the senses in constructing and mediating both boundary and relationship.

As I made my way through the show, it struck me that Gormley’s work addressed several preoccupations of the poet and thinker Susan Stewart. I might have known; when I reached the gift shop I found that she had, in fact, authored one of the catalog essays. In that essay she suggests that

Gormley’s contribution to the subject-object problem in art is analogous to the contribution the phenomenologists have made to that problem in philosophy more generally — Gormley begins from deep within the experience of life and moves outwards to encompass more and more of the given world; there is no alienation between perceiver and object or, more accurately, artist and nature.[1]

The procedure Stewart here ascribes to Gormley could equally describe much of her own poetic practice. She has also said that she uses her critical essays “as a kind of notebook for thinking through projects I’d like to do in poetic books”:[2] the poetry and criticism form a continuum. I’ll begin this essay, then, from within the experience of her poems, reading closely from the most recent collection Red Rover and following a few of her meditations outward into her critical thought. By setting her ideas in the context of a range of other voices — some that she engages directly and others that she does not — I’ll draw out some implications for her poetics and for her sense of the place of art, including poetry, in contemporary culture.

Red Rover opens with “The Owl,” a poem that is at once invocation of the muse, genre exemplar of the nocturne, figure for the creative act, and catalyst of a primary thematic exploration of the book — the relationship of perception to conscious being, to knowing, and to human and aesthetic encounters:

I thought somehow a piece of cloth was tossed
into the night, a piece of cloth that flew

up, then across, beyond the window.
A tablecloth or handkerchief, a knot

somehow unfolding, folded, pushing through
the thickness of the dark. I thought somehow

a piece of cloth was lost beyond the line —
released, although it seemed as if a knot

still hung, unfolding.[3]

Some fragmentary shape, like a hand at the wall of Gormley’s Blind Light, crosses the poet’s peripheral vision “through / the thickness of the dark.” Here, however, the fragment cannot yet be firmly identified or domesticated; it remains provisional. Its indeterminacy, though tied to naming, does not come from any quality or limitation of language itself; it is prior to that cultural negotiation. What the sense organs send the brain is not yet a settled percept, but still “lost beyond the [clothes-, sight-, or poetic] line.” Even an orienting scale is not yet clear (“tablecloth or handkerchief”). The poet is troubled by her provisional identification and, in an inversion, restates the problem by means of a different image, almost in passing:

The after-image went, a blot beyond

the icy glass. And, closer, there stood winter
grass so black it had no substance

until I looked again and saw it tipped
with brittle frost.

After positing alternatives to her first identification (cloth), the poet settles on a different one — a snowy owl — in a passage that introduces the role of memory and volition in perception even as it emphasizes the unstable link between natural phenomena and their perceiver:

I called this poem “the owl,”
the name that, like a key, locked out the dark

and later let me close my book and sleep
a winter dream. And yet the truth remains

that I can’t know just what I saw, and if
it comes each night, each dream, each star, or not

at all. It’s not, it’s never, evident
that waiting has no reason. The circuit of the world

belies the chaos of its forms —

Stewart here invites us to consider that the incommensurability of alternative percepts (and of the local worldview each implies) arising from a given stimulus might yield not an alienation between perceiver and object, but rather a space for the play of imagination, a site of the artist’s creativity, and a field in which her intention will operate. Elsewhere in the collection she will suggest that such incommensurability also constitutes a source of social conflict and tragedy.

In reviewing “The Owl,” John Kinsella makes the general observation that it is “also a poem about writing poetry, about where poetry comes from,”[4] and indeed Stewart’s line “the name that, like a key, locked out the dark” echoes a principal thesis of her Poetry and the Fate of the Senses that “the cultural, or form-giving, work of poetry is to counter the oblivion of darkness.”[5] Following Kant in the Critique of Judgment, Stewart has often made use of the idea that works of art and aesthetically striking things in nature exhibit finality of form. Ange Mlinko in her review notes a parallel with Hegel,[6] who uses the figure of the owl of Minerva that, in his words, “begins its flight only with the onset of dusk”[7] to argue that philosophy can provide understanding of a stage of reality only after it has occurred. Beyond a general claim about where poetry comes from, then, we might posit that “The Owl,” in its retrospective meditation, stages the process of coming into form.

In focusing on slippages of perception, slippages that raise the questions whether and how prior concepts or categories of understanding might be necessary for sensory events to be resolved as perceptions — and thus for us to know the world — Stewart engages in a mode of poetic exploration different from, and complementary to, one based on exploiting the slippages and cultural bindings of the linguistic material itself. This mode is a peer rather than an heir to that of Language writing.

The principal device Stewart uses in “The Owl” might be called a “troubled-recognition topos.” The recognition involved is not Aristotelian anagnorisis, in which discovery precipitates a tragic character’s pivotal realization, but the assimilation of sense impressions, troubled by some knot or mistake in that process. The knowledge or identification ultimately reached may be partial or flawed owing to the rigors of the passage to recognition. Though perhaps not commonplace, the device has numerous precedents. A few examples will indicate the wide range of inflections such troubled recognition may give to the passages in which it occurs and help characterize Stewart’s use of it in her poem — and in her poetics more generally.

The hero of the fourteenth-century romance Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, when directed to the site of the Green Chapel, has no language for the “balȝ berȝ,” or swollen mound, he finds there:

And al watz holȝ inwith, nobot an olde caue,
Or a creuisse of an olde cragge, he couþe hit noȝt deme
                         with spelle.[8]

[And all was hollow within, naught but an old cave,
Or a crevice of an old crag. He could not deem it
                         with speech.]

It appears to be nothing but a cave or cleft in an old crag, but he “could not deem (judge or pronounce) it with speech/words”:

Þenne he boȝez to þe berȝe, aboute hit he walkez,
Debatande with hymself quat hit be myȝt.

[Then he makes for the mound; he walks about it,
Debating with himself what it might be.]

As he struggles to fit the evidence of his eyes to his concept of a chapel, Gawain speculates that in such a wild and ruined place the devil himself might tell his matins: it is “þe corsedest [cursedest] kyrk þhat euer I com inne!” The poet uses the knight’s inability to recognize the structure as something from his own world to suggest the presence of the supernatural: here Gawain expects to be beheaded by the as-yet-unnamed Bertilak, whom the reader will learn was transformed into the apparently invulnerable Green Knight by the great sorceress Morgan le Fay. Gawain’s troubled recognition contributes to the mood of dread and suspense, and thus to narrative drive and to the poem’s psychic weight. That an unresolved sensory–cognitive incongruity evokes the uncanny or the supernatural is a phenomenon Stewart also acknowledges in her poem: “Some human hand could not / have thrown that high, or lent such force to cloth, / and yet I knew no god would mind a square of air so small.”

Emily Dickinson, in “In Winter in my Room,”[9] describes a mistake in sensory interpretation that leads to a misnaming. The speaker “came upon a Worm” that later turns out to have been a young snake, a fact that becomes apparent to the speaker and one that terrifies her, sending her running to the next town. Here the naming that tames this intrusion of nature into her bedroom (a harmless worm, “Pink, lank, and warm”) is disrupted by the later appearance of the snake “in feature as the worm before / But ringed with power —.” The poem ends with the ambiguous line “This was a dream.” — a line that retrospectively both undermines the earlier namings and raises the possibility that the dream explanation is itself just another naming that attempts to reconcile an unassimilated sensory experience. It also evokes the genre of the dream vision, which Stewart explores later in Red Rover in “Variations on the Dream of the Rood,” and hints at one approach to dealing with the subject-object division: the subjective idealist or “life is a dream” strategy (to borrow Calderón’s title), versions of which have played an important role in Buddhist thought as well as in Western philosophy.

In his 1944 poem “The Forgotten City,” a storm forces William Carlos Williams’s speaker to drive an unfamiliar route from the country back to the city. Along the way he passes through “extraordinary places, as vivid as any / I ever saw,” inhabited by “this / curious and industrious people” with “completely foreign manners” who live with “little apparent communication / with an outside world. How,” he asks, “did they get / cut off this way from representation” in “our” media, when they were “so near the metropolis, so closely / surrounded by the familiar and the famous”?

The suburban city and its inhabitants appear to Williams’s urban speaker as a newfound land or exotic civilization. Partly because of the estranging effects of the storm and its floods, and partly because “I had no idea where I was,” the entire scene strikes him as uncanny. He can vividly perceive physical attributes of the place and its people, but seems to be unable to abstract from these any category or label — any recognized place or street name, or term such as “suburb” — that might relate them to the world he knows. This speaker’s encounter with the philosophical problem of universals contrasts with that in Stewart’s poem, whose speaker has several categories at the ready but cannot establish the vision’s attributes with sufficient accuracy to confidently deploy any of them absent a self-conscious act of will.

Nearer parallels to Stewart’s use of troubled recognition occur in two poems from Robert Frost’s 1923 collection New Hampshire. In “A Boundless Moment,” the poet emphasizes the act of will involved in perception, and the potential such an act holds for the speaker’s self-deception. Frost’s poem, however, unlike “The Owl,” admits the possibility of a knowable external truth: its speaker consciously rejects his own comforting interpretation of pale ambiguous shapes among the bare maples (the kind of naming that allows Stewart’s speaker to “sleep a winter dream”) in favor of the harsher identification his reason and experience dictate must be correct. By contrast, Frost’s “For Once Then, Something“ insists on the speaker’s inability to be sure what he has seen in a well’s depths, as Stewart’s speaker insists that she “can’t know just what I saw” beyond her window. Frost’s speaker is allowed — only once — to glimpse something in the well of poetic inspiration[10] beyond his lyric self, something durable (“Truth? A pebble of quartz?”) that presumably remains at the bottom of the well awaiting better viewing conditions. Stewart’s speaker is of a different kind, and the nature of her encounter is both more dynamic and more exemplary. Like the casts of his own body from which Gormley often elaborates his sculptures, the speakers of Stewart’s poems are less vehicles for expressing the drama of individual personality than they are representative human beings, whose encounters with the world a reader might equally experience.[11] Frost’s poet-speaker has been “taunted” with “never seeing deeper” than his own reflection in the water’s surface; he has strived (“trying”) to make out some treasure of meaning, and “lost it.” He has pursued an agon with the nature that frustrates discernment, depicted in language laced with moral judgment (“always wrong,” “rebuke,” “for once”), emerging with a tone of bittersweet pride at having achieved at least a glimpse of something beyond himself. Stewart’s speaker, by contrast, is all inquiry: the “it” in “I can’t know just what I saw, and if / it comes each night, each dream, each star” can as easily refer to the dream and the star as to the thing she has named snowy owl. The subject-object problem remains, as does the paradox of simultaneous pattern and chaos in the world of phenomena. Even astronomers, the poem reminds us — whether Galileo making his pioneering drawings, or those who now observe a universe of accelerating expansion — must look down from their instruments and the vastness of their perceptual field in order to record what they can’t know with certainty they saw; the patient corroboration of their results by other observers produces the accumulating probability that is as close as science comes to certainty. Stewart writes poems of wonder, in every unsentimental sense of the word.

And she’s been doing so for a long time. Stewart toyed with troubled recognition in “Pear,” from her 2003 book Columbarium. The poem begins in the context of schoolchildren breaking off branches of pear blossoms for their teacher: “Believing each simple thing passes from a perception that is less clear / into one that is, eventually, more clear …” A few stanzas later, the grownup speaker, now stalled in traffic on a bridge, looks “out and up and there / I saw the girl flying and falling, flying and falling” with arms outspread; the speaker infers, though she cannot see, the trampoline “that must have been the yielding source of all her motion.” First wonder, then perception passing from less clear to more clear. But this faith is undermined by the rest of the poem, in which the speaker, stalled again weeks later at the same point of the bridge, cannot remember the flying-and-falling girl but only the vague sense that something is about to happen, which precipitates instead the memory of a fire alarm in her childhood (whether drill or actual conflagration is left unclear) when “everyone must leave the school — with every sweater and pencil left in place / — to burn, and burn / and burn back to the ground.” These images of the instability of perception, which relies on memory,[12] and of the fragility of the edifice of knowledge in contrast to irreducible matter, serve to direct our attention again to the moment of encounter with the flying-and-falling girl at the center of the poem, just as the conclusion of “The Owl” returns us to the encounter interrogated in the first half of that poem. It’s always the moment of encounter — with natural objects, with people, with works of art — that raises the subject-object problem and poses the question of what we can know. And beyond the specific trope of troubled recognition, the nature of that encounter and the question of what attitude one should take toward it are central to Stewart’s work.


Encounter

The second poem in Red Rover, “Lavinium,” begins:

I met the girl who held the flower and mirror
And the boy who sent his hoop up to the god.

Put away childish things they said, and stepped
Into the future. They were made of baked earth,
Their tenderness intact. (6)

Later, “The hoop rolled down again, / clattering.” And “The girl awoke and put her flower / inside the mirror.” The speaker observes, “We think of them. / They never think of us. / We think of them” so that “love’s asymmetry is true” (italics in original).

A reader conditioned by the emotional logic of personal lyric might see in this poem the wistful lament of an adult (Stewart is herself a parent) regretting the inevitable individuation and distancing of maturing children, depicted with symbolic attributes and a Genesis-like reminder of mortal clay. Such a reading is not illegitimate, but it’s incomplete. You can almost hear the borscht-belt plaint hovering in the background: “You don’t write, you don’t call …”

The richness of “Lavinium” and the rationale for its placement near the head of the collection are both signaled by the title. Lavinium (modern Pratica di Mare) was a port city of Latium, some fifteen miles south of Rome, whose legendary founding by Aeneas is mentioned by Virgil.[13] It remained a religious center into the Roman period, with important cults of Minerva and other gods. During the first five centuries BCE, certain classes of Latins made votive sacrifices of terracotta figures there to mark rites of transition from childhood to adulthood.[14] Some of these are now displayed in glass cases in the Museo Archeologico Lavinium. The poem’s characterization of the boy and girl as made of baked earth (translating ‘terracotta’) and its mention of locked cabinets, glass, a doll, and robbers that had come and gone for years, thus place the speaker before ancient votive figures rather than living adolescents.[15] Knowing this context changes the poem into something richer and stranger.

Boston Globe reviewer David Barber complained that Red Rover is “dense with … hermetic allusion.” In the age of search engines, however, one is tempted to say, as the poet herself does in “The Owl”: “So look it up.” Because, to quote Stewart on allusion, “It’s very important to me to have my poems be accessible to people from all kinds of backgrounds and experiences. … There are some things we all know, and some things that only a few people know. … A poem cannot be based on an experience that’s merely private, or esoteric to the degree that it’s private.”[16] Here the use of allusion rather than exposition — whether a reader acquires the particular references or not — represents an economy of poetic means that permits concentration on the moment of encounter.

Stewart’s choice of the verb “met” to characterize her speaker’s encounter with the votives, and her use of the words “boy” and “girl” to designate them, enact what she has called “the deep formal analogy between the face-to-face encounter between persons and the face-to-face encounter with artworks.”[17] The initial making of the figures presumed an audience or receiver of the offering: originally the priests of the cult, the family members in the rite, and ultimately the god. The rest being long dead, the modern speaker viewing the votives stands as if in the place of the god. And indeed the poet restarts suspended time: the hoop that the boy sent up to the god rolls down again and he turns cartwheels over “endless” sand.

So one encounter figured by the poem is the imaginative meeting between the speaker and the ancient children represented by the votive figures. This encounter invokes the wistful emotional response proper to the adult-child relationship of the first reading given above. However, as Stewart has pointed out, any work of art posits a reciprocity in which the “stored activity of the maker” is “simultaneous to an implicit and reciprocal capacity for animation in the receiver.”[18] Therefore the speaker in “Lavinium” is confronting not only the reanimated images of the ancient children, but the reanimated work of an ancient maker.

To attend to the maker is to realize that the adult-child relationship in the poem, in which the reader shares the speaker’s godlike position and assumes the respect due from minors to elders, has been altered and indeed reversed. The votives of the ancient maker are the work of the modern speaker’s artistic forebear; the child is parent to the woman. It is the “hard-hearted doll,” after all, who “repeats the lesson”: “love’s asymmetry is true, / they never think of you.” What relationship, Stewart invites us to consider, do we as contemporary audiences and artists bear to past (and future) makers and their creations? Do we think of them? What ought we think of them? These are ethical questions, a point to which I’ll return.

“Lavinium,” as the book’s second poem, thus introduces Red Rover’s exploration of childhood: the legacies we receive as children and those we leave our own children. In “as clerkes find written in their book,” one of the Songs for Adam later in the collection, the words are given to Adam, who broods on one child’s murder of the other: “Think of the child, / your father, / think of the mother, your child.” — the reader here addressed as if the offspring of Cain, and Adam’s grandchild.

Stewart has said that her 1995 book The Forest was concerned with the world of her parents and their generation, while the next, Columbarium, depicts the situation of her contemporaries as they face the future — the collection’s georgics, for example, ask what knowledge will be taught and what lost to the next generation, with what consequences.[19] In Red Rover she explores what it means to be very young in the world, to be transformed into the no-longer-young, to be recruited into the transmission of cultures with all their horrors and achievements. Several of the poems evince this directly in their conceits and titles, taken — as is the book’s — from children’s games. Others extend the concept to cultural childhood. The town of Lavinium, for instance, flourished during the formative stages of Latin civilization. Stewart’s “Variations on the Dream of the Rood” reinscribes one of the earliest poems in English, portions of which were carved in runes on the Ruthwell Cross in Scotland in the eighth century. She translates or adapts three poems from Chaucer, who wrote during English poetry’s youth; in “The Former Age” Chaucer himself conjures an innocent, mythic time before metal and techné introduced inequality and strife into human affairs.

At the very center of Red Rover opens the collection’s hinge, the poem that puts the greatest pressure on the book’s nexus of childhood and legacy: “Elegy Against the Massacre at the Amish School in West Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania, Autumn 2006.” The background to the triggering events, as well as Stewart’s ties to the locale and culture, are well covered in Mlinko’s review. “[A] girl is not a kind of girl,” writes Stewart of the five schoolgirls shot dead in their classroom; “she knows her rhyme / she has her name.” This quiet insistence on individual personhood parallels the assertion of Stewart’s early mentor, Alan Grossman, in his Summa Lyrica that “the traditional function of poetry is the conservation of names.”[20] The statement also inverts the category problem in “The Owl” — here it is the individual that matters, not the class “girl.”

Stewart constructs a spare and elegant form to preserve these names, as befits the culture of the Plain People of Lancaster County. Each of the poem’s fifteen stanzas has five lines, or one for each girl. The first two lines of each stanza consist simply of the italicized names of the slain girls, separated by commas, and occasionally the conjunction “and.” The litany of names is not, as we might expect, an exact refrain:

Lena, Mary Liz, and Anna Mae
Marian, Naomi Rose

when time has stopped
where time has slowed
the horses wear the rain

Mary Liz, Anna Mae, Marian
Naomi Rose and Lena

the lanterns lit
at midday dark
pain’s processional

At each repetition, with one exception, the leading name of the previous series vanishes from the head of the line, reappearing elsewhere in the list. Thus the poem enacts the shock of loss at every turn. The retention of the displaced name in the set creates, as Mlinko notes, an analogy with children’s circle games, thus conceptually rhyming with other poems in the collection titled with the names of games. More importantly, however, this retention testifies to the poet’s determination that through poetry none of the names should be truly lost, and bears witness to the faith of their community that its circle will ultimately be unbroken.

The remaining lines of the first stanza are repeated in the last, forming a ring composition that closes the sacral circle of the poem: “when time has stopped / where time has slowed / the horses wear the rain.” The figure of the dripping horses looks back to conventions of pastoral, and indeed to the pathetic fallacy of sympathetic nature in the pastoral elegy. I don’t think it mistaken to see even the immortal horses of Achilles, weeping for Patroklos, as ghostly presences at this scene of mourning for the young and the beautiful. But it’s typical of Stewart to choose such a detail, with all its literary-historical resonance, in order to stress a much more fundamental fact: this is a culture that still uses horses. Death has stopped time for the five girls, and in another sense for their families, in a community that has chosen not to be modern — to slow time. The killer introduced modernity into their schoolroom in the form of a 9mm pistol, a stun gun, and bondage equipment. He introduced, in other words, a fatal regime of nonconsensual time.


Face to face

In her pivotal essay “On the Art of the Future,” Stewart proposes that “what the practice of art in general [as opposed to the making of individual works] might be for is the carrying forward of a practice of ethical encounters between persons.” Purposelessness in aesthetic making — freedom from political, pragmatic, and other predetermined ends — is for her “at the heart of what makes art a possible ethical sanctuary.”[21] This purposive but purposeless quality, familiar from the first part of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, is foundational for Stewart. It acknowledges that a work of art is the result of an artist’s intentional or purposive activity, but to the extent that it is art, it is free of a prior purpose or agenda. It exists in and for itself; achieving its completed form is its highest or final end. Stewart also emphasizes something less often stressed, citing Kant’s paradigm (developed in sections 46–50) of aesthetic experience as “in truth an encounter between persons — the maker and receiver.”[22] Like nature, the genius (Kant’s term; Stewart extends the sense to include any maker) gives an unanticipated rule to art, but one that Stewart notes can be inferred only retrospectively and which thus requires the participation of another person: the person who receives the work. Though every work of art requires an intention or purposive action simply to come into being, that intention cannot be teleological, or it would be inadequate to any aesthetic result. “Here,” says Stewart, “every artwork confronts us with its integrity as form [Kant’s “finality”] and with its existence as the outcome of a prior intention. Engaged with the work, we can only move backward from its particulars to inferences of that intention.” Those particulars, like the work as a whole, cannot be fully brought under our pre-existing concepts or any predetermined program. We don’t explain the work away; we “enrich our apprehension, to challenge our usual habits of making the world intelligible.”[23] Thus, “this meeting with an artwork that is of itself and for itself is analogous to that free ethical stance in which persons are encountered in themselves and for themselves — without prior determination of outcome or goal.”[24]

In this formulation of the free encounter of persons Stewart draws first on the controversial ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, who holds that “the approach to the face is the most basic mode of responsibility.”[25] She notes, however, that Levinas rejects any true intersubjectivity, fearing that we inevitably project our own subjectivity onto the being of others, and thus in his ethics of the face-to-face he requires the perceiver to be “held hostage to the requirements of the other” — a position reminiscent of the sacrificial logic of human relation to the gods, and one that for Levinas has theological roots. Stewart retrieves from this a secular, less extreme, and more intersubjective potential, “since we are able to recognize the common human position of others without projecting upon them the features of our own interiority, just as the way we recognize faces in general is separate physiologically from the way we recognize particular faces.”[26] Hence the face-to-face response both to art and to persons partakes of an obligation of openness and nonhostility, if not of sacrifice, and Stewart draws several specific parallels between Kant’s aesthetics and Levinas’s ethics: “the nonteleological, the asymmetry inherent in reception, the imbalance between the underdetermination of received intention and the overdetermination of consequences, [and] the requirement of an affirmation or recognition of being.”[27]

Though Stewart does not engage with him directly, such a model of the face-to-face encounter shares striking affinities with the relational dynamics of Martin Buber. Buber’s state of pure relation, instantiated by speaking face to face the “primary word” I-Thou, represents for him the fullest realization of human personhood, and is contrasted with the objectifying and instrumental relationship of the I-It. For Buber the I-Thou relation is direct, occurs in an intense and timeless present, and cannot be continuously sustained: “this is the exalted melancholy of our fate, that every Thou in our world must become an It.”[28] Understanding, experience, recognition of means — all cause the Thou to become an object among objects. This is true of beloved persons and also of works of art: when “[a] man is faced by a form which desires to be made through him into a work”; this form is a Thou, which arises not from the artist’s soul but which “steps up to it and demands of it … effective power.” Through speaking the primary word with his whole being, the artist bodies forth the work. “To produce is to draw forth, to invent is to find, to shape is to discover. In bodying forth I disclose. I lead the form across — into the world of It. The work produced is a thing among things, able to be experienced and described as a sum of qualities. But from time to time it can face the receptive beholder in its whole embodied form.”[29]

This last sentence hints at a crucial point for Buber — that every It retains the potential to return to the fullness of a Thou in response to the “turning” (Umkehr) of an I: “that which has been so changed into an It, hardened into a thing among things, has had the nature and disposition put into it to change back … again and again that which has the status of object must blaze up into presentness and enter the elemental state from which it came. … So too in art … It [the work] longs as in a dream for the meeting with man, that for a timeless moment he may lift the ban and clasp the form.”[30] Thus in his own somewhat mystical formulation Buber not only affirms Kant’s characterization of the aesthetic experience as an encounter, but offers many colorful figures for the process that Stewart calls reanimation: the recuperation of the stored labor and intent of the maker.

Buber’s “turning” inevitably evokes the modern poet who “from his youth” had “read and revered” Buber[31] — Paul Celan, whose “breathturn” (Atemwende) makes the poem the site of a similar impulse toward relation. In his 1960 Büchner Prize address, the “Meridian” speech that is his most carefully considered and influential statement on poetics, Celan develops a number of ideas that offer illuminating context for Stewart’s own reflections on making. He identifies poetry first in the perception that its language is “tangible and like a person,” having “shape, direction, breath” — “breath, that is, direction and destiny.”[32] It is this sense of movement and intent, figured several times in the speech as a journey, that distinguishes poetry from mere ‘art’ — understood as petrified nature, trained carnival monkey, or technical automaton — and that, by defying any such program, allows it to become “an act of freedom” (a formulation not incompatible with Kant’s purposive purposelessness). “In other words: language actualized, set free under the sign of a radical individuation which, however, remains as aware of the limits drawn by language as of the possibilities it opens. … This shows the poem,” Celan writes, “as one person’s language become shape and, essentially, a presence in the present.”[33] (In his notes for the speech, Celan quotes from Whitman’s poem “So Long” as if to illustrate the strength of this commitment to the poem as agent: “Camerado, this is no book, / Who touches this touches a man.”)[34]

But though “the poem[35] speaks … only on its own, its very own behalf,” it has also “always hoped to speak on behalf of the strange — no, I can no longer use this word here — on behalf of the other, who knows, perhaps of an altogether other.” Celan evokes the cultural separateness he feels as a Jew, one valence carried by “strange” or “alien” at several places in this text, before redirecting his emphasis to a sense of the other as Thou, perhaps even a transcendent Thou (“This ‘who knows’ … is all I can add … to the old hopes”).[36] Celan doesn’t dwell on this incorporation of the other into the “shape, direction, and breath” of the poem, but it makes a crucial space for the absent other(s) to stand, as it were, beside the poet-as-survivor or poet-as-witness in the encounter with the reader, who is also an other. And this encounter is at the heart of poiesis for Celan:

             The poem is lonely. It is lonely and en route. Its author stays with it.
             Does this very fact not place the poem already here, at its inception, in the
encounter, in the mystery of encounter?

             The poem intends another, needs this other, needs an opposite. It goes
toward it, bespeaks it.[37]

And like Buber, Celan understands this encounter to be renewable. Even though the poem carries with it only “one, unique, momentary present,” it “holds its ground on its own margin. In order to endure, it constantly calls and pulls itself back from an ‘already-no-more’ into a ‘still-here.’”[38] Thus “the poem becomes conversation — often desperate conversation”:

Only the space of this conversation can establish what is addressed, can gather it into a ‘you’ around the naming and speaking I. But this ‘you,’ come about by dint of being named and addressed, brings its otherness into the present. Even in the here and now of the poem — and the poem has only this one, unique, momentary present — even in this immediacy and nearness, the otherness gives voice to what is most its own: its time.”[39]

In his insistence on incorporating the temporal situation of the other — the receiver, the spoken-on-behalf-of, the Thou — into the unique present of the poem, Celan makes a place for the dead, who were a constantly felt absent presence for him. But he also makes a place for the future reader, and so out of the poem’s constant struggle with darkness and silence “find[s] the connective which, like the poem, leads to encounters.”[40]

Stewart, like Celan, writes with a sense of addressing an audience that includes the living and the dead.[41] She does not, however, share Celan’s suspicion of — or hostility to — art as a history of forms. Hers is the poetics of someone who sees the present moment vividly, but as embedded in a long view; of someone steeped in cultural and aesthetic history, for whom the makers of the past seem intensely present. In The Poet’s Freedom (2011) Stewart meditates on and theorizes such transtemporal encounters, proceeding in her usual way by means of historical examples, in a chapter entitled “Meeting.” She attends carefully to this passage from Nadezhda Mandelstam’s memoir of the Stalin years, Hope against Hope:

Both [Osip] Mandelstam and Akhmatova had the astonishing ability of somehow bridging time and space when they read the work of dead poets. By its very nature, such reading is usually anachronistic, but with them it meant entering into personal relations with the poet in question; it was a kind of conversation with someone long since departed. … This would probably have been understood by Keats, who wanted to meet all his friends, living and dead, in a tavern.[42]

Of Akhmatova, Stewart notes: “Deliberately choosing confinement [under surveillance for a suicide watch in her little room at Fountain House] over emigration, she continually expanded her empathetic powers of imagination in space and time.”[43] Stewart espouses a similar empathy. She has said of Harold Bloom’s idea of the anxiety of influence that “I really don’t feel that very powerfully,”[44] and indeed, rather than any revisionary spirit of agon, she appears to share Mandelstam’s sense that he “could look for friends and allies” among writers of the past.[45] That spirit pervades Red Rover in the many poems that translate, rewrite, or otherwise converse with texts by known authors. It is also consonant with Stewart’s interest, in that book, in the cultural knowledge and rhetorical forms embedded in the rhymes and rituals of the children’s games she deploys.[46]


Persons

Stewart’s commitment to cultural and literary continuity is the opposite of nostalgia. If she is less than partisan on behalf of avant-gardes, she is clearly skeptical of the categorical and totalizing claims to which they are prone. Artists make what rebellions they must in order to create their art, and inevitably those will take their place in the history of encounters.

In The Poet’s Freedom, Stewart develops a three-part model of artistic creation, drawing not only on classical sources but on the variant origin stories in Genesis and their influence on Western traditions of art-making.[47] Here she argues that human making requires, first, a freely spontaneous act of will, independent of the biography of the maker — a speech act, as it were, analogous to the divine “Let there be light” or to the priestly source’s account of man as created “in our image” through the divine word alone. Second, since humans are not transcendent deities and cannot do their creating ex nihilo but must intervene in the material and cultural conditions into which they are born, there must be an act of making or forming analogous to the divine separating and forming on the six days — or to the Jahwist source’s account of man formed from clay and woman from man’s rib. Finally, in addition to these interdependent tasks of the intellect and tasks of the hands, Stewart reminds us that artistic making requires a judgment — the “it is good,” or decision to stop or abandon the work, that signals finality of form and separates the work of art from all that it otherwise might have been. This decision launches the work into the life of its reception, and into the possibility of its destruction. It’s worth noting that by incorporating this third component into her model, Stewart also facilitates the application of Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment to the artist’s creative act itself rather than solely to the apprehending act of the receiver.

Any of these three components of creation — volition, formation, judgment — may be, and indeed have been, valorized by artists or theorists to the diminishment or even exclusion of the others. Stewart observes such exclusive emphases as salient in different art-historical moments: a realism of “absolute obligation to the experience of the maker”; a Hegelian “art of absolute spirit” or pure conceptualism; an art of material intervention alone, or of everyday craft. For her, however, such narrowly focused practices are intrinsically both limited and inadequate to the ethical potential of art:

Each would have its own claim of resistance: the realist in a critique of imagination, the conceptualist in a critique of materialism, the materialist in a critique of hyperintellectualism, the artist of the everyday in a critique of self-consciousness. Yet, for obvious and self-contradictory reasons, these approaches to art making are defined by negative freedoms — they are driven by freedoms from. Bound by definition to those practices they deny, they cannot overcome their secondariness.[48]

In “On the Art of the Future” Stewart articulates her motivating concerns — for the essay and, I would propose, for her poetics more generally: “To put my aims simply, I am interested in preserving persons from totalitarian systems of social control, including systems of nonconsensual time and technological development, and preserving artworks from speculative allegory.”[49] We have seen Stewart protesting, in her elegy for Lena, Mary Liz, Anna Mae, Marian, and Naomi Rose, the fatal imposition of nonconsensual time; later in this essay I’ll consider some implications of technology for her poetics. First, however, I want to look at Stewart’s extension, in The Poet’s Freedom and elsewhere, of her argument that works of art, including poems, must be free, in their creation and in their interpretation, from extrinsic allegory.

“Why,” she asks in an interview, “would I ever make a work of art where I already know what I’m going to do when I start?” To begin with a definition of a ‘poem,’ or a prior idea of a particular relation of form to content, would be “a frame that you would then have to … bring as an allegory to what you’re doing.” For Stewart, “art is way ahead [of culture as an already made thing] and doesn’t know its terms from the outset. This is also why … I have advised against chance procedures of composition, but I’m really for chance in art. I think art is the most chancy thing.”[50]

This last remark may be a uniquely insightful reformulation of Mallarmé’s famous title, Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hazard (A throw of the dice will never abolish chance), reminding us that the use of aleatory methods, appropriation, or rule-bound procedures — however productive they may be as techniques — can never relieve the artist of her position of uncertainty before, and responsibility for, her choices in the field of possible actions. And to the extent that a chance procedure or constraint determines the character of the resulting work — gives it a prior purpose — to that extent it imposes on the work the nature of an allegory, as surely as any preexistent symbolic schema. To that same extent the work would no longer partake of Kant’s purposive purposelessness, and so, presumably, for Stewart it would be less adequate to aesthetic judgment.

This chancy quality of art is important for Stewart because it is a touchstone of the artist’s freedom. And the artist’s freedom is for her the paradigm of the person’s freedom: that preservation from totalitarian systems and nonconsensual development. So while art and ethics may have “strikingly different consequences,” in the sense that fictive actions and real ones are incommensurable,[51] they both involve forms of reflective judgment. Moreover,

[t]he artist’s positive freedom of making, and the face-to-face encounters between persons that follow from it, are … the foundation for the meetings of free and freely creating persons in free associations — those ideal meetings where persons sustain a mutual respect toward one another’s intentions as they move toward an open future.[52]

Stewart follows Kant and Marx in seeing self-legislation as central to both the artist’s creativity and the person’s authenticity; she follows Arendt in seeing art as the epitome of the distinction between labor, “which becomes erased back into time and nature,” and work, which “has some manifested consequence.” The further distinction between objects made for an explicit purpose and works of art “carries over into our sense of a life worth living,” since art “gives us an opportunity to judge what counts and what doesn’t count.”[53]

Stewart sees such a life, historically never very secure, as threatened. “We have an economic system that is willing, in the interest of short-term gain, to destroy not only the physical and mental health of individual workers but also, in utter self-defeat, the resources of the earth itself,” she writes. “Concepts of planned obsolescence and replacement, the operations of profit’s sublimity, are as counter as they could be to the values of singularity and saturated meaning I have been pursuing.”[54] She cites as a counterforce some prescient lines from Shelley’s “A Defence of Poetry” addressing those values:

The cultivation of poetry is never to be more desired than at periods when, from an excess of the selfish and calculating principle, the accumulation of the materials of external life exceed the quantity of the power of assimilating them to the internal laws of human nature. The body has then become too unwieldy for that which animates it.[55]


Subject-object 2.0

Shelley’s distinction between the body and that which animates it brings us back, via its mind-body dualism, to the larger subject-object problem. We have followed Stewart through poems that meditate on the mysterious paths by which physical sensations become perceptions and then intended images and ideas, including aesthetic creations. We’ve traced some implications of her assumption that, as Donald Wesling said in his review of Poetry and the Fate of the Senses, “the senses need a body to center and register them, and a person to socialize the body.”[56] We’ve seen that this concept of persons underpins a fundamental analogy between the face-to-face encounter of persons and the encounter with works of art, including poems. Such encounters with art, and the making that enables them, stand for Stewart against a privative solitude, darkness, and silence, thus exposing a deep affinity between this aspect of her work and that of Paul Celan. The person as subject of encounter is for Stewart also the subject to be spared from repression. In working out the implications of this idea, she — and we — must confront the subject-object problem in particularly contemporary forms.

Modeling the person as maker allows Stewart to explore at length, in The Poet’s Freedom, a variety of political, cultural, and biological conditions that characterize essential negative freedoms — freedoms from — and positive freedoms — freedoms to — that contribute to her paradigm of the creative, open, and tolerant life. In contrast to political action or certain technological interventions, the limited field in which free art-making operates “allows for erring as a kind of opening.” The reversibility of art — the maker’s “control over time and consequences” and the necessity and safety of constantly starting over — allows for “further richness in the emerging form and further knowledge of nature.” In Stewart’s view,

when human beings intervene in the fabric of nature at the level of molecules and cells, for example, it is only by doing so within a finite sphere, characterized by reversibility, that they can be saved from disaster. Irreversibility is the standard for damage as reversibility is the standard for healing.[57]

The centrality to Stewart’s poetics of the embodied person as individual subject, and of Kantian aesthetic judgment as a third capacity beside knowing and feeling, position those poetics as a kind of barometer of intellectual and cultural developments. If, as the philosopher and commentator on noise Ray Brassier proposes, the fundamental issue facing contemporary philosophy is how human experience fits into the world described by science, participants tend to fall into two camps: “those who want to explain science in terms of human experience” and “those who want to explain human experience in terms of science.” Brassier adds:

I side with those in the second camp who insist that we can attain an objective perspective on our own subjectivity. Philosophers in the first camp dispute this on the grounds that to explain experience objectively would be a contradiction in terms which would only ‘explain consciousness away’ and ultimately alienate us from the subjective core of our own humanity. … My own view is that despite its fundamentally reactionary tenor, the objection above registers a genuine difficulty, and that it is unrealistic and a little panglossian to insist that we will remain ‘human’ much as we are now even after the explanatory ‘reduction’ of experience.[58]

Stewart has said, “I have one primary goal as a poet and that is to get people to read more slowly, and to re-read … and see connections between poems.” She sees a “whole biological transformation that can happen in the reader” when attending to the physical aspects of poetic expression, and “by slowing readers down and helping them attend to language in this way, I have some small role in slowing the culture down and being a stay against this incredible imperative toward speed that we have, and toward making ourselves more machinelike.”[59] Stewart is not unaware of technology’s role as a sometimes-productive counter to contingent nature for art making. She notes, for example, that “the conditions necessary for the practice of art by women have only been available by means of technological interventions in our biological destiny.” But she is more concerned about “an alienating technological determinism and absorptive social coordination of time” to which art making might be an alternative, rather than a mere negation.[60] Even as little is done to mitigate poverty and physical dependence under hierarchical social forms, “new varieties of impoverishment have been brought about by the unthinking acceptance of technology.” It’s not physical want that she has in mind here, but the dearth of “undedicated” awareness in which a creative agent — Stewart dislikes the way the term “subjectivity” can elide the distinction between volition and passive experience — can have free play. “It has been our choice,” she writes, “to let machines demand our attention rather than free it.”[61]

It is, as McLuhan might have predicted, the dynamic of technological change and the seductive fascination of new media for both artists and audiences — more than the depredations of a hypostatized “capital” — that have the profoundest consequences for contemporary ways of being in the world, including art-making. As of 2011 data centers, or server farms, consumed about 2 percent of global electricity — more than Russia, and about the same amount as Italy or Spain — and worldwide, the amount of data to be stored doubles about every eighteen months.[62] Even without factoring in the environmental impact of the servers that feed ereaders (including tablets used for reading), their mere production, replacement, and use for reading ebooks over five years would account for a carbon footprint at least twice as great as that of the same quantity of printed books, and so far the explosion in ebooks has not resulted in a decline in the production of printed books; the impact is additive.[63]

The direction and scale of this trend are clear enough, and one could multiply citations in every domain of cultural production, from movies to scientific journals to digital art, and extend them to include blogs, social networks, and games like Farmville, whose data reside almost entirely in the cloud. While companies and researchers are working to mitigate the environmental impact, whether by moving server farms to Scandinavia (where ambient air can be used for cooling and most electricity comes from carbon-free sources) or pursuing quantum computing (whose greater efficiency depends so far on power-hungry cryocooling), the cultural record is being shifted wholesale to media that depend upon the electrical grid and to data formats that must be regularly updated or converted. Meanwhile the machines that read them obsolesce, only to be redundantly replaced by newer models at ever shorter intervals.

Stewart’s work meets these trends at two junctions. First, she resists the philosophical position that the given world, including the earth and its resources, exists for humans in an instrumental sense.[64] The often-noted elegiac strain in both her poetry and her criticism begins in this resistance. Lament for what has been and will be lost is further prompted by that ethical concern for persons and encounters that I have already discussed. “If we have any kind of environmental consciousness,” Stewart says, “we have to care about strangers, who may or may not have a blood relationship to us, in the distant future.”[65] Using E. O. Wilson’s term, she observes:

Perhaps we in contemporary Western societies do not see nature as a “language” — that is, as organized at a coherent, sacred, level of signification — but certainly most of us respond to nature, even at the most rudimentary level, with a kind of biophilia. Living things call out to other living things.[66]

If, as some believe to have already occurred, the progress of global warming reaches a point at which only geoengineering can salvage life on the planet,[67] then we will all, ironically, become dependent on the very instrumentalism Stewart warns against. Not surprisingly, then, her work — especially The Forest but other poetry and criticism as well — turns up regularly in syllabi and conversations on ecopoetics.

A second junction with technological determinism involves the preservation of created works. Unlike, say, a sixteenth-century book in storage, a digital file cannot survive under a regime of benign neglect. Unless regularly copied and converted to a current data format, or unless obsolete machines (whether virtual or physical) are maintained to interpret it, a digital work will likely become unrecoverable even faster than works on notoriously volatile cellulose nitrate film stock or nineteenth-century newsprint.[68] Undertaking such preservation activities on a large scale raises questions of societal commitment and allocation of scarce financial and other resources. As Stewart has said, “Like natural resources, art works need continual care — and care only comes from intimacy and knowledge.” There is no such intimacy without access; the universal availability of “the most refined, considered works of our minds and hands,” requires that “every person … have the resources and education necessary to cultivate his or her sense of taste. It seems to me to be as much a birth-right as the inalienable status of our bodies.”[69] Networked digital technology at once advances this availability and increases the long-term cost — and risks — of maintaining it.

In light of the speed, seductiveness (1.01 billion Facebook users and counting), costs, and risks of technology uptake, Brassier’s question about the status of human experience takes on a new urgency:

Some recent philosophers have evinced an interest in subjectless experiences; I am rather more interested in experience-less subjects. Another name for this would be ‘nemocentrism’ (a term coined by neurophilosopher Thomas Metzinger): the objectification of experience would generate self-less subjects that understand themselves to be no-one and no-where. This casts an interesting new light on the possibility of a ‘communist’ subjectivity.[70]

This is not too far from the concept of “substrate-independent mind,” one of the scenarios associated with a postulated technological singularity, or emergence of greater than human intelligence through technological means. Rapid advances in hyperconnectivity, robotics, biotech, nanotech, and miniaturization have led to predictions that the singularity is near; and though, as Bruce Sterling has recently written, machines still can’t pass the Turing test, many artists in the generation born after postmodernism are trying out aesthetics that reflect their comfortable collaboration and symbiosis with technology. Whether or not “seeing like digital devices” results in recruiting satellites or London’s web of ubiquitous surveillance cameras to construct a suprapersonal vision, it’s certainly not hard to imagine a day when the cliché of the smartphone as prosthetic becomes literalized. But as Sterling reminds us, “the aesthetics of surveillance cams are not value-free. Because aesthetics are not value-free.”

So if, as Brassier imagines, an objective, scientific characterization of human experience were achieved, and that characterization facilitated a collective subjectivity of some kind, what would it mean for such a subjectivity to create a work of art? Some more tightly integrated crowd-sourcing version of the artist’s collective might be a recognizable template for the volitional and formative aspects of making. But what would it mean for such a subjectivity to experience and judge a work of art? We don’t yet have a metaphysics or an aesthetics equal to the question.[71] Maybe a better question is what kind of ethics would apply to such a collective subjectivity. Again, we can’t know with confidence, but we do have a kind of prototype in the corporation. Legally a person, the liabilities and responsibilities of its constituent biological persons are explicitly limited. The track record for corporate ethics warrants critical study in this context.

But what if, as science grows closer to understanding the nature of human experience, that nature becomes, rather than a superseded and mystifying fact, a thing in Bruno Latour’s sense, a matter of concern[72] — so that art, philosophy, and science together work to enlarge our appreciation of its complexity rather than reducing and fragmenting it? It was after all the neopragmatist Richard Rorty who appropriated and “stretched” Harold Bloom’s term “strong poets” to designate writers who had enriched and advanced the contingent vocabularies of philosophy.[73] And while Rorty extended the term to include prose writers who had given us new language games, it was verse — not the philosophy he had read or written — that comforted him in the experience of his own final illness:

I suspect that no comparable effect could have been produced by prose. Not just imagery, but also rhyme and rhythm were needed to do the job. … [A]ll three conspire to produce a degree of compression, and thus of impact, that only verse can achieve. Compared to the shaped charges contrived by versifiers, even the best prose is scattershot.[74]

For Rorty, in other words, it is the sensory effects of verse that give it such force.

There is no more cogent exponent of the relationship of poetry to the embodied senses than Susan Stewart; she remains among those strong poets who enrich our ability to describe human experience as — in Latour’s sense — a matter of concern. And perhaps, as she writes, “the knowledge of parts and wholes, the freedom to act and the freedom to judge that art can provide, might help us become … a resource for that nature we have heretofore depleted.”[75]

In the concluding lines of “The Owl,” Stewart recurs to wonder and uncertainty:

And still I thought a piece of cloth
had flown outside my window, or human hands

had freed a wing, or churning gods revealed
themselves, or, greater news, a northern owl,

a snowy owl descended.

The wisdom of troubled recognition is shown to be the wisdom of humility. Neither human ingenuity nor divine intervention is “the greater news,” but rather the given world of nature. The difficulty portrayed here — as in Gormley’s Blind Light — in fixing the boundary between the human subject and the natural object suggests the ecological and philosophical interpenetration of human experience and the “objective” realm. However powerful science becomes in characterizing each, Stewart cautions in both her poetry and her criticism against excessive confidence in either the ‘disruptive change’ of technology or the teleological ‘creative destruction’ of aesthetic revolution. Unintended consequences, she intimates, are buried in small graves in Lancaster County. Inquiry, not mastery, is her aim:

In the Iliad, there is no natural death —
everything comes about by intent

… All that violence
out of somebody’s error.[76]

Intent, even the recovered intent of poets, is fallible. In art’s ability to accommodate error Stewart sees a great strength. In life, however, consequences matter. When the forests are gone, who will be able, like the Amish, to forgive?

 


 

Acknowledgments: In response to my query, Clare Kinney and Bob Perelman contributed examples of troubled recognition; thanks also to them, to members of the Smedley Street writers group, and especially to Rachel Epstein for insightful comments on the draft of this essay. Thanks to Danny Snelson and John Paetsch for early links to noise and nonphilosophy.

1. Susan Stewart, “The Sculptor as First Finder,” in Antony Gormley: Blind Light (South Bank Centre, UK: Hayward Gallery Publishing, 2007), 94.

2. Stewart, Studio 111 interview at University of Pennsylvania, May 4, 2004.

3. Stewart, Red Rover (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 3–5.

4. John Kinsella, “On Susan Stewart’s Red Rover,” Salt Magazine, no. 3 (March 2010).

5. Stewart, Poetry and the Fate of the Senses (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 1–2.

6. Ange Mlinko, “Lullaby: Susan Stewart’s Red Rover,” The Nation, November 17, 2008.

7. G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23.

8. J. R. R. Tolkien and E. V. Gordon, eds., Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 60.

9. Dickinson, Emily, The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson, ed. Thomas H. Johnson (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), 682–3.

10. Among the mythical wells of wisdom and poetic inspiration that prefigure Frost’s symbol is Connla’s Well, alluded to in several of W. B. Yeats’s works including “The Wanderings of Oisin” and the play The Shadowy Waters, and which the Irish poet encountered in a visionary experiment. In a letter to Mrs. Dorothea Hunter, a fellow member of the Order of the Golden Dawn, Yeats described its waters as “the waters of emotion and passion, in which all but purified souls are entangled” (letter of January 1, 1898, in The Letters of W. B. Yeats, ed. Alan Davis [London: Hart-Davis, 1954], 293–94). Frost met Yeats in London in 1913 and was familiar with his work.

11. In this Stewart’s practice recalls, though for different ends, Auden’s dictum: “Our sufferings and weaknesses, in so far as they are personal, our sufferings, our weaknesses, are of no literary interest whatsoever. They are only interesting in so far as we can see them as typical of the human condition. A suffering, a weakness, which cannot be expressed as an aphorism should not be mentioned.” W. H. Auden, “Hic et Ille,” in The Dyer’s Hand and Other Essays (New York: Vintage, 1968), 99.

12. In Poetry and the Fate of the Senses, Stewart quotes Henri Bergson from his 1908 treatise Matter and Memory: “There is no perception which is not full of memories. With the immediate and present data of our senses, we mingle a thousand details out of our past experience” (Stewart, Poetry, 152). Contemporary research is even more emphatic. British neuropsychologist Richard Gregory estimates that “visual perception is more than ninety per cent memory and less than ten per cent sensory nerve signals” (see Atul Gawande, “The Itch,” The New Yorker, June 30, 2008, 58–65).

13. Publius Vergilius Maro, Aeneid XII, 193–95.

14. Susan Deacy and Alexandra Villing, eds., Athena in the Classical World (Boston: Brill, 2001), 133–36.

15. Confidence in this mise en scène is supported by the fact that Stewart taught aesthetics at the Tyler School of Art in Rome from 1988 to 1997 and was a visiting writer at the American Academy in Rome in 2001.

16. Stewart, Studio 111 interview.

17. Stewart, “On the Art of the Future,” in The Open Studio: Essays on Art and Aesthetics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 15. A version of this essay was presented as a talk at Slought Foundation in Philadelphia on April 9, 2003.

18. Stewart, Poetry, 150.

19. Stewart, Studio 111 interview.

20. Allen Grossman, “Summa Lyrica,” in The Sighted Singer: Two Works on Poetry for Readers and Writers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 212.

21. Stewart, “On the Art of the Future,” 17.

22. Ibid., 19.

23. Ibid., 20.

24. Ibid., 18.

25. Quoted in Face to Face with Levinas, ed. Richard A. Cohen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 23–24.

26. Stewart, “On the Art of the Future,” 20.

27. Ibid., 21.

28. Martin Buber, I-Thou 2nd ed., trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Scribners, 1958), 16.

29. Ibid., 9–10.

30. Ibid., 40–41.

31. John Felstiner, Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 161.

32. Paul Celan, “The Meridian,” in Collected Prose, trans. Rosemarie Waldrop (New York: Routledge, 2003), 39–40.

33. Ibid., 49.

34. Celan, The Meridian: Final Version–Drafts–Materials, ed. Bernhard Böschenstein and Heino Schmull with assistance from Michael Schwarzkopf and Christiane Witkop, trans. Pierre Joris (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 132.

35. In his longest draft of this section before the final redaction of the whole speech, Celan throughout this passage uses “I speak” rather than “the poem speaks” (on its/my own behalf and on behalf of the other/alien) and connects this first-person agency with “the poem’s hopes” — emphasizing how deeply personal was his sense that the author “stays with” the poem. See Celan, The Meridian: Final Version–Drafts–Materials, 55.

36. Celan, “The Meridian,” 48.

37. Ibid., 49.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., 50.

40. Ibid., 54.

41. “[W]hen we use language, we’re entering into a relationship with others, both the living and the dead, and when I write a poem, I’m very aware of all kinds of audiences: an ideal audience, perhaps of just a few people who might, to my mind, represent very high standards for poetry or what poetry can do; but also I have to keep in mind people who might not understand what I’m talking about, so the poetic project has a kind of pedagogy to it — I think especially in the course of reading a book. … And of course the whole history of women as poets and artists and intellectuals has meant a great deal to me. And those women are among my ideal listeners, whether they’re present or not” (Stewart, Studio 111 interview).

42. Nadezhda Mandelstam, Hope against Hope, trans. Max Hayward (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 231, quoted in Susan Stewart, The Poet’s Freedom: A Notebook on Making (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 178.

43. Stewart, The Poet’s Freedom, 178.

44. Stewart, Studio 111 interview.

45. Mandelstam, Hope Against Hope, 231, quoted in Stewart, The Poet’s Freedom, 178.

46. It’s tempting here to detect traces, applied to the Western corpus, of the ethnopoetics pioneered by Dell Hymes, who was teaching in Penn’s Department of Folklore and Folklife when Stewart began her doctoral work there in 1973.

47. Stewart, The Poet’s Freedom, 18–28.

48. Ibid., 27–28.

49. Stewart, “On the Art of the Future,” 15.

50. Stewart, Studio 111 interview.

51. “In art we can explore freely a range of ethical choices without having to bear the burden of what would otherwise be their lived consequences. Art is saturated with intention in this way, and the receiver, instead of suffering from the maker’s will, is instead able to enter into it at a distance, and in turn make errors of interpretation that are likely to be productive.” Stewart, “Poetry and the Senses: An Interview with Susan Stewart,” Journal of Philosophy: A Cross Disciplinary Inquiry 4, no. 9 (Spring 2009): 54–55.

52. Stewart, The Poet’s Freedom, 28.

53. Ibid., 191–92.

54. Ibid., 192.

55. Percy Bysshe Shelley, “A Defence of Poetry,” in Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, ed. Donald H. Reiman and Neil Fraistat (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 503.

56. Donald Wesling. “Poetry and the Fate of the Senses,” Modern Language Quarterly 65, no. 2 (June 2004): 305–10.

57. Stewart, The Poet’s Freedom, 204–5.

58. Ray Brassier and Bram Ieven, “Against an Aesthetics of Noise,” nY no. 2 (2009). Brassier might also be termed a nonphilosopher, having often been associated with the “nonphilosophy” (sans-philosophie) of Francois Laruelle and its sympathizers.

59. Stewart, Studio 111 interview.

60. Stewart, “On the Art of the Future,” 26–27.

61. Stewart, The Poet’s Freedom, 200–201.

62. On the percentage of 2011 global power use and the comparison with Russia, see The Los Angeles Times Technology blog for April 22, 2011. On the 2010 percentage and the comparison with Spain and Italy, see The Telegraph for October 26, 2011. On the rate of growth of digital data stored on servers, see The Economist for June 30, 2011.

63. The Millions blog; “Are eReaders Really Green?” blog entry by Nick Moran, May 1, 2012.

64. Stewart, Poetry, 332.

65. Stewart, Studio 111 interview. Stewart explicitly follows Mary Warnock in taking this position.

66. Stewart, “Poetry and the Senses: An Interview with Susan Stewart,” 53.

67. Michael Specter, “The Climate Fixers,” The New Yorker, May 14, 2012.

68. Conversion of data formats itself raises the question of the definition of the digital “work” to be preserved. In many cases, the original code is an important constituent of the work itself, perhaps even more so than a manuscript or book as “material object.” As with analog sound recordings on magnetic tape or 78 rpm phonograph records, preservation of such formats implies maintenance of archaic playback machinery, whether in hardware or virtual form.

69. Stewart, “Poetry and the Senses: An Interview with Susan Stewart,” 56.

70. Brassier and Ieven, “Against an Aesthetics of Noise.”

71. Of course, should this collective subjectivity arise in a postsingularity world, it would by definition be impossible for us to predict the philosophy proper to a greater-than-human intelligence.

72. Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” Critical Inquiry 30, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 225–48.

73. Richard Rorty, “The Fire of Life,” Poetry 191, no. 2 (November 2007): 129–31.

74. Rorty, “The Fire of Life,” 130.

75. Stewart, The Poet’s Freedom, 205.

76. Stewart, “In the Western World,” in Red Rover (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 79.

Marjorie Perloff: A bibliographic essay

Perloff lecturing in 1965. Image courtesy of Marjorie Perloff.

With her work now spanning over four decades of publication, the preeminent critic and scholar Marjorie Perloff has amassed a body of writing on avant-garde/experimental poetics, modernism, postmodernism, pedagogy, and a host of other topics that remains at once complex and accessible, insightful and provocative. She has championed dozens of marginalized writers and artists whose difficult or seemingly indecipherable work has aroused the castigation or neglect of other established literary critics; her essays thus frequently target those very academics, artists, and institutions whose assumptions and structural deficiencies reveal a bias toward aesthetic conservatism. She has also continued a legacy of criticism whose practitioners, Guy Davenport and Hugh Kenner among them, utilized their distinct critical voices to investigate and contextualize various literary subjects. Her work, however, brings such methods into a climate distinguished by its post-postmodernism and techno-centricity, whose myriad indeterminacies and conceptualisms have complicated the “mot juste” of modernism (“The Fascination of What’s Difficult: Emily Dickinson and the Theory Canon”). In this way, she has formulated not so much a literary canon as a set of historical and cultural contingencies that — like many of her subjects — feed into and complicate one another. For an apt and comprehensive overview of Perloff’s career, one would do well to start with Peter Barry’s entry in The Encyclopedia of Literary Critics and Criticism (1999).

For an experienced reader of Perloff’s work, the intentional interconnectedness of her books, essays, reviews, and interviews at once deepen her pedagogical and polemical inclinations while anticipating the very “digital tunnels” and networked experimentalisms she has elucidated in her most recent book, Unoriginal Genius (2010). However, an uninitiated reader may find such an oeuvre daunting — especially if s/he is researching a specific figure within the scope of Perloff’s bibliography. Indeed, a single essay might touch on Goethe, Rimbaud, William Carlos Williams, Samuel Beckett, John Ashbery, and many others, as is the case in her essay “Lucent and Inescapable Rhythms: Metrical ‘Choice’ and Historical Formation” (1998). In this bibliographic essay, I will attempt to group Perloff’s writings by their major themes and figures; I will arrange them in loosely chronological order (i.e. romantic/premodern subjects followed by modernist subjects, etc.), ending with a grouping of her works on pedagogy and poetics. Though I will deploy terms such as “modernism” and “postmodernism” to differentiate historical periods, my intent is that they provide flexible frameworks rather than strict delineations.

Because much of Perloff’s work is freely available online, I have provided links when possible. This essay will ideally serve as a sort of “living document” that can be updated with respect to Perloff’s future publications, and/or refined according to the suggestions of other Perloff scholars. To aid readability, I have only included partial information regarding the publication of each essay, book, review, or interview cited. For more information, please refer to the bibliography at the conclusion of this essay.

Modernist inceptions: Goethe/Yeats

Although Marjorie Perloff’s knowledge of literary history is remarkably vast, most of her work, as we shall see, addresses topics related to twentieth- and twenty-first-century literature. There are, however, two major figures to whom she has dedicated a good deal of attention, and who could feasibly be characterized as romantic or premodern: William Butler Yeats and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Indeed, one of her earlier works, “Yeats and Goethe” (1971), explores the Goethe’s influence on the famous Irish poet. Perhaps even more tellingly, Perloff’s first published book, Rhyme and Meaning in the Poetry of Yeats (1970), deals exclusively with Yeats and the formal implications presented by his work; an essay published in 1995, “Teaching Yeats’s Sound Structures,” would echo that text’s themes. Dated even earlier than Rhyme and Meaning, “Yeats and the Occasional Poem: ‘Easter, 1916’” (1968), provides an in-depth reading of that famous war poem, and predates her 2005 contribution to The Oxford Handbook of British and Irish War Poetry, “‘Easter, 1916’: Yeats’s First World War Poem.” An analysis of Yeats’s “Coole Park and Ballylee, 1931,” “‘Another Emblem There’: Theme and Convention in Yeats's ‘Coole Park and Ballylee, 1931’” (1970), marks another early exploration of Yeats’s poetics; this interest in Yeats’s individual poems was reiterated yet again in 2007 with “How to Read a Poem: W. B. Yeats’s ‘After Long Silence.’” “‘The Tradition of Myself’: The Autobiographical Mode of Yeats” (1975) explores the connections between Yeats’s personal life and writing, and represents an early inception of Perloff’s interest in personal/cultural histories as filtered through literature and art. In the more recent “‘An Image from a Past Life’: Beckett’s Yeatsian Turn” (2007), Yeats serves as a lens through which to read Beckett’s notion of failure. One might also turn to her booklength study of Pound’s influence, Dance of the Intellect: Studies in the Poetry of the Pound Tradition (1985), in which Yeats — one of Pound’s early masters — makes several appearances throughout the essays comprising that collection.

Her major essays on Goethe date from around the same period (late ’60s/early ’70s) as those on Yeats, the most notable of which are “The Autobiographical Mode of Goethe: Dichtung und Wahrheit and the Lyric Poems” (1970) and “The Challenge of the German Lyric: Goethe and Heine in Translation” (1983). Goethe also becomes entangled with a more personal context in the second essay/chapter of Vienna Paradox (2003), “German by the Grace of Goethe” (73–120), in which Germany’s allegiance to its literary hero complicates histories both filial and national.

Modernism (early twentieth century)

Though it is perhaps anachronistic to divide Yeats and Goethe as such from early modernism, they do allow an opening into the broader spectrum of Perloff’s thematic concerns, many of which open with those writers and artists operating in the early twentieth century. Of these figures, one of the most imperative to Perloff’s work is Ezra Pound. An entire book, the aforementioned Dance of the Intellect, is dedicated not only to Pound’s writing, but even more so, to his influence across the century. The essays contained in this volume, including such titles as “Pound/Stevens: Whose Era?” and “Postmodernism and the Impasse of Lyric,” provide an expansive reading of Pound’s enigmatic poetics, criticism, and correspondence. However, Dance of the Intellect is by no means the end-all of Perloff’s writing on Pound. Like Cage, Duchamp, and many others, he is a frequently recurring character throughout her criticism. One might turn to such essays as “The Search for ‘Prime Words’: Pound, Duchamp, and the Nominalist Ethos” (2001) and “Pound and Rimbaud: The Retreat from Symbolism” (1975). “The Contemporary of our Grandchildren: Pound’s Influence” (1985) further explores the depth and complexity of Pound’s lingering prominence in various poetries old and (made) new.

It is from Pound that we might begin to confront the dilemmas of innovation and community in early modernism/avant-garde culture. Perloff has written a good deal on then-nascent avant movements like Cubism, Dadaism, and, perhaps most pronouncedly, Futurism. Doubtless, the most cohesive booklength study by Perloff on modernism is filtered through Marinetti’s infamous movement in The Futurist Moment: Avant-Garde, Avant-Guerre, and the Language of Rupture (1985/2003), which contains essays such as “The Invention of Collage” (1983) and “Violence and Precision: The Manifesto as Artform” (1984), both apt introductions to the currents of the early European avant-garde and its machinic impulses. Outside of The Futurist Moment, “Why Futurism Now?” (1988), “‘Grammar in Use’: Wittgenstein/Gertrude Stein/Marinetti” (1996), and “The First Futurist Manifesto Revisited” (2007) all serve to augment her explorations of the Futurists’/early modernists’ artistic practices.

The essays “Cubist Collaboration/Abstract Assemblage: The Avant-Garde Artist’s Book” (2008) and “Collage and Poetry” (1998) further bespeak an interest both in the specific contexts and legacies permeating European and American avant-garde practices. Part of the difficulty in locating a “definitive” Perloff work on modernism lies in the fact that her essays are often quite specific to movements or figures; however, one might turn to “The Aura of Modernism” (2005) or “Epilogue, Modernism Now” in Bradshaw and Dettmar’s A Companion to Modernist Literature and Culture (2006) for contemporary takes on the consequences and ongoing problems presented by modernism. One could turn also to “‘The Renaissance of 1910’: Reflections on Guy Davenport’s Poetics” (2006) or “Hugh Kenner and the Invention of Modernism” (2005) for brief historical analyses conducted via these two influential critics. “The Pursuit of Number: Yeats, Khlebnikov, and the Mathematics of the Modern” contained in Poetic License (1990) and “Playing the Numbers: The French Reception of Louis Zukofsky” (2006) touch on mathematics as a syntactical tool in early modernism.

As the title of Perloff’s 1994 book Radical Artifice: Writing Poetry in the Age of Media would suggest, many of these takes on early modernism/avant-garde movements are shaped by considerations of technology, a field that rapidly expanded through the twentieth century. Citation, appropriation, assemblage, and other practices are all at least partially indebted to a Benjaminian sense of art and culture being shaped by its media environment. Radical Artifice, The Futurist Moment, and Unoriginal Genius are the exemplary books on this thematic front. As we shall see, Perloff’s investigations of Beckett, Language writing, and Conceptual poetics all involve technology as a formative artistic/literary device; within the purview of early modernism, such an idea might best be apprehended first via Marcel Duchamp.

For Perloff, Duchamp stands as one of the most important figures in twentieth-century art and literature. His mutinous innovations and deceptively playful spirit are both of great importance to Perloff; “Duchamp’s conceptualism is best understood, not as the negation of ‘art’ as such, but as the drive to render unto art the things that are art — which is to say, the realm of the mind as well as the eye, the realm of ideas and intellect as well as visual image,” she writes in “The Conceptual Poetics of Marcel Duchamp” (2002) — perhaps the best introduction to her writing on him (83). The aforementioned essay “The Search for ‘Prime Words’” on Pound and Duchamp also serves to connect their pioneering art to larger modernist currents. However, because Duchamp posed such a massive problem for the avant-garde artists that follow him, many of these essays focus instead on his relation to specific artists and movements. “A Duchamp Unto Myself: Writing Through Marcel” (1994), which appears in Perloff’s coedited collection of essays, John Cage: Composed in America, explores Cage’s difficult relationship with Duchamp and his work. “Dada Without Duchamp / Duchamp Without Dada: Avant-Garde Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1999) finds Perloff investigating Duchamp’s fraught history with the Dadaists in personal, aesthetic, and historical terms. “Avant Garde and Difference: Duchamp and the Russian Avant-Garde” (1991), “But isn’t the same at least the same?: Wittgenstein, Duchamp, and the Infra-Thin” (2001), and “Of Objects and Readymades: Gertrude Stein and Marcel Duchamp” (1996) bring Duchamp into conversation with a more international avant-garde that stretches across continental boundaries. Finally, “Duchamp’s Eliot: The Detours of Tradition and the Persistence of the Individual Talent” (2007), which appears in Canci and Harding’s T. S. Eliot and the Concept of Tradition, utilizes the modernist theme of individuality to link the artist and poet.

Like Pound and Duchamp, Eliot casts a broad shadow over both his fellow modernists and future generations of writers. “Avant-Garde Eliot” (2002) explores both the connections and aporias in Eliot’s relationship with his contemporaries; in the introduction to Unoriginal Genius, “The Wasteland” — along with Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project — serves as a sort of guiding citational spirit for the other poets and literary works discussed therein. In hindsight, it represents a turn toward the machinic and manifesto-driven art that so distinguishes the early avant-garde.

Two other major literary figures of the early twentieth century play significant roles in Perloff’s work, and will serve as salient benchmarks in her engagement with later writers: Gertrude Stein and William Carlos Williams. Stein in particular seems a substantial touchpoint for Perloff; to be sure, Stein’s influence on the likes of John Cage, Language writing, and Conceptual poetry cannot be overlooked. One might turn to “‘A Fine New Kind of Realism’: Six Stein Styles in Search of a Reader” (1990) in Poetic License, “‘Grammar in Use’: Wittgenstein/Gertrude Stein/Marinetti” (1996) in Wittgenstein’s Ladder, “Poetry as Word-System: The Art of Gertrude Stein” (1979), “Abstraction and Unreadability” (2011), “The Difference is Spreading: Gertrude Stein” (2007), the aforementioned “Of Objects and Readymades: Gertrude Stein and Marcel Duchamp” (1996), “(Im)personating Gertrude Stein” (1988), and “Gertrude Stein’s Differential Syntax” (2002). William Carlos Williams also makes two notable appearances in Perloff’s books: “‘Lines Converging and Crossing’: The ‘French’ Decade of William Carlos Williams” (1981) in The Poetics of Indeterminacy and “‘To Give a Design’: Williams and the Visualization of Poetry” in Dance of the Intellect. “The Stain of Love and the Fallen Leaf: The Displacements of Desire in Williams’s Early Poetry” (1993) and “The Man Who Loved Women: The Medical Fictions of William Carlos Williams” (1980) both focus on specific styles within the broader scope of Williams’s influential work. Like Pound and Stein, he will make many cameos in Perloff’s future essays (“The Radical Poetics of Robert Creeley” [2007], to give one example).

One final figure of great importance to Perloff’s work — and who might represent an apt bridge between the early and mid-twentieth century — is Ludwig Wittgenstein. While Perloff’s engagement with specific philosophers is typically contingent upon the poets they inspired, Wittgenstein remains an exception. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary (1996) examines the philosopher’s influence (conscious or otherwise) on a number of literary innovators, including Stein, Beckett, Cage, and Thomas Bernhard. Elsewhere, numerous essays further explore Wittgenstein’s work with language, and, more generally, his life and legacy. These essays include “But Isn’t the Same at Least the Same?: Wittgenstein and the Question of Poetic Translatability” (2004), “The Poetics of Description: Wittgenstein on the Aesthetic” (2003), “Writing Philosophy as Poetry: Wittgenstein’s Literary Syntax” (2009), “Toward a Wittgensteinian Poetics” (1992), and “From Theory to Grammar: Wittgenstein and the Aesthetic of the Ordinary” (1994), all of which explore the poetics in and about Wittgenstein’s writing and philosophy. A more jocular application of Wittgenstein can be found in the essay “Sex, Lies, and First Ladies: A Modest (Wittgensteinian) Proposal” (1998), which utilizes the philosopher as a means of reading of Bill Clinton’s 1998 testimony regarding his affair with Monica Lewinsky.

Modernism (mid-twentieth century)

As the twentieth century unfolded, its various movements sparkling and fading, its various developments dispersed or reified, America began to witness a slew of new poetic sensibilities, from the confessional and imagistic lyricism of Robert Lowell and Sylvia Plath to the experimental projections of Black Mountain to the playful and exuberant New York School. Writers like Samuel Beckett sustained linguistic paradoxes raised by Wittgenstein and Duchamp; the Beats inherited a surrealism suffused with social consciousness. Perhaps most importantly (at least in the spectrum of Perloff’s writing), John Cage emerged as a powerful and inspiring force for musicians, artists, and writers. His work evolved Duchamp’s concerns, combining them with aspects of eastern philosophy, including chance operation, indeterminacy, and absence. It is through these movements that we might first glimpse something like postmodernism or Conceptualism — artists both fractured and networked, emphasizing context and content.

While many other contemporaneous movements (e.g. New York School, Black Mountain) are remembered as more communal affairs, Robert Lowell and Sylvia Plath today appear decidedly individualistic, even in the milieu of “confessional poetry.” This is not to suggest that they are isolated; they do, however, appear to carry on a certain legacy of modernism’s respect for the past and romanticism’s proclivity towards introspection. Indeed, one of Perloff’s earliest books is dedicated entirely to Lowell: The Poetic Art of Robert Lowell (1973), which contains both polemic and formal approaches to Lowell’s oeuvre. As a sort of bookend to her Lowell study, a review of his Collected Poems, entitled “The Return of Robert Lowell,” was published in 2004. The book and the review make for a good pairing, with the latter providing significant scholarly and personal reflection on over thirty years spent with Lowell’s writing. Contained within Poetic Art, “The Voice of the Poet: The Winslow Elegies of Robert Lowell” (1967) provides one such example of a specific reading akin to her work with individual Yeats poems. “Fearlessly Holding Back Nothing: Robert Lowell’s Last Poems” (1980) further addresses Lowell’s output, while “Poètes Maudits of the Genteel Tradition (Robert Lowell and John Berryman)” situates Lowell in a longer lineage of poetic practices. For more discussion of specific Lowell poems, see “A Critical Exchange on Selected Poems by Robert Lowell,” conducted between Perloff and David Wojahn and published in 2007.

Similar to her essays on Yeats and Lowell, most of Perloff’s writing on Sylvia Plath either provides a specific reading of one of Plath’s works, or situates her legacy in a broader historical/academic context. “Sylvia Plath’s ‘Sivvy’ Poems: A Portrait of the Poet as Daughter” (1979), “‘A Ritual for Being Born Twice’: Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar” (1972), “On the Road to Ariel: The Transitional Poetry of Sylvia Plath” (1973), and “On Sylvia Plath’s ‘Tulips’” (1975) are instances of the former; “The Two Ariels: The (Re)Making of the Sylvia Plath Canon” (1984) and “Extremist Poetry: Some Versions of the Sylvia Plath Myth” (1973), the latter. “Angst and Animism in the Poetry of Sylvia Plath” (1970) stands as an exception to these two categories, providing a wider thematic vantage point on Plath’s poetics.

Around the time that poets like Lowell, Plath, and Berryman were writing some of their most well known works, a more directly community-driven group of poets was springing up in North Carolina, centered at the experimental arts school Black Mountain College. Its faculty boasted some of the most progressive artists and writers of its time, including John Cage, Buckminster Fuller, Charles Olson, Robert Creeley, Robert Rauschenberg, Merce Cunningham, and Aaron Siskind. Of the poets operating out of BMC (excluding Cage), Perloff has focused most on Creeley and Olson. The latter of these two poets serves as the subject of a relatively early essay, “Charles Olson and the ‘Inferior Predecessors’: Projective Verse Revisited” (1973). Meanwhile, two more recent essays on Creeley, “The Radical Poetics of Robert Creeley” (2007) and “Robert Creeley Out of School: The Making of a Singular Poetics” (2010), provide more holistic readings of Creeley’s writing career. “Robert Creeley’s Windows (2002) and “Four Times Five: Robert Creeley’s The Island” (1978) focus on specific books.

However, Perloff’s favorite subjects of the mid-twentieth century are by no means confined to America. Samuel Beckett remains a writer of great importance to Perloff’s historical-aesthetic narrative of the avant-garde’s development; his deep language games and exophonic subtleties — “his way of not-saying and yet saying” — at once destabilized the boundaries of prose and poetry while evoking poets, philosophers, and satirists of the past (“In Love With Hiding: Samuel Beckett’s War,” 27). “Witt-Watt: The Language of Resistance/The Resistance of Language” (1996), contained in Wittgenstein’s Ladder, explores the philosopher’s influence on Beckett’s work — and in particular — his novel Watt. Perloff has written several notable essays — “Between Verse and Prose: Beckett and the New Poetry” (1982), “Beckett the Poet” (2010), and “Between the Shingle and the Dune: The Poetry of Samuel Beckett” (1978) — on Beckett’s poetics, disputing in part its frequent relegation to the realm of “fiction” or “drama.” This argument has subsequently produced some of Perloff’s rare essays on music, “The Beckett/Feldman Radio Collaboration: Words and Music as Hörspiel” (2003) and “The Silence that Is Not Silence: Acoustic Art in Beckett’s Embers (1999) being key examples. “Beckett in the Country of the Houyhnhnms: The Inward Turn of Swiftian Satire” (2008) relates Beckett to one of his Irish forebears, while “Light Silence: Dark Speech: Reading Johns’s Images, Seeing Beckett’s Language in Foirades/Fizzles” (2002) scrutinizes connections between Beckett’s writing and the Abstract Expressionist paintings of Jasper Johns.

New York School

While these varied strains of avant-garde practices were occurring in the 1940s and ’50s, another wholly distinct movement, comprised of poets, artists, and dancers, was coalescing in New York. Poets like Frank O’Hara, John Ashbery, Kenneth Koch, and Barbara Guest began working with a new poetic vernacular infused with the bustling images of New York and privileging spontaneity over careful construction. Of the poets involved with the New York School, Frank O’Hara has undoubtedly earned the majority of Perloff’s attention; her early book Frank O’Hara: Poet Among Painters (1977, reprint 1998) brings together several essays that — as we have seen in dozens of other examples — place O’Hara in the context of his New York milieu, a city rife with ambitious experimental visual artists, while examining the evolution of his writing chronologically. The book contains most of her major essays on O’Hara, though a few others are worth mentioning here: “Alterable Noons: The poèmes élastiques of Blaise Cendrars and Frank O’Hara” (1988) and “‘The Ecstasy of Always Bursting Forth!’: Rereading Frank O’Hara” (2008) provide post-Painters readings of O’Hara’s work, the former in relation to the Swiss-Franco modernist. “Watchman, Spy, and Dead Man: Johns, O’Hara, Cage and the ‘Aesthetic of Indifference’” (2001) and “‘Transparent Selves’: The Poetry of John Ashbery and Frank O’Hara” (1978) also serve to further contextualize O’Hara amongst figures in his social circle. Within the purview of that scene, one might also turn to Perloff’s essays on John Ashbery: “Normalizing John Ashbery” (2001) and a review, “Still Time for Surprises: John Ashbery’s Recent Books” (2001), approach the famous American poet’s work across a career that has spanned far more time than O’Hara’s.

Though mostly peripheral to the New York School, the Beat movement is perhaps still more well known today. Perloff’s oeuvre is largely devoid of writing on that movement, with the exception of Allen Ginsberg. For Perloff, “Howl” stands as a tremendously important poem of its time, with “America” playing a more comic counterpart. The aforementioned “A Step Away from Them” provides a glimpse into the social conflicts surrounding these poems, while “‘A Lost Batallion of Platonic Conversationalists’: ‘Howl’ and the Language of Modernism” focuses on Ginsberg’s hugely popular book. “A Lion in Our Living Room: On Allen Ginsberg’s Collected Poems” (1985) takes a more expansive approach to Ginsberg’s work. An interview with Kurt Kline, entitled “Who’s Wearing the Pants? Marjorie Perloff on Ginsberg and the Beats,” was published in 1994.

John Cage

John Cage endures as a crucial figure to any reading of Perloff’s criticism. His musical, artistic, and literary innovations seem an apt point of convergence between Perloff’s interest in earlier modernists like Duchamp and Wittgenstein and contemporary poets like Kenneth Goldsmith and David Antin. Like several other writers/artists mentioned in this essay, it would be difficult to catalog every instance of Cage in Perloff’s writing; instead, I will provide those sources most apposite and/or readily available to an uninitiated reader.

Perloff and Charles Junkerman coedited a collection of essays on Cage, subtitled Composed in America (1994) [1], and collaborated on its introduction. While Perloff’s only other piece is the aforementioned “A Duchamp Unto Myself,” the book brings together a host of essays on Cage’s various projects. The Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage (1981) utilizes Cage as a sort of apotheosis of certain trends in modernism; across eight essays Perloff implies a lineage of indeterminate approaches to the production of content and new techniques, ending with “‘No More Margins’: John Cage, David Antin, and the Poetry of Performance” (1981), an affirmation of the performative potential of such practices; in this vein, one might turn to “John Cage’s Living Theater” (2006). “Cage: Chance: Change” (1994), which appears in Radical Artifice, and “Music for Words Perhaps: Reading/Hearing/Seeing John Cage’s Roaratorio” (1987) both read particular Cage works through the wider scope of his nuanced practice(s). “The Music of Verbal Space: John Cage’s ‘What you Say’” (1997) further highlights the overlapping qualities of Cage’s musical and textual works, while “‘Unimpededness and Interpenetration’: The Poetic of John Cage” (1982) more specifically explores his poetic sensibilities. Finally, “The Portrait of the Artist as Collage Text: Pound’s Gaudier-Brzeska and the ‘Italic’ Texts of John Cage” (1982) makes a move similar to her essay on Beckett’s Yeats influence; here, older sources of experimentation — in this case, Pound — are unexpectedly brought into conversation with a contemporary mode of creation.

Postmodernism (late twentieth century/early twenty-first century)

Having rounded out the mid-twentieth century with Cage, whose work continues to serve as a touchstone for many artists that have followed, and who — to be sure — continued working until his death in the 1990s, we shall proceed into the murkier waters of “postmodernism,” a term whose deceptive singularity belies a vast number of styles, practices, and polemics, many of which are often in contradiction with one another. The mere title of Perloff’s Postmodern Genres suggests this multiplicity, but her criticism goes further, arguing that the “tired dichotomies” of modernism and postmodernism obscure the more subtle shifts and developments of experimentation and avant-garde styles (21st-Century Modernism, 1). To quote further: “what interests me is the unfulfilled promise of the modernist (as of the classical) poetic impulse in so much of what passes for poetry today — a poetry singularly unambitious in its attitude to the materiality of the text, to what Khlebnikov described as the recognition that ‘the roots of words are only phantoms behind which stand the strings of the alphabet.’ It is this particular legacy of early modernism that the new poetics has sought to recover” (21st-Century Modernism, 5). For her, the poets who seem to best affirm this are largely writers operating in the Language movement of the ’70s and ’80s, and the digital/conceptual poets who followed them in the ’90s on into the twenty-first century. Among the books, Differentials: Poetry, Poetics, Pedagogy (2004), Unoriginal Genius (2010), Poetic License (1990), and the aforementioned 21st-Century Modernism are best suited for a reading of Perloff’s take on late-twentieth/early-twenty-first-century literature and art. Postmodern Genres, while also an important reference point, mostly consists of essays by other critics, academics, and poets. Pertinent essays on the postmodern/new poetics conundrum include “Postmodernism / Fin de Siecle” (2004), “Contemporary / Postmodern: The ‘New’ Poetry?” (1980), “From Action to Image: The Return of Story in Postmodern Poetry” (1982), and “Postmodernism and the Impasse of Lyric” (1984).

Language writing

In the 1970s, a heterogeneous group of American and British poets began to coagulate through various small press/DIY publications, most notably Bruce Andrews and Charles Bernstein’s L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E magazine. Though the Language writers — as they came to be known — did not maintain a unified aesthetic/style, they were all invested in the materiality of language and the political implications such a stance implied. Though they were ignored in mainstream academia for some time, Perloff was an early champion of these writers, celebrating their inventiveness and their abiding knowledge of the literary/art history already discussed in this essay. “The Word as Such: L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Poetry in the Eighties” (1985), “New Nouns for Old: Language Poetry, Language Game, and the Pleasure of the Text” (1987), and “Avant Garde Tradition and the Individual Talent: The Case of Language Poetry” (2006) all provide overarching takes on the movement and encompass numerous readings of writers important to the movement, including Charles Bernstein, Lyn Hejinian, Ron Silliman, Susan Howe, Tina Darragh, Bruce Andrews, and many others. As further evidence of her support for the Language writers, Perloff’s bibliography is speckled with reviews of individual writers. One might turn to her ‘cases’: “Teaching the ‘New’ Poetries: The Case of Rae Armantrout” (2002) or “The Portrait of the Language Poet as Autobiographer: The Case of Ron Silliman” (1998). Unoriginal Genius contains essays on two Language writers, “Writing through Walter Benjamin: Charles Bernstein’s ‘Poem Including History’” (2010) and “‘The Rattle of Statistical Traffic’: Documentary and Found Text in Susan Howe’s The Midnight (2010). Both of these writers are major figures for Perloff — Bernstein is frequently cited throughout her work, both for his poetic and critical ideas; Howe is also the subject of “‘Collision or Collusion with History’: The Narrative Lyric of Susan Howe” (1989) and — in part — “Language Poetry and the Lyric Subject: Susan Howe’s Buffalo, Ron Silliman’s Albany” (1999). Other writer-specific works include “Inner Tension/In Attention: Steve McCaffery’s Book Art” (1992), “Happy World: What Lyn Hejinian’s Poetry Tells Us about Chance, Fortune, and Pleasure” (2000), “Triplespace (on Hank Lazer’s Poetry)” (1998), “Sentence Not Sentence” (1996), and “A Syntax of Contrariety (on Bruce Andrews)” (1997).

Conceptual/digital poetics

In the late 1990s, a number of younger writers expanded on the developments of the Language writers and began to explore the possibilities of literature in the context of digital technologies and the Internet. While several of these writers, including Kenneth Goldsmith, Craig Dworkin, Vanessa Place, and Rob Fitterman would group together under the banner of Conceptual poetry (or Conceptual writing), other writers and artists functioned more autonomously. For Perloff, however, they are united by the same virtues that distinguish avant-gardists of the past — they create a literature that is at once well aware of its historical/cultural milieu, but utilize that environment to transcend, complicate, and/or question it.

Unoriginal Genius represents the most definitive statement on Conceptual/digital poetics Perloff has yet produced (the afterword, in particular), though several essays, including “After Language Poetry: Innovation and Its Theoretical Discontents” (1999), “Conceptualisms, Old and New” (2007), and “Screening the Page/Paging the Screen: Digital Poetics and the Differential Text” (2006), serve as apt readings of these contemporary movements and trends. Furthermore, Jacket2 has published her essay “Towards a Conceptual Lyric: From Content to Context” (2011), an analysis of Kenneth Goldsmith’s 2011 performance at the White House, and perhaps her most polemic essay on Conceptual writing to date. Perloff has also discussed Goldsmith’s work in “Conceptual Bridges/Digital Tunnels: Kenneth Goldsmith’s Traffic (2010) and “‘Moving Information’: On Kenneth Goldsmith’s The Weather (2005). An interview, “Conversation with Kenneth Goldsmith” (2002), was published in Jacket 21. With Craig Dworkin, she coedited The Sound of Poetry/The Poetry of Sound (2009) [2], a collection of essays — several of them by writers included in this essay — on the ways in which sound creates and interacts with various poetic fields. 

Caroline Bergvall and Yoko Tawada have also served as contemporary subjects of Perloff’s writing. Both appear in “Language in Migration: Multilingualism and Exophonic Writing in the New Poetics” (2010), which provides readings of Tawada’s Sprachpolizei und Spielpolygotte (2007) [3] and Bergvall’s “Say ‘Parsley’” (2005) [4] through the lens of Pound and Eliot’s multilingual work. Aside from the foreword to Yoko Tawada: Voices from Everywhere, Perloff has translated the Japanese-German poet’s aforementioned work as “Speech Police and Polyglot Play” (2006). Bergvall and the Canadian Conceptual poet Christian Bök are the subject of “The Oulipo Factor: The Procedural Poetics of Caroline Bergvall and Christian Bök” (2004); an interview with Bergvall, entitled “ex/Crème/ental/eaT/ing,” was published in 2002.

Perloff has also written on many other contemporary writers who might not fall within the strict purview of Conceptual, Language, or digital poetics, “Filling the Space with Trace: Tom Raworth’s ‘Letters from Yaddo’” (2003) and “Rosmarie Waldrop’s Auto-graphs” (2002) being prime examples. She has also written more broadly about the conditions of contemporary writing in the essays “Writing Poetry after 9/11” (2002), “Introduction: Young American Poets” (1998), and “Whose New American Poetry? Anthologizing in the Nineties” (1996). In “In Search of the Authentic Order: The Poetry of Yasusada” (1997), she investigates Kent Johnson's infamous hoax and its broader implications within contemporary literary culture.

On pedagogy and poetics

Having analyzed Perloff’s writing via a historical narrative, it is now appropriate to turn to the writing that has earned her both the accolades and ire of academics and poets — namely, her writing on the practice(s) of pedagogy and poetry criticism. Indeed, these essays often find Perloff at her fiercest, assailing — as one essay would have it — “Some Aporias of Recent Criticism” (“Contextualizing Contemporary Lyric,” 1991). Her targets are those critics, anthologies, and artists who neglect the alternative histories of experimental/avant-garde literature in favor of a perceived “diversity”; in “Postmodernism/Fin de Siècle: Defining ‘Difference’ in Late Twentieth-Century Poetics” (1998), she quotes Charles Bernstein, who asserts that diversity “‘presupposes a common standard of aesthetic judgment or implicitly aims to erect a new common standard. In this context, diversity can be a way of restoring a highly idealized concept of a unified American culture that effectively quiets dissent” (Poetry On and Off the Page, 21). It is against this idealization that Perloff’s criticism functions.

The titles of these essays alone often bespeak the problems at hand: whether critiquing the integration of cultural studies and literature in “In Defense of Poetry: Put the Literature Back into Literary Studies” (2000) or illuminating the deficiencies of various publications in “What We Don’t Talk about when We Talk about Poetry: Some Aporias of Literary Journalism” (1998). While Poetry On and Off the Page: Essays for Emergent Occasions (1998) might represent the definitive source for such polemics, essays abound elsewhere, including the seminal “Ca(n)non to the Right of Us, Ca(n)non to the Left of Us: A Plea for Difference” (1987), “Crisis in the Humanities?: Reconfiguring Literary Study for the Twenty-First Century” (2004), “Tolerance and Taboo: Modernist Primitivisms and Postmodernist Pieties” (1998), and “‘Living in the Same Place’: The Old Mono-Nationalism and the New Comparative Literature” (1995) being just a few examples. Perloff has also criticized certain manifestations of feminism in literary studies; as she writes in “Canon and the Loaded Gun: Feminist Poetics and the Avant-Garde” (1990) — an important essay on this front — “we must beware of proclamations that herald the New Dispensation” (34). Elsewhere, “The Corn-Porn Lyric: Poetry 1972–73” attacks similar notions of feminine/feminist poetics in the 1970s.

Conclusion

In writing on Wittgenstein in the prologue to her Vienna Paradox, Perloff asks, “Is it a case of continuity or reaction?” (13). As was mentioned at the opening of this essay, Perloff’s oeuvre constitutes not so much a holistic unit of texts as a sort of nuanced evolution that in some ways resembles the experimental/avant literary history she has sought to explicate and defend. Coupling precise technical reading abilities with stimulating challenges to various literary and academic institutions, her writing presents the curious reader with a host of engaging dilemmas. She is already a figure of great influence in literary criticism and contemporary literature itself; one awaits not only the future of Perloff’s complex body of work, but also how it might shape the poetry of the future.

To end with another quote from Vienna Paradox, this time from the preface, that might double as a sort of mission statement: “As a professor of literature, I long for a word where people actually care about the artistic and intellectual life, a world where art and poetry might be regarded as more than Sunday ‘enrichment’ but, on the contrary, central to life itself. At the same time, I am aware of the price High Culture exacts and the dangers of nonengagement in the actual public life of one’s nation” (xv).

 


 

1. John Cage: Composed in America, ed. Marjorie Perloff and Charles Junkerman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

2. The Sound of Poetry/The Poetry of Sound, ed. Marjorie Perloff and Craig Dworkin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

3. Caroline Bergvall, “Say ‘Parsley,’” in Fig (London: Salt Publishing, 2005).

4. Yoko Tawada, Sprachpolizei und Spielpolygotte (Konkursbuchverlag, 2011).

 

Marjorie Perloff Bibliography

21st-Century Modernism: The “New” Poetics (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002).

“‘A duchamp unto my self’: ‘Writing through’ Marcel,” in John Cage: Composed in America, ed. Marjorie Perloff and Charles Junkerman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

“‘A Fine New Kind of Realism’: Six Stein Styles in Search of a Reader,” in Poetic License: Essays on Modernist and Postmodernist Lyric (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), 145–160.

“A Lion in Our Living Room: On Allen Ginsberg’s Collected Poems,” in Poetic License: Essays on Modernist and Postmodernist Lyric, 199–230.

“‘A Lost Batallion of Platonic Conversationalists’: ‘Howl’ and the Language of Modernism,” in The Poem that Changed America: ‘Howl’ Fifty Years Later, ed. Jason Shinder (New York: Farrar Straus, 2006), 24–43.

“‘A Ritual for Being Born Twice’: Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar,” Contemporary Literature 13 (Autumn 1972): 507–22.

“‘A Small Perliplus Along an Edge’: Rosmarie Waldrop’s Auto-graphs,” HOW 2 (2002).

“A Step Away from Them: Poetry in 1956,” in Poetry On and Off the Page: Essays for Emergent Occasions (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 83–115.

“A Syntax of Contrariety (on Bruce Andrews),” Aerial 9 (1997): 234–38.

“Abstraction and Unreadability,” Vlak 2 (2011): 156–62.

“After Language Poetry: Innovation and Its Theoretical Discontents,” in Contemporary Poetics, ed. Louis Armand (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 15–38.

“Alterable Noons: The poèmes élastiques of Blaise Cendrars and Frank O’Hara,” in Yearbook of English Studies 15: Anglo-French Literary Relations, ed. C. J. Rawson and Jenny Mezciems (1985), 16–78.

“‘An Image from a Past Life’: Beckett’s Yeatsian Turn,” Fulcrum 6 (2007): 604–615.

“Angst and Animism in the Poetry of Sylvia Plath,” in Collected Essays on Sylvia Plath, ed. Linda Wagner (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1984), 109–23.

“‘Another Emblem There’: Theme and Convention in Yeats’s ‘Coole Park and Ballylee, 1931’,” The Journal of English and Germanic Philology 69, no. 2 (April 1970): 223–40.

“The Aura of Modernism,” Modernist Cultures 1, no. 1 (April 2005): 1–14.

“The Autobiographical Mode of Goethe: Dichtung und Wahrheit and the Lyric Poems,” Comparative Literature Studies 7, no. 3 (September 1970): 265–96.

“Avant Garde and Difference: Duchamp and the Russian Avant-Garde,” New American Writing (Spring 1991): 81–96.

“Avant Garde Eliot,” in 21st-Century Modernism: The “New” Poetics.

“Avant Garde Tradition and the Individual Talent: The Case of Language Poetry,” Foreign Literature Studies 28, no. 4 (August 2006): 20–37.

“Beckett in the Country of the Houyhnhnms: The Inward Turn of Swiftian Satire,” in Swift’s Travels: Eighteenth-Century British Satire and Its Legacy, ed. Nicholas Hudson and Aaron Santesso (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 280–99.

“Beckett the Poet,” in A Companion to Samuel Beckett, ed. S. E. Gontarski (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

“Between the Shingle and the Dune: The Poetry of Samuel Beckett,” Parnassus: Poetry in Review 6 (Fall/Winter 1978): 170–84.

“Between Verse and Prose: Beckett and the New Poetry,” in The Dance of the Intellect: Studies in the Poetry of the Pound Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 135–154.

“But isn’t the same at least the same? Wittgenstein, Duchamp, and the Infra-Thin,” in The Literary Wittgenstein, ed, John Gibson and Wolfgang Huemer (London: Routledge, 2004), 34–54.

“Cage: Chance: Change,” in Radical Artifice: Writing Poetry in the Age of Media (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 

“Canon and the Loaded Gun: Feminist Poetics and the Avant-Garde,” in Poetic License: Essays on Modernist and Postmodernist Lyric, 31–52.

“Ca(n)non to the Right of Us, Ca(n)non to the Left of Us: A Plea for Difference,” in Poetic License: Essays on Modernist and Postmodernist Lyric, 7–30.

“The Challenge of the German Lyric: Goethe and Heine in Translation,” American Poetry Review 12, no. 5 (September-October 1983): 10–17.

“Charles Olson and the ‘Inferior Predecessors’: Projective Verse Revisited,” English Literary History 40 (Summer 1973): 285–306.

“Collage and Poetry,” in Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, ed. Michael Kelly (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

“‘Collision or Collusion with History’: The Narrative Lyric of Susan Howe,” in Poetic License: Essays on Modernist and Postmodernist Lyric, 297–310.

“The Conceptual Poetics of Marcel Duchamp,” in 21st-Century Modernism: The “New” Poetics, 77–120.

“Conceptual Bridges, Digital Tunnels: Kenneth Godlsmith’s Traffic,” in Unoriginal Genius: Poetry by Other Means in the New Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 146–166.

“Conceptualisms, Old and New,” in Parkett 78 (2008).

“The Contemporary of our Grandchildren: Pound’s Influence,” in Poetic License: Essays on Modernist and Postmodernist Lyric, 119–144.

“Contemporary/Postmodern: The ‘New’ Poetry?,” in Romanticism, Modernism, Postmodernism, ed. Harry T. Garvin (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1980), 171–180.

“Contextualizing Contemporary Lyric: Some Aporias of Recent Criticism,” Review 13 (1991): 203–24.

“Conversation with Kenneth Goldsmith,” Jacket 21 (February 2003).

“The Corn-Porn Lyric: Poetry 1972–73,” Contemporary Literature 16 (Winter 1975): 85–125.

“Crisis in the Humanities?: Reconfiguring Literary Study for the Twenty-First Century,” in Differentials: Poetry, Poetics, Pedagogy (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 1–19.

“A Critical Exchange on Selected Poems by Robert Lowell,” with David Wojahn, New Ohio Review 1 (Spring 2007): 216–25.

“Cubist Collaboration/Abstract Assemblage: The Avant-Garde Artist’s Book,” 2008.

“Dada without Duchamp/Duchamp without Dada: Avant-Garde Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Stanford Humanities Review 7, no. 1 (1999): 48–78.

The Dance of the Intellect: Studies in the Poetry of the Pound Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

“The Difference Is Spreading: Gertrude Stein,” Poets.org (January 2007).

Differentials: Poetry, Poetics, Pedagogy (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004).

“Duchamp’s Eliot: The Detours of Tradition and the Persistence of the Individual Talent,” in T. S. Eliot and the Concept of Tradition, ed. Giovanni Cianci and Jason Harding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

“‘Easter, 1916’: Yeats’s First World War Poem,” in The Oxford Handbook of British and Irish War Poetry, ed. Tim Kendall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 227–44.

“‘The Ecstasy of Always Bursting Forth!’: Rereading Frank O’Hara,” Lana Turner 1 (Fall 2008), 194–206.

“Eliot and the Avant-Garde,” in T. S. Eliot in Context, ed. Jason Harding (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2011), 252–61.

“Epilogue, Modernism Now,” in A Companion to Modernist Literature and Culture, ed. David Bradshaw and Kevin Dettmar (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 571–578.

“ex/Crème/ental/eaT/ing: An Interview with Caroline Bergvall,” Revue d’etudes Anglophones 12 (2002): 123–38.

“Extremist Poetry: Some Versions of the Sylvia Plath Myth,” Journal of Modern Literature 2 (1973): 581–88.

“The Fascination of What’s Difficult: Emily Dickinson and the Theory Canon,” Stand 1, no. 3 (June 2000): 33–51.

“‘Fearlessly Holding Back Nothing’: Robert Lowell’s Last Poems,” in The Critical Response to Robert Lowell, ed. Steven Gould Alexrod (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999).

“Filling the Space with Trace: Tom Raworth’s ‘Letters from Yaddo’,” The Gig 13-14 (May 2003): 130–44.

“The First Futurist Manifesto Revisited,” Rett Kopi: Manifesto Issue: Dokumenterer Fremtiden (2007): 152–56.

“Foreword,” in Yoko Tawada: Voices from Everywhere, ed. Douglas Slaymaker (New York: Lexington Books, 2007).

“Four Times Five: Robert Creeley’s The Island,” boundary 2 6, no. 3 (Spring/Fall 1978): 491–507.

Frank O’Hara: Poet Among Painters (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

“From Action to Image: The Return of Story in Postmodern Poetry,” in The Dance of the Intellect: Studies in the Poetry of the Pound Tradition, 155–172.

“From Theory to Grammar: Wittgenstein and the Aesthetic of the Ordinary,” New Literary History 25, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 899–923.

The Futurist Moment: Avant-Garde, Avant-Guerre, and the Language of Rupture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

“German by the Grace of Goethe,” in The Vienna Paradox: A Memoir (New York: New Directions Press, 2003), 73–120.

“Gertrude Stein’s Differential Syntax,” The Sarah Tryphena Phillips Lecture, Proceedings of the British Academy 117 (2002): 401–27.

“‘Grammar in Use’: Wittgenstein/Gertrude Stein/Marinetti,” in Wittgenstein’s Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 83–114.

“Happy World: What Lyn Hejinian’s Poetry Tells Us about Chance, Fortune, and Pleasure,” Boston Review (February/March 2000).

“How to Read a Poem: W. B. Yeats’s ‘After Long Silence,’” 2007.

“Hugh Kenner and the Invention of Modernism,” Modernism/Modernity 12, no. 3 (September 2005): 465–470.

“(Im)personating Gertrude Stein,” in Gertrude Stein and the Making of Literature, ed. Shirley Neuman and Ira B. Nadel (Evanston: Macmillan and Northeastern University Press, 1988), 61–81.

“In Defense of Poetry: Put the literature Back into Literary Studies,” Boston Review 24, no. 6 (December–January 1999–2000): 22–26.

“Inner Tension/In Attention: Steve McCaffery’s Book Art,” in Poetry On and Off the Page: Essays for Emergent Occasions, 264–289.

“Introduction: Young American Poets,” Yang 182 (Summer 1998): 183–85.

“The Invention of Collage,” in The Futurist Moment: Avant-Garde, Avant-Guerre, and the Language of Rupture, 42–79. Originally published in 1983.

“In Search of the Authentic Order: The Poetry of Araki Yasusada,” Boston Review 22, no. 2 (April–May 1997): 26–33.

“John Cage’s Living Theater,” in Against Theatre: Creative Destruction on the Modernist Stage, ed. Martin Puchner and Alan Ackerman (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 133–48.

“Language in Migration: Multilingualism and Exophonic Writing in the New Poetics,” in Unoriginal Genius: Poetry by Other Means in the New Century, 123–145.

“Language Poetry and the Lyric Subject: Susan Howe’s Buffalo, Ron Silliman’s Albany,” Critical Inquiry 25 (Spring 1999): 405–434.

“Light Silence: Dark Speech: Reading Johns’s Images, Seeing Beckett’s Language in Foirades/Fizzles,” Fulcrum 1 (2002): 83–105.

“‘Lines Converging and Crossing’: The ‘French’ Decade of William Carlos Williams,” in The Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 109–154.

“‘Living in the Same Place’: The Old Mono-Nationalism and the New Comparative Literature,” World Literature Today 69, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 249–255.

“Lucent and Inescapable Rhythms: Metrical ‘Choice’ and Historical Formation,” in Poetry On and Off the Page: Essays for Emergent Occasions, 116–40.

“The Man Who Loved Women: The Medical Fictions of William Carlos Williams,” in William Carlos Williams: A Study of the Short Fiction, ed. Robert Gish (Boston: Twayne, 1989).

“‘Moving Information’: On Kenneth Goldsmith’s The Weather,” Open Letter 7 (Fall 2005): 85–95.

“Music for Words Perhaps: Reading/Hearing/Seeing John Cage’s Roaratorio,” Genre 22, nos. 3–4 (Autumn/Winter 1987): 195–230.

“The Music of Verbal Space: John Cage’s ‘What You Say,’” in Poetry On and Off the Page: Essays for Emergent Occasions, 290–308.

“New Nouns for Old: Language Poetry, Language Game, and the Pleasure of the Text,” in Exploring Postmodernism, ed. Matei Calinescu and R. Fokkema (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1987), 95–108.

“‘No More Margins’: John Cage, David Antin, and the Poetry of Performance,” in The Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage, 288–340.

“Normalizing John Ashbery,” Electronic Poetry Center (1997).

“Of Objects and Readymades: Gertrude Stein and Marcel Duchamp,” Forum of Modern Language Studies 32, no. 2 (1996): 137–54.

“On Sylvia Plath’s ‘Tulips,’” Paunch 42–43 (December 1975): 105–110.

“On the Road to Ariel: The Transitional Poetry of Sylvia Plath,” Iowa Review 4 (Spring 1973): 94–110.

“The Oulipo Factor: The Procedural Poetics of Caroline Bergvall and Christian Bök,” in Differentials: Poetry, Poetics, Pedagogy, 205–226.

“Playing the Numbers: The French Reception of Louis Zukofsky,” Verse 22–23 (2006): 102–20.

“Poètes Maudits of the Genteel Tradition,” in Robert Lowell: Essays on the Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 99–116.

The Poetic Art of Robert Lowell (New York: Cornell Press, 1973).

“The Poetics of Description: Wittgenstein on the Aesthetic,” in Ordinary Language Criticism: Literary Thinking After Cavell After Wittgenstein, ed. Kenneth Dauber and Walter Jost (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 231–44.

Poetic License: Essays on Modernist and Postmodernist Lyric (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990).

The Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

“Poetry as Word-System: The Art of Gertrude Stein,” in The Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage, 67–108.

Poetry On and Off the Page: Essays for Emergent Occasions (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998).

“The Portrait of the Artist as Collage Text: Pound’s Gaudier-Brzeska and the ‘Italic’ Texts of John Cage,” in The Dance of the Intellect: Studies in the Poetry of the Pound Tradition, 33–73.

“The Portrait of the Language Poet as Autobiographer: The Case of Ron Silliman,” Qarry West 34, Ron Silliman Issue (1998): 167–81.

Postmodern Genres, ed. Marjorie Perloff (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989). 

“Postmodernism and the Impasse of lyric,” in The Dance of the Intellect: Studies in the Poetry of the Pound Tradition, 172–200.

“Postmodernism/Fin de Siecle,” in Poetry On and Off the Page: Essays for Emergent Occasions, 3–33.

“Pound and Rimbaud: The Retreat from Symbolism,” Iowa Review 6 (Winter 1975): 91–118.

“Pound/Stevens: Whose Era?” in The Dance of the Intellect: Studies in the Poetry of the Pound Tradition, 1–32.

“The Pursuit of Number: Yeats, Khlebnikov, and the Mathematics of the Modern,” in Poetic License: Essays on Modernist and Postmodernist Lyric, 71–98.

Radical Artifice: Writing Poetry in the Age of Media (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

“The Radical Poetics of Robert Creeley,” Electronic Book Review 10 (2007).

“‘The Rattle of Statistical Traffic’: Documentary and Found Text in Susan Howe’s The Midnight,” in Unoriginal Genius: Poetry by Other Means in the New Century, 99–122.

“‘The Renaissance of 1910’: Reflections on Guy Davenport’s Poetics,” Fulcrum 4 (2006): 167–173.

“The Return of Robert Lowell,” Parnassus 27, nos. 1 and 2 (Winter 2004): 76–102.

Rhyme and Meaning in the Poetry of Yeats (Paris: Mouton), 1970.

“Robert Creeley Out of School: The Making of a Singular Poetics,” in Form, Power, and Person in Robert Creeley’s Life and Work, ed. Stephen Fredman and Steve McCaffery (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2010), 19–35.

“Robert Creeley’s Windows,” Bridge 2, no. 1 (Fall–Winter 2002): 187–94.

“Screening the Page/Paging the Screen: Digital Poetics and the Differential Text,” in New Media Poetics: Contexts, Technotexts, and Theories, ed. Adalaide Morris and Thomas Swiss (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 143–64.

“The Search for ‘Prime Words’: Pound as Nominalist,” Paideuma 32, nos. 1–3 (2003): 205–28.

“Sentence Not Sentence,” Sulfur 39 (Fall 1996): 139–51.

“Sex, Lies, and First Ladies: A Modest (Wittgensteinian) Proposal,” Southwest Review 84, no. 1 (1998): 30–42.

“Speech Police and Polyglot Play,” trans. Perloff, Lyric 9 (2006): 55–63.

“Teaching the ‘New’ Poetries: The Case of Rae Armantrout,” Kiosk: A Joural of Poetry, Poetics, and Experimental Prose 1 (2002): 235–60.

“The Silence that Is Not Silence: Acoustic Art in Beckett’s Embers,” in Samuel Beckett and the Arts: Music, Visual Arts, and Non-Print Media, ed. Lois Oppenheim (New York: Garland, 1999), 247–68.

“The Stain of Love and the Fallen Leaf: The Displacements of Desire in Williams’s Early Poetry,” in The Love Poetry of William Carlos Williams, ed. Cristina Giorcelli and Maria Anita Stefanelli (Roma: Edizione Associate, 1993), 189–212.

“Still Time for Surprises: John Ashbery’s Recent Books,” Thumbscrew 18 (Spring 2001): 46–48.

“Sylvia Plath’s ‘Sivvy’ Poems: A Portrait of the Poet as Daughter,” in Sylvia Plath: A Collection of Essays, ed. Gary Lane (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 155–78.

“Teaching Yeats’s Sound Structures,” in Yeats: An Annual of Critical and Textual Studies XIII, ed. Richard J. Finneran (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 81–90.

“‘To Give a Design’: Williams and the Visualization of Poetry,” in The Dance of the Intellect: Studies in the Poetry of the Pound Tradition, 88–118.

“Tolerance and Taboo: Modernist Primitivisms and Postmodernist Pieties,” in Poetry On and Off the Page: Essays for Emergent Occasions, 34–50.

“Toward a Wittgensteinian Poetics,” Contemporary Literature 33, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 191–213.

“Towards a Conceptual Lyric: From Content to Context,” Jacket2 (2011).

“‘The Tradition of Myself’: The Autobiographical Mode of Yeats,” Journal of Modern Literature 4, no. 3 (February 1975): 529–73.

“‘Transparent Selves’: The Poetry of John Ashbery and Frank O’Hara,” Yearbook of English Studies 8, ed. C. J. Rawson and G. K. Hunter (1978), 171–96.

“Triplespace (on Hank Lazer’s Poetry),” Virginia Quarterly Review (Spring 1998): 381–90.

“The Two Ariels: The (Re)Making of the Sylvia Plath Canon,” in Poetic License: Essays on Modernist and Postmodernist Lyric, 175–198.

“‘Unimpededness and Interpenetration’: The Poetic of John Cage,” in A John Cage Reader, ed. Peter Gena and Johnathan Brent (New York: C. F. Peters Corp., 1982), 4–16.

Unoriginal Genius: Poetry by Other Means in the New Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

The Vienna Paradox: A Memoir (New York: New Directions Press, 2003).

“The Voice of the Poet: The Winslow Elegies of Robert Lowell,” in The Poetic Art of Robert Lowell (New York: Cornell Press, 1973), 131–163.

“Violence and Precision: The Manifesto as Artform,” in The Futurist Moment: Avant-Garde, Avant-Guerre, and the Language of Rupture, 80–115. Originally published in 1984.

“Watchman, Spy, and Dead Man: Johns, O’Hara, Cage, and the ‘Aesthetic of Indifference,’” Modernism/Modernity 8, no. 2 (2001): 197–223.

“What We Don’t Talk about When We Talk about Poetry: Some Aporias of Literary Journalism,” in Poetry On and Off the Page: Essays for Emergent Occasions, 168–192.

“Who’s Wearing the Pants? Marjorie Perloff on Ginsberg and the Beats,” interview with Kurt Kline, Poetry Flash 253 (June/July 1994): 1–2.

“Whose New American Poetry? Anthologizing in the Nineties,” Diacritics 26, nos. 3–4 (Fall-Winter 1996): 104–23.

“Why Futurism Now?,” Formations 4, no. 3 (Spring 1988): 1–19.

“Witt-Watt: The Language of Resistance/The Resistance of Language,” in Wittgenstein’s Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary, 115–144.

Wittgenstein’s Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

“The Word as Such: L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Poetry in the Eighties,” in The Dance of the Intellect: Studies in the Poetry of the Pound Tradition, 215–238.

“Writing Philosophy as Poetry: Wittgenstein’s Literary Syntax,” in Language and World Part Two: Signs, Minds, and Actions: Proceedings of the 32th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg 2009 (Rutgers: Transaction Books, 2010), 279–96.

“Writing Poetry after 9/11,” American Letters and Commentary (2002): 18–23.

“Writing through Walter Benjamin: Charles Bernstein’s ‘Poem Including History,’” in Unoriginal Genius: Poetry by Other Means in the New Century, 76–98.

“Yeats and Goethe,” Comparative Literature Studies 23, no. 2 (Spring 1971): 125–140.

“Yeats and the Occasional Poem: ‘Easter, 1916,’” Papers on Language and Literature 4 (1968): 308–28.

Close, very close

Marjorie Perloff at the ACLA Forum, 2007.

Marjorie Perloff is one of our best readers of poetry, one of those critics whose interpretive craft is always compelling to follow. She has not only kept practical criticism relevant, she has shown that it can be renewed even in the close reading of the most refractory modernist poems. This commitment to close reading has required nerve. Even critics sympathetic to the modernist avant-garde can be opposed to such a critical strategy: close reading, they say, is mere pedagogy; it views the text through lenses tinted with undeclared ideological commitments; it finds in even a multitudinous text just a few devices and deconstructions; it is ahistorical; or it is too historical, too closely rooted in the historical moment of the reader. 

Despite such pressures to abandon close reading, Perloff has held fast. Close reading enables her to affirm the fundamental intelligibility of poems, and locate this intelligibility in the logical space of reasons, the embodied space of empathy, and in a long and many-sided poetic tradition.

Avant-garde poetry has repeatedly been dismissed as nonsense. Perloff adapted the techniques of practical criticism that she learned from an earlier generation of literary critics (and initially practiced on Robert Lowell’s poetry) to the task of arguing that such dismissals ignore the emergence of new forms of intelligibility. Her incisive reading of Gertrude Stein’s “Susie Asado” (1913) employs prosodic analysis, knowledge of other languages, analysis of syntax as well as semantics, plus biographical information, to demonstrate that such a seemingly abstract, unintelligible text can be rendered lucid. “Skeptical readers will object at this point, arguing that texts like Susie Asado are unnecessarily obscure, unreadable, and boring, that Stein fails to communicate a coherent meaning to the reader. The line between sense and non-sense is, of course, a narrow one. Remove all vestiges of reference and the text collapses into a series of empty sounds.”[1]

It is characteristic of Perloff’s independence as a critic that she rightly talks of reference and not the fashionable concept of a “play of signifiers,” which implies that interpretive rigor would be misplaced.[2] She gives the last word on this issue to another poet: the poem “becomes, in John Ashbery’s words, a ‘hymn to possibility.’” Ashbery’s witty review of Donald Sutherland’s edition of Stein’s Stanzas in Meditation calls the poem “a celebration of the fact that the world exists, that things can happen,” even though the text “sometimes makes no sense and sometimes makes perfect sense.”[3] The implication is that it takes close reading to discern this realism of reference in Stein’s text. 

No phoneme, no allusion, should go unheeded in a close reading. Writing about the challenge of teaching Rae Armantrout’s poetry in the classroom, Perloff makes explicit the assumptions on which her discussion is founded: “First, that any serious poem, however disjointed and ‘nonsensical,’ is meaningful. Second, that the poem’s meanings are never quite paraphraseable, never univocal […] And third, that the only way to get at the poem is in fact to read it, word for word, line by line […] a close reading — and there is no other way to understand poetry […] has to account for all the elements in a given text, not just the ones that support a particular interpretation. From this perspective, we read Armantrout’s poem as we would any other, whether ‘experimental’ or conventional, contemporary or Renaissance.”[4] The modernist or avant-garde text is part of a much larger history of poetry whose relevance we must not lose sight of.

In her later critical writing, Perloff reflects on the risks inherent in close reading. Lyn Hejinian’s Oxota, Perloff says, “actively engages us in the poet’s own ‘hunt’ for meaning.” A trap awaits the hunter though. “If we read Oxota as a self-enclosed text, its ‘obscure points’ and ‘arbitrary elements’ will look like ‘mere examples of the freedom of expression.”[5] I would add that this raises a doubt. Can these tiny elements of prosody, etymology, and other verbal brushstrokes really be so important?

This is a dilemma eloquently described by Jay Bernstein in a discussion of how — given the demands we make on art that it should be more than simply entertainment — we can possibly assign significant cultural value to features such as brush strokes in an abstract painting: “It must seem an insult to commitments to justice and a travesty of the feelings that support such commitments […] that the intelligibility and validity of those commitments and feelings should be thought to hang on or be found in just ‘this’ painting or ‘this’ urgent brushstroke of red.”[6] Bernstein’s answer is that the apparent “disproportion” between “the unjust ruination of human lives” and “the velleities of some cultural artifacts on the other” can best be understood as an aesthetic struggle to revalue sensuous experience.

Perloff puts her confidence in what I have called the intelligibility of every verbal note and brushstroke. “Once writing is no longer regarded as the vehicle that conveys an already present speech, every word, indeed every morpheme can be seen to carry meaning, to enter relationships with its neighbors […] and syntax is at least as important as the invention of striking images”; and that “it is reference, not representation, that we cannot do without.”[7] Good close readers do not neglect even the smallest brushstrokes in the poem; every part is intelligible, and this intelligibility connects to the world where lives as well as meanings are at stake. Another name for these interconnections is reference. Her extended, thoughtful practice of close reading is one of our richest sources of reflection on just what poetic reference entails.

 


 

[1] Marjorie Perloff, The Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 77.

[2] Lyn Hejinian for instance writes: “I hate a person’s sentimental / use of the word ‘play’ / as a substitute for subjectivity[.]” in The Cell (Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 1992), 27. 

[3] John Ashbery, “The Impossible (Review of Stanzas in Meditation by Gertrude Stein),” Poetry 90, no. 4 (July 1957), 250–254.

[4] Marjorie Perloff, Differentials: Poetry, Poetics, Pedagogy (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 246–7.

[5] Perloff takes these quotations from Oxota: A Short Russian Novel (Great Barrington: The Figures, 1992). Marjorie Perloff, Poetry On & Off the Page: Essays for Emergent Occasions (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 223, 225.

[6] J. M. Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies: Late Modernism and the Meaning of Painting (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 46.

[7] Perloff, Poetry On & Off the Page, 238–39.