1. The drafts
Since 1985, Rachel Blau DuPlessis has been publishing a series of 114 poems which together form a single long poem entitled Drafts. There are five full volumes to date. Of this project, DuPlessis writes, “There is no narrative, no plot outline, and in terms of seriality (building an argument inferentially, by leaps and movement) — the poem works only in the most general way.” Critics have called DuPlessis’s Drafts “massive” and “endless,” although this sense of them has been somewhat attenuated since she announced a numerical end to the project now in sight. DuPlessis uses this extensive and recursive long poem as an apparatus to find new ways to understand the dynamics of daily and social life in the context of global relations.
The poems catalogue one woman’s lived experience in a way that offers an expansive understanding of what might constitute one woman and what might constitute her physical, intellectual, emotional, and political realities, realities that the reader can perceive as both unique and shared. Drafts offers an account of the speaker’s complex subject positions and through them, we are offered the opportunity to consider our own. Drafts represents a material, and immaterial, life in such a way that we are forced to encounter it not just as mere representation, a place for identification, but as an ethical and phenomenological practice wherein issues of human autonomy and agency are experienced. The poem’s real contribution, though, is how — through the time that she demands we spend with this long project, through the experience of time the formal attributes of the poem create, and in the way she manipulates our understanding of the place of the individual in history — Drafts shifts our understanding of the relationships of time, history, and agency. I will argue that the poem opens a space, or rather a time, that lets us conceive a slowdown to the speedup of capitalism that robs us of the possibilities of agency outside of moments of crisis.
2. Take your time
Drafts is based on a rhetoric of provisionality, and DuPlessis describes the ethical conditions of her work as being characterized by a “messianic deferral” expressed through the “feeling of the unknowable and the unreachable” enacted by the poems as “versions of something that can never really be completed, never fully be found, never totally be articulated.” And yet, the poems are deeply concerned with articulating the possibilities of a politics of change and the potential for individual or collective agency. Which is not to say that the poems have a hopeful view of the world or these possibilities. Often in her explorations of the Holocaust, the work of Adorno, the limits of language, the disastrous “news of the day” — all topics she returns to repeatedly — the speaker seems overcome by despair. Yet while each individual poem may seem stuck in the frustrations of powerlessness, the project as a whole offers something else, something with more potential. The fact that she returns to write another poem, to offer us another, and yet another, attempt to understand, allows us to stay in the moment of seeking longer and longer. Drafts defers conclusions and solutions, but it does not defer their seeking. One effect of her repeated returns is that it allows the present to take a long, slow time before it is relegated to the category of the historical.
This extension of the present is amplified in multiple ways, one of which is her explicit investigation of our relationship to history. In “Draft 85: Hard Copy,” from Pitch, an example that is echoed in many other drafts, DuPlessis writes, “17 May 1986 Or whenever ‘now’ is.” We might read this statement as a bleak assertion that by deferring solutions, we don’t move on, we make no progress. And, in fact, when I Googled this date, the first hit told me that the Los Angeles Times headline for May 17, 1986, was “Chernobyl toll rises to 13” while that day’s headline was: “Japan Nuclear Crisis.” But this passage in the poem can also be read as a reminder that this moment is like that moment, is a significant return, that there is something to be learned and used from the doubling. The next two lines in the poem read: “Enough to look at here / For the rest of a lifetime.” One date that will take time to contemplate. One day turns into another, turns into a life. We must take our time with this, the poem implores. And, in fact, the epigraph to the poem, from Celan, tells us: “The poem is lonely. It is lonely and en route. Its author stays with it.” DuPlessis stays with this poem for a lifetime and the poem asks us to do the same.
Often, in the poems, you can see an anxiety that we will speed past what is real and past the possibility of an ethical life because of the way capitalism requires our surrender to rapidity. In “Draft 27: Athwart,” Toll, DuPlessis reminds us:
is meant to prevent
feeling much, even any, of this.
It sutures us to things
we will buy
whatever, straight thru time
and never look at shame.
“Straight thru time / and never look at shame.” DuPlessis’s work asks us to stop shooting or slipping “straight thru time.” It aims to slow us down. Long enough to look at shame, long enough to acknowledge our complicity with the exploitations she charts, and long enough to do something about it, to use our time.
3. Suspended animation and politically engaged aesthetics
But what happens when we use our time not in activist engagement, but in contemplation? What happens when we use our time to read a long work like this one? What happens when we succumb not to the lure of speed, but to the lure of suspension from speed?
Robert Mitchell’s recent PMLA essay “Suspended Animation, Slow Time, and the Poetics of the Trance” bears directly on this issue. Here, in his consideration of Keats and Shelley, he writes:
A politically engaged aesthetics must do more than awaken a population frozen in automaticity; it must also seek to produce suspensions in those who are already too animated. Suspension, in this sense, empowers their differential capacities of sensation, which in turn makes possible new forms and objects of willing … Keats and Shelley’s poetics seek to produce the future by attuning readers to the rhythms of slow time.
This is one of the central effects of DuPlessis’s work as well, although I find myself wanting to write my own version of that last sentence of Mitchell’s. I have an added term. My sentence reads, “DuPlessis’s poetics seek to produce the future by attuning readers to the rhythms of the slow time of history.”
Mitchell’s article traces two different responses to questions of animation and agency in Romanticism:
Authors such as Coleridge saw suspended animation as a dangerous condition, and they employed the concept to describe a loss of subjective autonomy produced by the distractions of modernity. Authors such as John Keats and the Shelleys, by contrast … [saw suspended animation] as a potentially desirable state that could regulate the otherwise swift and automatic animations of modern life. Where Coleridge feared suspended animation, seeing in it only a narcosis of the will, Keats and the Shelleys aimed at a poetics of trance, deploying literary form as a technology that could vitalize readers’ will and understanding by suspending animation.
As in Keats and Shelley, DuPlessis’s work “deploys literary form as a technology that could vitalize readers’ will and understanding by suspending animation,” but, unlike theirs, her mode of suspension is not that of the sustained trance, but instead a periodic suspension that is repeatedly punctuated by interruptions that serve as injunctions to return to a renewed and reconceived animation. Hers is not the slow time of semiconscious reverie, or anaesthesis (etymologically without sensation), as her text shuttles back and forth between suspension and its critique, between contemplation and action.
Still, the danger of losing the reader to “too much,” to “too long,” haunts the Drafts. First, the accretions of DuPlessis’s archive of memories participates in the conundrum of any archive, that is, the piling up of unique examples inevitably becomes so massive that it risks working against itself, risks, as “Draft 27: Athwart” says, “A lost specificity / not documentary, not song / but a wall.” And it is true that this wall of words we encounter in book after book of poems might easily be seen as an impediment to our reading. Another danger to her project is the sheer time it takes to read. Time lost. Time taken away from the animations of lived life and political engagement that DuPlessis seeks to both represents and provoke. Time spent in the trance of reading — a trance that DuPlessis heightens at times with moments of lyric rhythmicality. Time that might be seen as allied with the “narcosis of the will” Coleridge feared. But DuPlessis’s text persistently works against both he impediment of “too much” and the narcosis of “too long.”
Drafts breaks into the monolithic with its striking, often playful, heterogeneity. Formally, DuPlessis does this through a number of devices including the multiple entry points each new beginning offers, the informal welcome of naming the poems “drafts,” the inclusion of the occasional doodle, image, or glyph, and the myriad ways she invites multiple modes of reading — bouncing across open field pages filled with gaps and irregular line breaks, or stumbling across blackened redacted lines that literally bar the poem from sonorous propulsion (as in “Draft 68: Threshold”), in numerical order, or leapfrogging from one “donor draft,” as she calls them, to the donee (a sidenote here: the poems are, she says, “folded” over one another with each poem donating bits of language to another).
To get anywhere, to resist complicity,
XXXXXXXXXXXX how to touch
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX long and wide XXXXXXX
longer and wider, wilder, meaner and more bereft
XXXXX haunted. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
As Patrick Pritchett writes in his review of Drafts 1–38, Toll in Jacket 22, “DuPlessis’s notion of the fold recalls Deleuze’s comment that the challenge for the fold is how to multiply itself to infinity.”
Another technique of refocusing our attention, or of awakening us from the reverie of reading, is her placement of text that demands we read it in more than one way. This can be seen in “Draft 27: Athwart” at the passage where the gaps, line breaks and quotation marks force a kind of double enjambment:
The social world they said “drained
Is writing the bringing of justice? from the work” after
Is just light the “conventional
Justice? icons of the 30’s”
And you can see it again in the columns of “Draft 66: Scroll” where we have to read both down and across the columns:
|down and remember
little museums of the commonplace
incorporating clutter evidence
|to Resist Monoculture with
in which someone awaits
A number of the poems also feature the disruptive appearance of prose passages that break the trance of verse, and almost all of the poems are linked to extended endnotes that force us to shuttle back and forth in the book, in and out of the poems. These endnotes, of course, at first present themselves as merely paratextual, secondary by virtue of their placement and posing as the recognizable authority markers of referential discourse. But the notes are central to the poems, to DuPlessis’s inquiry and to the analyses that take place within the text’s bifurcated realms and in the dialogue between the realms.
When we turn from formal attributes toward content (although the distinction is not always clear in this work) DuPlessis returns us time and again to moments where we encounter the tension between suspension and activation, between suspension and political agency, considerations that are at once made possible by the lost time of reading and simultaneously challenge us not to loose too much more. Our contemplative time is always punctuated by reminders of something like the vita activa and its demands. Poem after poem asks us to consider the interruption of suspended time by specific historical events and by Alain Badiou’s vital notion of “the event.” As in the passage from “Draft 27: Athwart” where DuPlessis writes:
There was a time
up thru November 10
wherein the tree
Just was, its oakish life
one storm and
one thud. It’s the work of a moment,
Something live from the winds
That empties “is”
Of its simplicities
and pours “it” as libation on the ground.
It’s the “work of a moment.” A moment in which “is” — the ongoing being, the living, the flow of time and history — is suddenly interrupted by the appearance of a subject, the “it” poured as libation on the ground. The event as the place where the axes of horizontal and vertical intersect. The moment that makes visible the horizon of history. The place where it unfolds and in that unfolding offers us the chance to become subjects precisely when we “pledge ourselves to sustain a continuity of thought and action” (as Peter Dews described Badiou’s arriving subject) when we heed Badiou’s call to “do all that you can to persevere in that which exceeds your perseverance. Persevere in the interruption.” DuPlessis’s Drafts “persevere in the interruption” and offer us an experience and understanding of time that keep us both focused on and participants in the contradictions of contemplation and action in a manner that doesn’t allow for any simple, political suspension. The poems unfold a new time, an interruption in which we can persevere.
1. See Carlos Soto Román’s Elective Affinities blog.
The redactive prosodies of Rachel Blau DuPlessis
“Inside art, poetry would succeed — perhaps — in withdrawing from art; it would exit art within art. Thus we must think, in art’s greatest intimacy and as this intimacy itself, of a sort of spacing or hiatus. A secret gaping. Perhaps intimacy — the ‘heart’ of the same — is always such a gaping, as the possibility for the same to be itself and to join within itself to itself; the pure — empty — articulation of the same. And perhaps for art (the Unheimliche), this intimate gaping would be precisely what ceaselessly ‘estranges’ the strangeness of art (of the strange): precisely the caesura of art, the spasm — furtive, hardly felt — of the strange. In which case poetry would not be, in art-outside-of-art, the flaw or the failing of art, of language: let us say, silence. But rather the pain of art (of language). Hence the aggravation of the catastrophe, which is, strictly speaking, a revolt …” — Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry as Experience
“Ash, we were saying, annihilates or threatens to annihilate even the possibility of bearing witness to annihilation.” — Jacques Derrida, Sovereignties in Question
Working through George Oppen’s various calls for clarity, Patrick Pritchett arrives at a discussion of the caesura: “It’s as if the only way for Oppen to write clarity is through these sharp incisions of white space. […] Clarity becomes a kind of invisible ideogram, a para-notational blank space, a scission cutting into the material body of the poem. […] Clarity, finally, is not what can appear through means of the orthographical sign alone, but only as and from the pauses within the overall shape of the poem, the white caesuras of its metrical breaks.” I’d like to explore how this material caesura has been revisited and extended since Oppen, particularly in writing that seeks to politicize clarity by framing the problem in the context(s) of difference. Broadly speaking, legibility is a near central, often excessive demand in navigating any discourse, but the problematic of ‘the clear and the obscure’ or ‘the legible and the illegible’ might also be situated more narrowly within a poetics of the document, where confronting that demand involves developing strategies for understanding what it might mean to go on record, materially, and for engaging that record.
I’m concerned, then, not with erasure, but disfigurement: by redaction I mean to call to mind a forcible collision whereby the visible and vocable edges of a text contract. In this collision, the redacted remains apparent — even as redaction occludes, it mars material. More than erasure, redaction is how a discourse tends its own limits, since the out-of-bounds must remain visible as such whenever the lines of permissible speech are drawn. But to adopt redaction as a tool of lyric work is to bring the noise — to welcome refuse and to allow debris to collect along the road to clarity, as a kind of clarity. So what I’m calling redaction engages a material practice even at the expense of legibility.
One way Rachel Blau DuPlessis has responded to Oppen is by positing occlusion as an inroad to clarity. I want to consider her work as a renewal of Oppen’s call through the overwriting, overprinting, and redaction of his ‘white caesura.’ In Pritchett’s terms, a white caesura isn’t the silence of a poetic voice, or the falling silent of speech or song — it instead re-members a history gone silent, pointing up the always visible occlusions in the record when the historical person was silenced. An embodied gap in the historical record, this notion of a material caesura opens the door for other ways of writing clarity, inviting in particular a response to “transparence” as the vehicle (in Oppen’s “Clarity in the sense of transparence”).
DuPlessis overwrites Oppen’s call and intervenes precisely at the question of obscurity in art, as if to say that we haven’t reached the limit of lyric work if we rest in a view of the illegible as a threat to clarity. In a poem that deploys as much redacted as unobscured text — an effort to approximate war’s syntax — DuPlessis frames the practice as lament: “Such sorrow obliterates statement.” I understand her work as exploring strategies for arriving, via a material practice, at that caesura of revolt named by Lacoue-Labarthe in the epigraph above: a critical space of “exit[ing] art within art,” a space of mourning-as-resistance. Her redactive gestures eventually disfigure rhetoric and exit discourse — so to give it a start.
Notes and redactions: Describing some edges
The lengthy notes accompanying most sections of Drafts perform a rigorous transparency regarding the source materials and engagements that went into the poem’s composition. They take up citational practice as a problem, and reading the notes as a gender-inflected gloss on the poetics of appropriation would not be far afield. But it’s also worth pointing out from the beginning (if one can begin at the beginning with Drafts — and perhaps one really shouldn’t) that occlusion is as much the modus operandi of the notes as exegesis or citation.
An early example can be found in the following elliptical note for Draft 1: “There is also a buried statement by Paul Celan.” (The statement remains buried in the note.) Much later — if reading Drafts according to the linear sequence of the y axis — a note for Draft 39 clarifies: “‘No sandpoems’ as in Draft 1, from Paul Celan.” DuPlessis has written that, from the outset of the project, she adopted Celan’s dictum for guidance in “how to write […] some austere, deliberative, materialist, awe-struck art in segmented language.” Though it might seem like minutiae to begin by parsing the notes to the poems, the delayed disclosure suggests that even the critical apparatus of the notes attempts to work out a material practice, perhaps even with an eye toward Oppen’s notion that “To write poetry is […] to control ‘the sequence of disclosure.’” That “No sandpoems” is “buried” — both in the poem and the notes for Draft 1 — is a pun that points up the material nature of the citational system at play here.
If DuPlessis’s sensibility in Drafts is shaped in part on midrash, then this occlusion itself might function as gloss. The Draft 1 note is unforthcoming, offering attribution and immediately withdrawing it. As a dictum, “No sandpoems” calls (impossibly) for work commensurate with the disasters to which it responds, but I would argue that the burial of Celan’s statement in DuPlessis’s early citation seems to further qualify his demand: no immaterial work. That is, one should strive after a commensurate work, but particularly through understanding that one’s materials are uniquely capable of registering disaster’s persistent trace, including the white ‘space’ of the page, including even a critical apparatus. Further, if the practice is material, if a material’s in play, no erasure’s ever complete. (From an ecological perspective, even our beaches can absorb a permanent mark.)
So, almost immediately, the apparatus refuses full disclosure, so to lament a historical foreclosure on so much immaterial, unremarkable detail strewn in the wake of events. As if to suggest that, in the absence of “a past become citable in all its moments,” citation buckles, or becomes at least suspect, and that, holding one’s tongue under the weight of such a messianic reevaluation of writing history, one might via occlusion produce at least a draft. Even to declare “No sandpoems,” if only as program, is beside the point, immaterial. Better simply to do it, to put it in play — to keep a material in play — as Celan does by the end of his poem. Thus, the Draft 1 note declares a burial and performs it in the same gesture, marking in the process the material residue of Celan’s work and dictum, as against (or as inseparable from) the shifting sands of ‘mere’ citation or commentary.
Before considering DuPlessis’s deployment of the literal redactions from Oppen’s FBI file as a similar kind of burial, it would be worthwhile to weigh the significance of the fact that this earlier redaction — “No sandpoems” — is her rendering of the opening line of a poem that ends: “Deepinsnow, / Eepinno, / I-i-o.” A snow burial of the word “Deepinsnow,” “I-i-o” is a “white caesura” wherein the poem concretizes its lament by disfiguring its own lexicon, muting the semantic content but also foregrounding a sonic value (virtually illegible noise). DuPlessis has explored a similar becoming-silent in Oppen through a reading of Adorno: “As close as one gets to ‘stopping’ writing (something Oppen, of course, did, a silence generated and supported variously, a sociocultural act), that temptation and its complex overcoming ‘expresses negatively’ (in Adorno’s terms) ‘the impulse that animates committed literature.’” Redaction is a material trace of that impulse where, in an attempt to ‘write’ silence, the poem must somehow move to render it legible.
In fact, at stake in the entire line of 1 (thus far) is a test of reiterated silence that deploys multiple, simultaneous silences or silencings. And this is in some ways where DuPlessis’s response to Oppen’s call for clarity really takes shape: as opposed to a “transparent” or quiet silence, here is a poly-vocal arrangement of silence, where the trace, the evanescent, the redacted are “[called] to account,” even in muteness and occlusion. Here is a noisier clarity that picks up its own station at the same time as it lets in the static ghosts of other channels, previous broadcasts. This clarity “Will verb; will Verb verb” — will silence silence:
Silence, silence, silence
was, this was, the implicit subject was
The lines from Draft 1 above gloss Oppen’s “Clarity in the sense of silence” and announce a concurrent direction for thinking through what constitutes the immaterial in the lyric: many silences (many different silencings) must be in play simultaneously, must be recognized, named, performed, reiterated. This is integral to the methodology of Drafts and bound up in the notion of the written draft as the organizing principle. The provisional nature of drafting is adopted as a compositional strategy, so that the project offers itself as a critique of the monumental work’s authority. But redaction further qualifies the methodology, since the draft is exactly where “the page would go black from overprinting,” where excess would be separated from essence and rendered mute. In DuPlessis’s work, however, the draft doesn’t generate refuse along a trajectory towards an ideal form (the clear, the monumental) — but instead activates a gendered space of the lyric that contests Pound’s principle of condensare as little more than ‘trimming the fat’ (a friend calls this a demand for the “anorexic lyric”).
As much as Oppen, then, it seems Beverly Dahlen’s on the other end of the line in Drafts, since the question of what’s beside the point or immaterial is exactly the point. DuPlessis writes of her early “desire for poetry so great that it [stops] poetry, and [her] inchoate quarrel with gender narratives in the lyric.” To reiterate, she writes of being driven by both pursuits at once. In Dahlen’s work, DuPlessis locates this other model for tracing a political edge of material practice: “Dahlen’s A Reading is an articulation between lyric (the force moving) and documentary (record without judgment). And something else, this palimpsest where language (and thus social registers and discourses) constantly overwrites and whispers the otherness of half-seen, shadowy words. An ‘it,’ a space half-entered.” As a methodology, “it” is thus a kind of redaction that shatters “the binary distinction between text and space” to create a poetry of “voided markings, marked void.”
This reading of Dahlen’s work is useful in situating redaction as close as possible to a part of speech (and thus, to legibility), if only to clarify the difficulty of establishing it as a linguistic act. If it can occupy a legible space in a lexicon, it must do so pronominally, for the closest it comes to articulation is the “space half-entered” that DuPlessis finds in Dahlen’s “it.” The line of 1 extends a consideration of “it,” a pronominal thread announced in the subtitles to the Drafts in that line (“It,” “Incipit,” “Split,” “In Situ,” and “Pitch Content”) — and contains as well a Draft dedicated to Dahlen herself (Draft 39). So “it” (the line of 1) calls on a community, positioning Drafts in proximity to other projects — specifically a feminist intervention in the long poem — and, like Dahlen in DuPlessis’s reading, “it” does so as a means of “preparing in the most banal way to say everything possible.”
I want to claim that, if we read them as lexical, the redactions in Drafts would seem to occupy the space of pronominal address, saying roughly (though they’re not speaking) “you” and “we” — perhaps also, eventually, “yiou and thwe and wey and hheer” — only, that is, if we insist on extrapolating from them a semantic content. When they make their first appearance in Draft 5, redactions are meant to approximate Oppen’s FBI file, and by the time they’re deployed in Draft 68, they’re part of a syntax of war: “As the war returns; / its syntax recurs.” So, they arrive out of a confluence of the private and the historical—figured in DuPlessis’s personal and critical relationship with Oppen (the inarticulable you of redaction as pronominal address in Draft 5) — and they “recur” as part of a question (our question) about how to wrest a writing of history from the grip of the ideologies and apparatuses that run it through.
However, even if address is there, somewhere back of the blacked out passages, it’s important to note that redaction is primarily a textual event: that, rather than capitulating to a troublesome tradition of apostrophic lyric address, DuPlessis engages the redacted text (the official document, the lyric poem) as a disaster site where historical trauma can be examined in situ. Redaction inserts the distance of textuality into even ostensibly personal poems (like Draft 5 or Draft 99, written after Robin Blaser’s death), but it also mourns the distance. Draft 5 begins in redaction, which is first figured as a behavior of the photographic record:
A man within a day
estranged in light […]
Then, in running columns of text that quickly bleed into one another — interrupting and doubling the sentences — the physical properties of redaction take on roughly the shape of a flag, but with an organic texture:
enamel a “modern” kind of minimal
mural: indelible black rectangles […]
A photo of the near dead, a flag, a “Strange […] enamel”: the funereal, corpse-like qualities of redacted texts seem to be highlighted from the outset. Confronted with such a textual corpus, one is forced to wonder, “who coded the deletions,” and to confront a reading of history as a material encounter, so that, asking such a question, one maneuvers (impossibly) to interrogate the immovable and impersonal apparatus of the state. To engage institutional redactions, the poem deploys its own, inviting some complicity with that state as it selects what can and can’t be divulged, and in what order. This strange flag threatens to collapse the machinations of poetry into those of state, since whoever “coded the deletions” controlled the sequence of disclosure. The blackouts also seem to mourn Oppen’s textual body, or mourn the passing of his physical body textually, by obliterating the present text, by taking in obliteration as a horizon, even as a textual mark or event (thus rendering it legible).
I’m tempted to read the practice through DuPlessis’s own gloss on Adorno’s claim that poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. Thinking through Adorno in “Draft 52: Midrash,” DuPlessis first revisits the visual arrest of the redacted text as matter, corpus:
“I am put in this place.”
Personal pronouns are moot. Eye only.
Poetry constructed of enormity:
mounds — of faces, limbs, shoes, rags.
Later, DuPlessis interprets Adorno’s unrelenting claim as self-disfigurement:
It is an act of mourning
to cut off
what is important to him —
poetry — 
Again, I’m tempted to see a similar self-immolation in DuPlessis’s approach to redaction, but I want to resist overemphasizing the destructive nature of that gesture (and the bodily nature of texts), since redaction is also — as in Draft 68 — a generative critical tool. In the unnumbered Draft (“Précis”), DuPlessis ‘reads’ all the poems on the front end of the project (1–57), and her complicated account there of Draft 5 — where mourning is palpable, if ‘hidden’ — bears mention here:
= Hidden elegy, the dark lines.
Blackening out of specific records.
The dark inside of unopened present (unopened parent).
Death with everything but regret left inarticulate.
A burned page. Laden ink and tar
across the heavy surface
weighted with obscurity.
The bleak inside of transport.
Dread of the future packed in convoy.
Small recoveries within effacement.
Train across the dark, beclouded country.
Night sky in which some milky lights
are sometimes evident but sometimes
whited out by haze of powerful cities.
Folded into a working definition of redaction in this gloss are the following: redaction as the inside (of present, of parent, of transport), as death itself or the inarticulate, as “a burned page,” as “ink and tar,” as “dread of the future,” as night. What’s more, any words visible in the midst of redaction are devastatingly described as “Small recoveries within effacement,” a sentence that threatens blithely to level all of Drafts. A few lines prior, this assessment of what remains is literally a death sentence: “Death with everything but regret left inarticulate.” So, almost all of Drafts gets despairingly reduced to a series of small recoveries or to little more than articulated regret. Only a handful of the poems thus far contain redacted text (Drafts 5, 52, 68, 87, and 99), and of these, only 5, 68, and 99 make extensive use of redaction. But the concerns bodied forth in that practice are pervasive, and precedents abound in DuPlessis’s long poem.
In some fundamental way, we must look at redaction, confront it visually (as “Poetry constructed of enormity”), and as such it interrupts a reading, but the visual or plastic edge of Drafts is everywhere in evidence. To my mind, there are two important contexts for understanding redaction as a visual practice in Drafts: first, there are the written characters, scrawl, and drawings of Drafts (in 1, 6, 7, 23, and 73). These figures take up Pound’s ideograms, reminding us of the direct engagement with his Cantos in these poems, but the black boxes in Draft 5 also gesture towards the visual arts, finding a specific corollary in, for example, Anselm Kiefer’s black books. DuPlessis has described the poem’s methodology as collage: “this work pressed / down unfinished overwritten refolded.” In the collage poem “Draft 94: Mail Art,” the visual gains a striking primacy, and the arrival of an entire book of The Collage Poems of Drafts suggests that much more work will need to be done to understand this late exit — from within the poem — to another medium entirely. I’ll return to this shortly, though a full treatment will be beyond the scope of the present essay.
Equally important in contextualizing redaction as prosody is the preponderance of abbreviation and contraction in Drafts. DuPlessis makes use of standard abbreviation and grammatical contraction, but as often she torques both practices, so that, for example, “memory” becomes “m-m-ry” and “power” becomes first “pwer,” and then “pwr.” Rather than a proper grammatical contraction, what gets occluded in “Did not yet strike with full intent” refracts and doubles: “Dd nt, or strk.” Then, somewhere between abbreviation and strikethrough, there’s “No writing. Nothing there but / – – lessness,” and in tandem with the first appearance of redaction in Draft 5, there’s also “‘J–w.’” These are only a few illustrations, but the gesture’s pervasive. In exploring strategies for thwarting standard grammatical contraction, DuPlessis situates syntax itself as a site of the trace, a concept so central to her project that it’s treated at length in the longest Draft (number 87, “Trace Elements”).
I would argue that what we read in DuPlessis’s use of redaction isn’t the disappeared but the contracted, the still visible illegible. Though it contains no literal redaction, Draft 85 is written over Oppen’s “Of Being Numerous”—section for section—and in it DuPlessis offers a direct account of redaction as prosody: “If I were to say all this, all at the same time / The way it’s felt, / The page would go black from overprinting, / An unreadable un-negotiable plenitude.” In Draft 99, redaction is (again) illegible excess: “This marks the urge to put everything in. This is it / XXXXXXXXXXXX.” In fact, Drafts often approaches just this type of contraction, where an overabundance of text begins to crowd into the page, and frequently the poem works its own margin, incorporating marginal annotation (as in Draft 68) as well as multiple running columns of text (as in Draft 66). So that we might see the literal redactions as part of the apparatus, an extension of these other formal features — as the resolution of, for example, the ‘stacked’ textual variants in a poem like Draft 2, where the leading (the space between lines of text) drops out to propose “hurl,” “hole,” and “hurt” as simultaneously completing the phrase, “for I am afraid to [ ____ ] it too much.” As a resolution, then, we might say that redaction doesn’t choose among alternatives. It occludes, but does so by way of excess, by including everything “all at the same time.”
And this contraction-redaction may be the only way to gloss a poem that’s already been so thoroughly glossed: Draft 49 includes both “Turns” and a reading of “Turns” (“Turns: An Interpretation”), and the unnumbered Draft also circles back on 49. Though the system of donations in Drafts often behaves a bit like annotation, the direct treatment of 49 (in the addendum to 49 and in “Unnumbered: Précis”) is perhaps unprecedented in this poem. It makes sense, then, that the next Draft after 49 in the line of 11 is riddled with blacked out passages, having arrived at a contracted view of so much gloss. Redaction might be the most literal embodiment of what’s happening in the incessant donations of Drafts: one might imagine that the poem, were it to continue on indefinitely, would eventually resolve into a sequence of black monoliths. The exit to the visual arts late in the poem begins to make a new kind of sense, inasmuch as it’s a palpable way to read the poem anew — by plasticizing it, cutting it off from poetry.
“Draft 68: Threshold” — the third ‘take’ on “Turns” — is a contraction of “Turns.” As Ron Silliman has usefully noted, in Draft 49, “what gets effaced is nothing less than the role & contribution of women.” This, Silliman posits, is due to the formal modeling of 49: while the engagement with Zukofsky’s “Mantis” and “Mantis: An Interpretation” is voiced in DuPlessis’s title, the poem’s nod to Alice Notley’s The Descent of Alette remains unvoiced outside of the notes to the poem, since the debt to Notley is primarily legible in the form of the frequent use of caesura, which remains (roughly) silent. This silencing, this occlusion, is part of the poem’s great elegy, yet here again in “Turns,” caesura performs such radical effacement by approaching the material.
It’s important to bear in mind that “Turns” and “Threshold” are on the same itinerary, since the former explores — explicitly, at length — a contested relationship to feminisms that the latter virtually buries. But the everything-in redaction of 68 isn’t unvoiced; it instead becomes a wail of many silencings. The deep lament of “Turns” resurfaces immediately in “Threshold” — “This what you wanted / When you said you wanted ‘more’?” — only to be occluded by the blackouts, cut short in comparison to how it’s sustained in “Turns.” Redaction here is sorrow heaped on itself: “Such sorrow obliterates statement.”
Thus obliterated, statement itself takes shape, becoming object:
The page is slowly turning black
XXX words XXXXXXXXXX XXX.
And reading, drafting, critique, poetics, historiography — the central pursuits of Drafts, all variously strategies for “slowly turning black […] words” — resolve into simultaneously funereal and activist gestures. The threshold is a threshold of touching:
To get anywhere, to resist complicity,
XXXXXXXXXXXX how to touch
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX long and wide XXXXXXX
longer and wider, wilder, meaner and more bereft
XXXXX haunted. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
So, not the question of how to mourn touch (as aporia), and not how not to touch (“resist complicity”) — but how to mourn-touch, how to say it “the way it’s felt.” This, for me, is the question at the heart of DuPlessis’s use of redaction.
A note for Draft 68 appends the following from Edouard Glissant: “It can happen that the [literary] work is not written for someone, but to dismantle the complex mechanism of frustration and the infinite forms of oppression.” The desire to find some pronominal address back of redaction might only be an effort to translate something that doesn’t need translating, since redaction as prosody already begins to come clear. As mark, as material, redaction obscures, positing an ‘other’ side to the text (as in Draft 94: “If there were holes cut in this page / (not impossible) / what would be the word groups / underneath?”). The pronoun’s its cousin, but redaction is parts (all parts) not part of speech. As syntax, it contracts, even beyond recognition. And when sound — when sounded — redaction wails.
1. Patrick Pritchett, “Clarity, or Late Modernism (A Photological Midrash),” paragraphs 11–12.
2. DuPlessis’s account of Oppen in the context of the work of Paul Celan and Walter Benjamin draws out, as a reading of clarity, his reference to “black verse,” a pun that would certainly be apropos here. See her essay “‘Uncannily in the Open’: In Light of Oppen,” in Blue Studios: Poetry and Its Cultural Work (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006).
15. The blacked-out passages are somewhat performative, so that we might see them as enacting drafts in Drafts. In this sense they’re similar to a strikethrough, where text remains legible in spite of being ‘crossed out.’ There may only be a handful of examples of words stricken through in Drafts, to date. In Draft 3, a bracket in the left-hand margin extends for roughly half of the poem, with a marginal note indicating that the bracketed text should be “CUT” (Toll, 19), which again might be seen as a kind of scripting. I think it would be a mistake to see redaction as no more than an instance of Drafts ‘replicating’ drafts, but the performative should not be entirely disregarded.
39. DuPlessis, “Draft 99: Intransitive,” Jacket 38 (2009).
41. Ron Silliman, Silliman’s Blog. Silliman made a series of posts on the publication of Torques: Drafts 58–76 that included a discussion of Draft 68, all of which can be accessed in the archives to his blog.
A story that all readers of Drafts know well: in 1982, almost twelve hundred sculptures were discovered by trash collectors in a Philadelphia alley. The subsequent search for the artist who produced these pieces was unsuccessful. The working theory is that the artist had died and the pieces were discarded by those left behind — a family member, a friend, perhaps a landlord. The artist was dubbed the “Philadelphia Wireman,” assumed to be a man due to the physical strength necessary to work with the resistant found materials: “a wire armature or exoskeleton firmly binds a bricolage of found objects, including plastic, glass, food packaging, umbrella parts, tape, rubber, batteries, pens, leather, reflectors, nuts and bolts, nails, foil, coins, toys, watches, eyeglasses, tools, and jewelry.” Additionally, the demographic of the neighborhood, coupled with the apparent influence of African figural aesthetics on the sculptures, leads critics to believe that the artist was African American.
The Philadelphia Wireman is one of the many figures woven into Rachel Blau DuPlessis’s Drafts, a shadow artist who embodies so many of the poem’s aesthetic and sociopolitical concerns. He was a shaper of “ordinary stuff,” “scratch, gum, mite, dust: travelling the range of signs. / Grunge things, junk things, things singed by light” — an art of anonymous transformation, a quoter and citer, a collagist with an acute sense of how the forces of the body intersect with the material pressure of inert matter and cultural signs. He toiled for what must have been decades on his craft, and left behind a massive body of work. And yet, in contrast to our received notions of artistic ambition, the work does not memorialize. It was mere chance, after all, that kept the work from becoming scrap once again.
The Wireman’s sculptures are also an apt representation of the life poem. His work reflects the dialectic between ongoing artistic effort and the subsequent accumulation of that process. Large and small, art and accident, form and medium/mediation — these always come together in the life poem. What changes from poet to poet is the attitude toward that interplay. All embrace it, as they must. The work takes over, and they cannot help but keep writing. But we can also detect degrees of resistance, a counterpressure, different inhabitations of the work.
In some cases, we find a monument to the writing’s own excess. The Maximus Poems, published posthumously in its oversized folio form, sits on my bookshelf. It is the most valuable text I own, now out of print, a gift from family members. I am inordinately fond of it. I could also use it as a weapon, should the need arise. Olson appears on the front cover, again a large photograph designed to accentuate the work’s concern with size, space, projection of a post-human historical consciousness. Less physically impressive, perhaps, my tattered paperback New Directions copy of The Cantos, its black binding recognizable to any student of modernist poetry and poetics. Together, these texts can’t help but suggest one element of the life poem: its hulking presence in the world and imagination, its often insane ambition, its fortification against time.
Ironically, of course, the monumental aspect of the life poem actually arises from its opposite: its inherent vulnerability, the constant sense that it is on the verge of falling apart. An impossible art form. It is this exchange between impossibility and force that, to my mind, makes these works both interesting and important. They test both the nature of composition (the possibility of form) as well as the limits of distribution and exchange (the prospects of reading). The life poem asks us what can be written, and what can be read.
A few shelves over is my collection of Drafts: Toll, Drafts, Torques, Pitch. Undoubtedly, these texts could be, and I suspect will be, collated into an equally impressive single volume. But, somewhat different from the case of Olson and Pound, Drafts has been composed during a time of unprecedented transformation in textual distribution. It is one of the preeminent examples of the life poem in the digital age, a time when, as Kenneth Goldsmith has recently written, “[faced] with an unprecedented amount of available digital text, writing needs to redefine itself to adapt to the new environment of textual abundance.” Although the life poem, more than many literary practices, anticipates textual abundance, Drafts seeks to realize those anticipations. In many respects, DuPlessis’s work has evolved alongside the digital revolution; “Draft 1: It” was composed in the 1980s, over a decade before the first Google search. The work has adapted itself to that new environment and, most importantly, interrogated it. The results are exploratory and yet forceful, contemporary and yet untimely. Almost anonymous, like the sculptures of the Philadelphia Wireman, Drafts produces messages that call out of and into the network: “who circulated zigzag workings filled zeros. / WHO DID the work?”
To write a life poem in the network, to write the digital life poem, is to loosen one’s hold on the monument in order to embrace a new textual ontology. Text, after all, is now a verb, not merely a noun.
A somewhat exceptional Draft offers an interesting illustration of the digital life poem’s transformed mediation. “Draft 94: Mail Art” is more radically pictorial than most of the work, although DuPlessis’s poetics has been avowedly visual from the very beginning. The different versions of “Mail Art,” when read side-by-side, stage dynamics unique to the digital world. And I believe that the poem is best read in this way, seen as multiple to achieve its many effects. In other words, the poem divides itself, cites itself, like all of DuPlessis’s work, but it uses the exchange between the digital and analog to produce this commentary.
When read in its original digital form, published in Jacket 37, the collage of “Mail Art” shimmers, particularly if your computer screen is of sufficient size. The ephemera of an imagined international snail mail is overwritten, tonally pitched, scribed and erased. Most importantly, digital reproduction, here, becomes an irreplaceable tool for the artwork’s transmission. The substance and heft of the material is visible in the texture of the physical artifacts. Compare this digital publication to its second version, in Pitch. Here, the colors are lost; the sense of the work as a multidimensional creation, flattened. The stamps and postmarks less visible, both of which are central to the concept of the piece. Strangely, then, the analog, in this case, becomes somewhat impoverished next to the digital, exactly the opposite of what those of us who often succumb to analog-nostalgia (like myself) would expect.
We could say, then, that in print the poem is subjected to a more fragile mediation. Why undergo this loss? To take its place in another moment, a different dialogue, for one. Drafts has structured itself as a process of ongoing revision, as its readers know, in which each textual element becomes meaningful in several directions at once. “Mail Art,” when placed within a volume of Drafts, calls to, and is responded by, “Draft 75: Doggerel,” “Draft 56: Bildungsgedicht with Apple,” “Draft 37: Praedelle, “Draft 18: Traduction,” the structure of the fold that DuPlessis has used to grid the work. But it also echoes, less directly, the found art and lost sender of the Philadelphia Wireman; it puns, to my ear, the play between virtual and analogue in “Draft 85: Hard Copy” (also originally published digitally); as a mail art project, it clearly is a link in the chain of communication between “Draft 42: Epistle, Studios,” and “Draft 80: Envoi.”
In Jacket, the work took place in a different exchange, within a localized network that included entries as unexpected as Jennifer Moxley, Jack Spicer, Oulipo, Rosmarie Waldrop, Seamus Heaney (a flurry of postings on that one), Jonathan Littell’s The Kindly Ones, on and on. More significantly, like the many other recent Drafts first published on the web, “Mail Art” participated in any number of lines of unanticipated connectivity. In the network, the work can be linked, referenced, copied and pasted, rapidly and unexpectedly transformed from one moment of transmission to the next, intercepted or encountered by a reader who knows nothing of Drafts as a whole. When read through this context, Pitch becomes simply another transmission, discrete from other, future moments in the (re)publication of the work. Because the text was “limited to black and white presentation,” DuPlessis writes in her note, the work in the book is “a selected Mail Art” (Pitch, 146). The book, in other words, becomes only a link in the digital life poem’s network.
In this sense, Drafts is always sent. And sending is risky business, a fact that champions of the network sometimes overlook. Consider the opening text from “Mail Art”:
anything — envelopes
according to the weight of insouciance (Pitch, 147)
The mail as propriety, in its proprietary, official capacity, appears in this mini-catalogue of “anything.” Sealed, stamped, paid for, approved, sent off under the proper authorities. And can we not help but hear in this passage an attempt to reclaim the transgressive roots of collage, to remind us that the now most ubiquitous practice of the avant-garde called into question the control over letters that ownership and authorship under bourgeois copyright implied? Your deed to your letters, author, gives you the right to publish them, and yet, paradoxically, as soon as you publish those words they are no longer entirely yours. They are then vulnerable, not simply to the approved responses of reviewers, peers, other authors, the press, but also to tearing and remaking, the cutting and pasting, of the Dadaist and vandal.
The mail, in this sense, acutely stages the dangers of publication: you send your letters out into the world, and you do not know into whose hands, entirely, they will fall. No one has theoretically analyzed this quite like Jacques Derrida. The Post Card:
Of course I felt, at the second I was writing, that this letter, like all the others, was intercepted even before any hands could be put on it, any accidental interception — for example, by the woman postal clerk, the rival of your childhood. All the precautions in the world are taken in vain, you can register your envois with a return receipt, crypt them, seal them, multiply coverings and envelopes, at the limit not even send your letter, still, in advance, it is intercepted. It falls into anyone’s hands, a poor post card, it ends up in the display case of a provincial bookseller. … Once intercepted — a second suffices — the message no longer has any chance of reaching any determinable person, in any (determinable) place whatever.
Derrida’s fearful, obsessive letter writer confronts the inherent fragility of the text, and the structurally inevitable failure to arrive that accompanies any sent message. Despite Derrida’s relentless critique of presence and the ego, The Post Card plays with the feelings of anxiety that comes when you realize that the letters you send are not, never will be, your own. Today, awash in Wikileaks and social media, that feeling may strike us as inescapably romantic. But we often can’t help but feel it.
Drafts confronts not simply the reality of threatened circulation but also the subjectivities the post produces. “Mail Art,” in its opening page, takes those supposed illicit hands into the compositional process. The type is notated by hand — the text is not the “original” but the original annotated, the letter defaced or displaced or corrected. The letter not under erasure but under the pen, or, in the world of the digital, under the keystroke of another, of many others that we cannot know or anticipate. Where Derrida’s post cards fear theft and misplacement, the networked text can expect to be converted, resaved, reformatted, pasted, X-posted. Even more than the post card, permeable and multiple uncontrolled circulation is the condition of the digital life poem’s existence.
Under certain signs, poetic form has been represented as the anti–post card, the nontransmittable or untranslatable. “The poem should not mean / But be.” “The Heresy of Paraphrase.” The life poem rewrites this regime, by seeking to incorporate the accident of the post card into its form. Instead of writing to resist translation, the life poem writes as a transmission, and, by doing so, it tests formal potential and the ways of subjectivity that sending produces. Drafts is nothing if not formally precise, an ongoing dialogue between poetic traditions and practices. We feel language being shaped, torqued, as we read Drafts, even as the demands of the life poem never allow that shaping to come to a final resting place.
In this sense, the poem stages the tension of making form, of forming language poetically, in the world of multiple languages, infinite signs, and global networks. In my mind, the effort to make something new adds to the vulnerability of the digital poetic exchange. There is no doubt that the responses to Goldsmith’s “new environment of textual abundance” are as varied as the environment itself. Goldsmith’s own conceptual poetics represents one form of response, what we could call the procedural or what he calls the “uncreative.” Another response might be detected in David Shields’s recent manifesto Reality Hunger, which takes up some of Goldsmith’s concerns but in a significantly different way:
All new works will be born digital, and they will flow into the library as you might add more words to a long story. In the clash between the conventions of the books and the protocols of the screen, the screen will prevail. On this screen, now visible to a billion people, the technology of search will transform isolated books into the universal library of all human knowledge …. We all need to begin figuring out how to tell a story for the cell phone.
Where Goldsmith frames, shifting the focus from artistic creation to the artistic mediation of information, Shields samples, adding to that library screen with tiny flashes, transformations, new mash-ups. Goldsmith’s Day is decidedly not composed for the cell phone, while Reality Hunger wants to abandon citation entirely. Not entirely new, of course: “What matter who’s speaking?”
Neither conceptualism nor “reality-based art” (Shields’s term) adequately describes the following lines:
“12 hours per day for a pittance, living
“12 to a room, working
“in fenced-in factory complexes,”
nailed to the sewing,
chained to the fabrications.
Who controls these junctures?
who prices these conjunctions?
who mines the evisceration?
Another walks beside me, not an illusion.
Revenant, tell me if you know
what land am I? and you?
The newspapers become the source for this work, copied and quoted, as in Day. In this particular case, the 2001 story reports on factory labor conditions in China. The poetic response, however, is not content with mere framing. The questioning lines test various possibilities not only of description but also communication and authority, acknowledging both disorientation and anxiety. In a global marketplace, the ghostly other who weaves our clothes and assembles our cars is decidedly not an illusion. Thus, the speaker is literally haunted by the report, unable to adequately account for the situation, turning the interpretation over to that other in the hopes of a response.
In lines such as these, Drafts does seek to write something new, to say something singular, forging a temporary poetic authority, but in such a way that the realities of the digital world, with all of its material pressures and disorientating virtuality, is brought to terms. The digital life poem bares its own vulnerability, turns this into a central concern of the work, but simultaneously crafts resilience and seeks to offer that counterpressure to the world. The results are always engaged with other voices, always in a process of formation that never ossifies into monumental form. Between poetic form and digital mediation, the poem seems to suggest, is where a language of communication could emerge, however humble and temporary.
This poetics, fragile yet resistant, contestatory yet haunted, is, for me, one of the ways DuPlessis extends and transforms George Oppen. Drafts can be read as an effort to develop not simply a “language of New York,” but a language of the network. Oppen’s life and poetry was a constant struggle to assert the articulation and exchange of singular selves and voices in a world of numerousness. The paradox is that for both DuPlessis and Oppen this articulation is always a citation, a borrowing and a giving. Hence the struggle, the drama of a poetry and a self tentatively exploring the conditions of linguistic existence, venturing into the virtual where another citation is inevitable, for better or worse.
Like the Wireman’s sculptures, cast into the alley, Drafts desires the anonymous revenant to pick them up in some as yet unknown future network, to speak back to the challenge of the material by acknowledging the pressure of the crafting hands.
1. For more general information, see the brief biography posted by the Fleisher/Ollman Gallery.
3. Pound’s concern for the book as an art form, including deluxe editions illustrated by his wife, is usefully examined in Olga Nikolova, “Ezra Pound’s Cantos De Luxe,” Modernism/Modernity 15, no. 1 (2008): 155–77.
4. From the preface to Against Expression.
5. Drafts 1-38, Toll (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2001), 142. I wonder if “almost anonymous” could be the contemporary correlate of nineteenth-century ennui or twentieth-century angst, a characteristic sentiment of what Zadie Smith has dubbed “people 2.0” (“Generation Why?,” New York Review of Books, November 25, 2010)? The paradox of our unprecedented power over information, our access to it and power of manipulation, our connectivity and communicability, on the one hand, and our exposure, permeability, fragility on the other. I am one node in a network of billions, but you can find me on Facebook.
6. Pitch: Drafts 77–95 (London: Salt, 2010), 146–65. Reproduction in the book form, the book being the traditional conclusion of the literary art work in the age of print, the book bound, bought, sold, collected, reviewed, signed. The books climbing the library shelves, swarming, a fact that bothers William Carlos Williams to no end in the third section of Paterson. I recognize the irony to then call the publication of Pitch a reproduction, for isn’t this the end to which the original text was striving — is not the telos of the life poem that ambitious monument? Not for the life poem in the digital world. Monuments are, after all, for the past.
8. I may appear to be making far too much of a decision that was undoubtedly prompted by the exigencies of publishing and economics. But those accidental and inescapable realities are exactly the point. In the digital life poem, every publication is a selection, every gesture subject to endless reframings and new articulations precisely because the definition of publication is so rapidly changing.
9. Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 51. The obsessiveness over phallic certainty in this text by Derrida, with its subsequent anxiety over origins and arrivals, crosses in the mail with Drafts’ interrogation of patriarchal post cards.
12. George Oppen, “Of Being Numerous,” Selected Poems (New York: New Directions, 2003), 84. Another moment of mail art: “Of Being Numerous” contains anonymous, but willingly acknowledged, quotations from DuPlessis’s letters to Oppen.
Rachel Blau DuPlessis’s response to Oppen
“Whether as the intensity of seeing increases, one’s distance from Them, the people, does not also increase” — Rachel Blau DuPlessis to George Oppen
George Oppen was an important friend and instigation for Rachel Blau DuPlessis at the start of her career as a poet-critic and has remained a presence throughout. Their relationship was mutually productive both despite and because of their difference in age, gender, and as DuPlessis’s career progressed, her intertwining scholarly, critical, and political commitments. He offers an admiring, brief comment on the back jacket of her first book of poetry, a visit to the Oppen archive just after his death is among the several events that she has cited as launching Drafts, her work in seriality and collage that stands as a major and ongoing contribution to the long poem tradition, and acts of citation and dedication continue throughout the work. During the same period in which DuPlessis was writing what she would come to conceive of as the first “half” of her long poem and the experimental essays she would collect in The Pink Guitar, she edited both The Selected Letters of George Oppen and, with Peter Quartermain, The Objectivist Nexus. Beginning with his response to an early piece of her dissertation on Pound and Williams, Oppen’s letters to DuPlessis reveal him to be the rigorous mentor he was to several younger poets of the moment. However, one significant feature of their correspondence distinguishes it from most of the other younger poets to whom Oppen was then writing: the way in which letters to her function as a site for working out his response to the New Left and the relationship of that response to his poetics. They would directly discuss the intersection between poetry and politics in the late 1960s, but in October 1965 it is the subtext of another unique aspect of their friendship: the fact that just two months into it he sends her the poem that would become “Of Being Numerous,” and, while rejecting most of her queries, includes the question I cite as my epigraph prominently in the finished product.
In February 2006, in the midst of a lifetime of personal and poetic connection to Oppen, DuPlessis returns most directly to “Of Being Numerous” in “Draft 85: Hard Copy,” a poem which is, in her words, “mapped loosely on, thinks about, and responds to” Oppen’s poem. In returning to her initially restrained inquiry into Oppen’s stance with respect to social collectivity, DuPlessis sharpens it and, in so doing, begins what might be a reorientation of her own. This turn, which might be called a torque towards the political, marks a crucial juncture for her long poem. Over the now twenty years and five volumes of its production, Drafts has absorbed a range of sociopolitical issues and events — most obsessively the Holocaust and gender inequity. I have argued elsewhere that Drafts’ accumulation of and commentary upon on the materio-linguistic fragments of modern catastrophe represents DuPlessis’s unique version of Walter Benjamin’s tarrying among the ruins of culture in order to uncover their “messianic” potential, the historical materialist process of “brush[ing] history against the grain (“Little Words”). Through procedures like layered deictic gestures, randomized repetition, and what DuPlessis calls the “fold,” Drafts creates the conditions for poetic language to produce and reproduce itself, letting go of certain elements of authorial control. The considerations informing these practices are multiple — from a desire to dismantle muse and hero figures, to a recognition that even the smallest signifying element may bear witness to provisional truth, and that, therefore, “to show,” in Benjamin’s terms, rather than “to say” is the most humane approach. As Walter Kalaidjian puts it: “DuPlessis grants a certain autonomy of expression to the ‘anguage’ she witnesses in her verse” with the belief that “the revolutionary moment of Benjamin’s ‘material historicism’ happens neither in the social solidarity of a ‘polis’ nor in some saving ideological narrative of heroism and progress” but instead in the “truth” of language’s “symbolic procedures.”
But even as DuPlessis continues to theorize the validity of this practice, and while the very structure of Drafts is hardwired against any singular trajectory, the last page of Torques summons the poem to radical change: “Clear the table! Break this allegiance! … Begin! / Here! And Here!” The “intransigent response” DuPlessis demands in “Hard Copy” — the title itself suggestive of a new directness — is the only response, she suggests, to the “error after error” of modernity as it builds towards a kind of catastrophic apogee. Early in the poem, she asks, “Were there other times like this— / over and beyond the bearable?” While acknowledging that the question is “callow,” she also says it is “heartfelt” and goes on to confront the evidence accumulating quite literally at her doorstep. It “surely seems a bloody time,” she writes, with a sense of understatement, “where / someone is murdered down South 23rd St., / drugs, deals, rage, guns, / and then / the shame of War … / cabal of manipulation and / devious complicity.” The answer to the initial question is apparently “no,” but the poem is going to continue, “demanding other — unknown, strengths.” She asks, “What is the point of pure revulsion? I am beginning / to be very simple, to have very simple thoughts, no / complicated language” she writes. “Hard Copy” is by no means “simple,” but in it, Drafts, which has built itself into a reverberative archive of traumatic witness, turns toward political judgment and action.
And this is why “Hard Copy,” written at the moment when the costs of the Iraq War were poised to exceed Vietnam, faces Oppen and “Of Being Numerous” so directly. DuPlessis’s critical reassessment of what Oppen called, in “The Mind’s Own Place,” the poet’s “political non-availability” marks an important moment in Drafts as a long poem that would, as DuPlessis puts it, “offer the force of an intervention.” In section 37 of “Hard Copy,” DuPlessis cites lines from both her first book of poetry, and from section 37 of “Of Being Numerous” which itself glosses lines from Discrete Series, Oppen’s first book of poetry. Both poets view their early work from a distance of about thirty years, questioning their efforts “‘to see / what was really going on.’” Oppen appears ambivalent, both about his decision to open Discrete Series with the Henry James character Maude Blessingbourne, in an attempt to see with her into a new century’s clarity, and about whether witness can yield anything in the contemporary moment. Against argument and action, which the poem suggests are guilty of “thickening the air / … with myth,” the section ends with the vague affirmation that the act of seeing the materials — “motes, an iron mesh, links” — is still “relevant.”
Writing what she has called a “midrash” on their accumulated language, DuPlessis creates a meeting place for, “what could then be written,” as “then” points to the locus of constant change — 1934, 1968, 1980, 2007. While the page thickens with citation, it becomes curiously, correspondingly clear. Drawing from the title of one of the “donor drafts” of “Hard Copy,” the act of “facing pages” in this instance produces not just a “coruscation” — a word whose vagaries she considers in that draft — but a fiery blast, the explosion of direct combat. As her text engages Oppen’s retrospect on his own, DuPlessis whirls round to confront what’s happening right now: “One nano-second later and / a snarl of light that crashed to the floor binds one / to the terrors of historical time,” she writes, “That’s what awe is, that’s what fear. / Demanding an intransigent response / To the knife and its addictive power.” Where Oppen’s consideration of the act of seeing still finds in it a primary if limited ground on which to stand, DuPlessis’s poem cannot contain itself to a discussion of first principles — the extratextual world comes crashing in and “binds” her to respond; there is no choice.
The experience of binding, the reality of the knife — DuPlessis is here presenting the echoes of the binding of Isaac, in the ongoing war of human sacrifice conducted along the thin line between faith and secular ethics. She has recently called this story “the most startling, repeated, vital,” biblical text in Drafts as a whole, a negative moment in her sense of “creolized Jewishness.” Here, it recalls most immediately Oppen’s modified citation, in section 16 of “Of Being Numerous,” of a fragment from Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. Oppen’s section begins, “‘… he who will not work shall not eat,” and concludes, “and only he who unsheathes his knife shall be given / Isaac again. He who will not work shall not eat … / but he who will work shall give birth to his own father.” His identification with the value of “work” opens his text to a surprising endorsement of “unsheathing his knife” as an act of sincerity, grounded in the “vertical consciousness of oneself and one’s god.” This stance becomes especially clear when we read section 16 as a rejoinder to section 15’s ventriloquizing of the concern with being or doing “good” that Oppen disparagingly associated with women poets: “‘… find every hair / Of my belly, I am good (or I am bad), / find me.’” Work, or more specifically the solitary “workman,” is cited as a strongly positive way to “speak of poetry,” in section 27, further sharpening the gender distinctions that emerge in the interchange between 15 and 16.
“There is trouble in the desert,” DuPlessis writes in her section 16, “trouble in the lineage,” meaning at once her Jewish lineage and her patrilineage in Oppen. Part of the problem and likely part of the allure of Abrahamic allegory is its stark singularity: “they are all male singletons,” she writes, “one A, one I and one One / (undercounting various brothers / who do not matter in the tally; nor enumerating most sisters, though they certainly existed).” For DuPlessis, the resolution of Judaism’s founding narrative is radically inadequate because of this singularity; it needs to be reread from the perspective of the absent Ishmael, the unnamed sisters. Even as “regime of human sacrifice / was declared theologically finished,” she writes, it is clearly not “politically and ideologically finished,” because of the value it gives to what the poem elsewhere calls, referring to Bush and Cheney, “single Illumination,” and “mono-Ocular blind-sided Vision.” In section 9 of her poem, we find the knife “readied / for another human sacrifice” in this “this time and place.”
Section 9 is, of course, the site of DuPlessis’s original entrance into “Of Being Numerous,” and in “Hard Copy,” she treats this looking glass moment with a mixture of self-deprecation and seriousness: “And in this space a birth of enigma / to which one owes one’s own enigma,” she writes, in the space Oppen allotted her fragmented question. But the question she goes on to ask reflects her accumulated sense that the “distance from Them, the people” has increased, with dangerous effects: “What art for this recurrence?” In the word “recurrence” I read DuPlessis’s torque on Oppen’s “occurrence” — a value term, linked in his thought to “experience as it presents itself on its own terms” and positioned prominently in the opening section of “Of Being Numerous” as a figure for human relations as at once “true” and “impenetrable”: “Occurrence, a part / Of an infinite series.” Maintained over the “time that has passed — almost forty years” between the two poems, this stance, DuPlessis seems to suggest, may be partially culpable for the “grief after grief, / error after error, profit after profit,” the history of violent recurrence. At the very least, for her, right now, it is inadequate: “as if the sheer clarity of pointing / the dialectical oscillate of meditation / could ever illuminate this time and place.”
Clearly what I’ve read as DuPlessis’s critical Jewish response to Oppen is also a critical gender response. The Abrahamic gift of “giving birth to one’s own father” is but one site in “Of Being Numerous” where masculinity and a valued, austere singularity become possible in reaction to feminized figures of less rigorously considered human connection. As John Lowney has noted, female and feminized figures become a primary focus in the latter sections of the poem, though Oppen tends to position them as either beautiful objects of vision — “the perfect tendons / Under the skin” — or “assuming the burden of blindness.” The long poem presses towards its conclusion through these images, beginning with section 29’s address to “my daughter, my daughter … / I have a daughter / But no child,” and ending, ambivalently, in the voice of Walt Whitman contemplating the statue of freedom atop the Capitol dome, in a letter written during the time he spent in Washington as a quasi-nurse tending to Civil War wounded. Of the final sections of the poem, 34 probes issues of gender most deeply, reviving intratextually many of the “competing propositions” that I’ve been arguing Oppen kept in play both on and off the poetic page in the decade of his reemergence.
The section begins, “Like the wind in the trees and the bells / Of the procession.” Like section 9, this opening cites the writing of a young woman, however here the words are incorporated without quotation marks. Until Lowney’s chapter, DuPlessis remained the only reader to address the fact that these lines come from a woman named Jo Pacheno, in a brief note to a 1966 Oppen letter to John Crawford in which Oppen discusses “the problem of the ‘I’ in feminine poetry,” and the question of Pacheno’s future as a poet. The letter summons Sappho and Emily Dickinson as the only women writers capable of achieving “some sense of the distances and the realities around the ‘I’” that Oppen associates with “the chance of poetry.” In “Of Being Numerous,” Pacheno’s “procession” opens onto a catalogue of “beautiful particulars.” Encompassing the natural (“the earth / children and the grass”) as well as the urban (“the papers blown about the sidewalks”), these specific details are at once a site of value and limitation. Given the liberty of Oppen’s multidirectional line breaks, we read “Among the beautiful particulars … // ‘… a Female Will to hide the most evident God / Under a covert.’” Lowney has suggested that the prophetic stance of this couplet from William Blake’s Jerusalem appears “disjunctive” with respect to the opening nine lines of the section, which he describes as an homage to the “immanentist poetics” of Reznikoff’s “urban pastoral.” But if the juxtaposition seems sudden, it isn’t surprising, as it recapitulates the double positioning of women as both mute representatives of a valued object world and powerful agents of the “regime of right thinking” that would “veil” that world’s truths [this is the argument that the longer version of this essay develops extensively with respect to Oppen’s poetry, prose, and letters]. In the compressed logic of this passage, the feminized “particulars” (in the form of Blake’s Vala) themselves block access to “infiniteness,” or what Oppen calls in the letters, “vertical consciousness.” When section 34 resumes after the Blake quote, it underscores, rather than contradicts it. For whatever the social etiology of the “burden of blindness” women “assume” (and the poem leaves their choice in this matter an open question), they remain “intruders,” associated with “life” and the relationships of dependency that stem from it, as against “the most evident God.”
There are six more sections of “Of Being Numerous,” and the fact that the last three revolve around the figure of a genderless “Nurse” and appear to embrace the “knowledge” gleaned from “touch” and “care” does much to complicate the value system Oppen established around these terms and the people he associated with them. The poem may very well remain, as DuPlessis has recently said, “perfectly unstable.” But if even this is the case, its reception is riddled with gender gaps, and her section 34 of “Hard Copy” seeks to fill them. Where he launches his section with the uncited “voice” of a woman would-be poet, she constructs hers entirely of dedications, beginning, “To mothers who cannot / protect their young?” She inhabits his heroic/romantic figure of “the young women // Carrying life / Unaided in their arms” from the inside, investing her “mothers” with a canny double consciousness: “They probably know / impotent despairs, / expressed as resignation / but surfacing in little sleights of hand, candy,” she writes. This passage subverts the precursor image in “Of Being Numerous,” giving the lie to the debilitating sweetness of yet another iteration of the “Lady Poet … the Domestic Poet, the poet of the happy ending,” against whom Oppen would establish his “purity,” his “clarity in the sense of silence.” Though it is clearly intended to question the nature of the “courage” that Oppen attributes to his “young women,” we might also read the central stanza of DuPlessis’s section 34 as a dedication her younger self and, more distantly, to Denise Levertov (whose relationship to Oppen as a figure of a feminized, abjected political sphere the longer version of this essay traces):
To girls asked to filter the universe
by the poets who evoke their beneficence?
what will protect them
from the enormities
that they might suffer in their skirts and veils
while staged on the buffer zone they
are imagined to constitute?
If there are answers to the above question, they lie in the “fierce storehouses of articulation” that, as her career builds, sharply distinguish the “mesh” of DuPlessis’s writing from Oppen’s “clarity in the sense of silence,” even as she works to establish his poetic reputation and position him literary historically (“Hard Copy”). Occupying multiple positions in the nexus of “participation, production, and reception over time” is another answer — multitasking as feminist strategy.
This essay is excerpted and adapted from a longer piece entitled “‘That We Can Somehow Add Each to Each Other?’: George Oppen between Denise Levertov and Rachel Blau DuPlessis,” which appears in Contemporary Literature 51, no. 4 (Winter 2010).
1. Rachel Blau DuPlessis, letter to George Oppen, 1965, in The Selected Letters of George Oppen, ed. DuPlessis (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 390. Cited in Oppen, “Of Being Numerous,” New Collected Poems, ed. Michael Davidson (New York: New Directions, 2002, 167.
3. The small press Potes and Poets published up through Draft XXX before Wesleyan University Press brought out its first volume, which republished the thirty drafts along with an additional eight to produce what is commonly taken to be the first volume, Drafts 1–38, Toll (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2001).
4. After the nineteenth draft, DuPlessis established a grid method of composition whereby each new poem emerges in part out of the language, ideas, images, etc. of its “donor draft” nineteen poems prior to it. DuPlessis discusses “the fold” in depth in “Inside the Middle of a Long Poem,” in Blue Studios: Poetry and Its Cultural Work (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006), 242–43.
6. DuPlessis, Drafts 58–76, Torques (Cambridge, UK: Salt, 2007), 136. In an essay on Oppen, DuPlessis analyzes his formation of the line and the “combinatoire” of materials he achieves across line breaks in terms of Benjaminian allegory (Blue Studios, 196). The essay begins “in memoir” with an account of Oppen’s early editing of her work, and announces that “in a certain light everything I write is set against his uncompromising sign” (186).
7. DuPlessis describes the “midrashic” element of her poetics in a number of essays, including, most recently and fully, “Midrashic Sensibilities: Secular Judaism and Radical Poetics (A Personal Essay in Several Chapters),” in Secular Judaism and Radical Poetics, ed. Stephen Paul Miller and Daniel Morris (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010), 199–224.
8. “Drafts” that work through this story include “Draft 25: Segno,” “Draft 32: Renga,” “Draft 34: Recto,” and, most significantly prior to “Draft 85,” “Draft 52: Midrash” (in Drafts 39–57, Pledge [Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2004]).
9. Commenting on the “find me” section in a 1965 letter to Diane Wakoski, Oppen writes, “it seems to me still the pitfall that has trapped every woman poet who has written in English: I am good (or I am bad); find me” (Selected Letters, 110; noted in New Collected Poems, 384). Nevertheless, Oppen admired Wakoski personally and poetically.
10. Oppen’s Kierkegaard citation has for the most part eluded critics. Zack Finch offers one of the most extensive analyses to date in a recent essay about Oppen, Whitman, and violence. Introducing an interesting sexual waver into the gender terms with which we’ve been working, Finch claims that the citation “addresses both Abraham — ‘he who unsheathes his knife’ — and Isaac, who ‘shall give birth to his own father.’ Isaac’s suffering is really just as unthinkable as Abraham’s. Through an act of Levinasian forgiveness in the face of originary persecution, Isaac manages to give birth to his father, to renew the father’s life. … For the labor of giving birth, as an act of being penetrated from within, is both a temporary wounding and a sacrifice one typically considers to be an act of love. In giving this maternal work to a man, Oppen opens himself to the ordeal of a penetration which he actively chooses.” Finch, “‘I am / of that people the grass / blades touch’: Walt Whitman and the Aesthetics of Curiosity in George Oppen’s Critique of Violence,” Jacket 36. In my reading, the fragment Oppen takes from Kierkegaard seems focused solely through Abraham’s perspective, and the poet’s identification, to the extent there is one, is, I’d argue, with him.
12. Oppen, New Collected Poems, 181, 188. Several recent essays have discussed the stakes of Oppen’s Whitman citation, including Izenberg, Lowney, and Finch. Lowney reads Whitman’s status as a “nurse” as “perhaps the most conventional representation of female valor,” and suggests that it is on these antimasculinist terms that the poem means to end (225).
13. Oppen, Selected Letters, 137, 392n18. Davidson doesn’t mention this citation in his notes to the poem in the New Collected. Lowney reads Oppen’s appropriation of Pacheno as validating “female vision” (224).
October 21, 2010: An invitation and a beginning
It’s kismet. When I left the Poetry/Rare Books Collection a few days ago, Jim gifted me with a signed broadside of Rachel’s poem “Some Codas,” illustrated with a detail from Duncan’s drawing for the cover of his Fragments of a Disorderd Devotion. And now — upon returning home after a month in Duncan’s archives at Buffalo and Berkeley — I have received Patrick Pritchett’s invitation to write about Rachel’s work. She was the first to give me permission to do much: to read Duncan, unafraid of other’s scorn for his romanticism and, yes, effete poetics (“He’s just a shrill queen. I guess that’s why I don’t like his work,” another mentor had admitted); to embrace the possibility of becoming a “poet-critic” (though the institution too often squashes my double claim, robbing me of time for the first); to know that thinking poetry is living with it, in the totality of language and on the page; to recognize, and challenge, the religiosity of minority identification through the mechanism of the word (though without trusting entirely in what Jolas had called “the revolution of the word”); to experiment out of necessity as demanded by the poetic or even the critical project at hand, not out of faddishness. These were her lessons first. My study of Duncan over the years (fast coming on “decades”) has underscored them, emphasizing their relevance not just for me but also for the art, generally.
So the task is simple: to write in the spirit of Duncan’s notebook studies (of Olson, Levertov, Eigner, Dorn, Dickey — Dickey?!?! —, Blake, Dante, Whitehead, Boehme, Cassirer); of his daybooks on the War Trilogy in the second section of the H.D. Book; of End to Torment, H.D.’s own memoir of her life in poetry with Pound; of Oppen’s and Creeley’s daybooks, to which I keep returning; of the openness and opening and process so important to both of us. And so, I will write my own étude (a favorite word Duncan used to describe his studies) of Rachel’s work. For many reasons, I must keep it personal: not out of overfamiliarity or lack of respect, but for reasons quite the opposite. More than any other poet, critic, or teacher, Rachel has directly shaped my intellectual and artistic consciousness, my author-ity. But she also was one of the few who have modeled, more by example than by explicit instruction, the degree to which personhood exists in tension with subjectivity, personality alternating with impersonality. I will refer to her as she sometimes signs herself, after another: RBD.
As I reread some of her Drafts, this process will be a testing ground for ideas I keep butting up against ideas she, in one way or another, set into motion — set me into motion after — years ago. Process is a procès, as Deleuze and Guattari would say; productive and politicized thinking really is shadowed by a trial, a series of experiments working toward a judgment. RBD would appreciate that duality, she the lover of what she called “shadow words” in the seminars I took with her. [January 15, 2011: Or, as she puts it in “Draft 35: Verso,” “shadow things inside behind the said.”] It’s fitting that I use the essay form to conduct these proceedings. I have repeatedly told my own graduate students the now perhaps apocryphal story of when she sat me down — in 2000 or 2001, sometime before I finished that trial called dissertating — to tell me I would always have a hard time writing books. “You are a processual writer,” she diagnosed. Correctly. “You are a writer of essays.” A bewildering observation, especially for a fledgling academic whose career has depended on producing more books read by fewer people, to satisfy administrative fetishists and bean counters. I am writing yet another now. In contrast, my own poetic “career” has been marked by a near-refusal to publish because, as Lynne once joked with me, there are too many “novels (here, read: poetry volumes) of inexperience.” Stevens is my standard. (NB: Harmonium was published when he was forty. I have two more years. One more, by the time this appears.) RBD’s warning may have flummoxed me back then, but now I understand better. She truly appreciates — and models — the spirit behind the word essay. “These are works of ‘reading’ — for essays are acts of writing-as-reading. Acts of trying out, as the French root essayer says.” She doesn’t say as much here, but she knows that that “trying out” is also a putting on trial. There’s judging in testing. Not just a judgment of the subject about which one is writing, but also a judgment — sometimes mixed, always shifting — about what one is writing, that is about writing itself.
Alongside RBD, I want to consider two others who are cornerstones for her work, as well as mine: Duncan and Oppen. Patrick says my plan is to read her between her “Objectivist and Projectivist modalities.” I want to see it less academically, more as a vocation. Better: as a testing ground, a field of experiment. Oppen and Duncan will enter this study only peripherally, in-forming (as Duncan would put it) my reading, just enough to track developments in RBD’s writing. She herself does not distinguish absolutely between objectivism and projectivism. Take, for instance, her characterization of Oppen’s work as “a kind of ontological arousal to thinking itself — not to knowledge as such but to the way thought feels emotionally and morally and processually in time.” That is to say, she, too, sees this “objectivist” as a process thinker, one who works in time through the medium of thinking, of consciousness. Much of what I’m working through now in my own work on Duncan has to do precisely with this idea of consciousness and process as constitutive of his imaginative and visionary mode of projective verse or, more accurately put, field poetics. So, indeed, these two shared predecessors’ examples, poetics, do converge. At the point of consciousness.
Of course, there are differences between Oppen and Duncan. The former gives us the immediacy of word, not as object but as “it”: poem as discrete series; ephemera and phenomenon; a standing still to contemplate; Heidegger’s notion of art as supplying an opening in the pause, “The art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This opening up, i.e., this disconcealing, i.e., the truth of beings, happens in the work. In the art work, the truth of what is has set itself to work. Art is truth setting itself to work.” The latter appropriates this philosophical argot of What Is. Rather than a prophetic revelation breaching reality or reaching out to readers through objects and things, though, he sees it as the field itself: the open series; the unfolding of perceptions and consciousness; a continually grasping at one’s physical and linguistic environs to make them known, to make them meaningful, or simply just to make them; Whitehead’s idea of experience and environment as recursive, mutually affecting one another and thus impelling process: “Also in our experience, we essentially arise out of our bodies which are the stubborn facts of the immediate relevant past. We are also carried on by our immediate past of personal experience; we finish a sentence because we have begun it. The sentence may embody a new thought, never phrased before, or an old one rephrased with verbal novelty. There need be no well-worn association between the sounds of the earlier and the later words. But it remains remorselessly true, that we finish a sentence because we have begun it. We are governed by stubborn fact.” Oppen and Duncan conceive of action differently, but they share the similar idea that action is being, the poetic act makes existence articulate. For them, such a notion of action is the extent of the poetic event. Whether meaning comes staccato, moment by moment, or all in a flow, whether it emerges from the field or constitutes the field itself, is irrelevant. Such distinctions are based on rather minor differences for poets and philosophers and academics to quibble over. There is a place and time for that. What matters most here, in these reflections on RBD, though, is the common ground Oppen and Duncan share: that action and being are rooted in meaning.
Can meaning be the bottom line, though? Both Oppen and Duncan are stumped, stupefied, silenced by one common “problem”: politics. If poetry is meaning, if the poem is the event of Life and of Life’s Language voicing itself meaningfully, can politics play a role in poetry? Is politics part of Life (with a capital “L”)? Or, does introducing the political into the poem render existence into merely existentialism (of an angsty order)? Does politics reduce the poem to the effluvia of the person? That is the conclusion both Oppen and Duncan resist. Sometimes that resistance leads only to stoppages. Best-case scenario: writer’s block (viz. Duncan’s major freeze, the year-long stoppage when writing “Passages 26, The Soldiers,” 1964–1965; along with other, shorter moments of writer’s block … most occurring when he was lecturing for universities, a political as well as poetic lecture circuit, and working on poetics essays and his H.D. Book, whose political undercurrents have not yet received sufficient attention). Worst-case scenario: the poet stubbornly refuses to let politics enter the poem, is hounded by apparatuses of the state (including the FBI), is driven into exile, and falls silent (viz. Oppen, 1934–1958). Either kind of stoppage results from the poet’s obedience to the pressures of a patriarchal “Thou Shalt Not,” from perhaps his own unacknowledged belief that poetry is pure of the taint of the polis, an unrecognized acceptance of Plato’s decree of the poet as exiled from the Republic or Lenin’s decree exiling the poet from the Party. To lend such prohibitions any credence, though, would stop me — from writing, from thinking, from trying to answer in my own way Heidegger’s famous question: What are poets for?
My critical point of departure is this, then: though RBD herself is a product (and shaper) of second-wave feminism, for which “the personal is political,” she has devoted her work to avoiding the reduction of either politics or poetry to the personal, to personality. As she puts it in her essay “f-words,” “positionality, not personality is central.” It is an argument she has long maintained. Just note her response almost two decades earlier in “Sub Rrosa” (1987/1989) to the second-wave–style assertion that “To read as a woman is to rupture this expected practice [i.e., of all women having been acculturated to read like men].” As she goes on to wonder, “But to read as what woman? A woman? Is that phrase generic or specific? […] It seems amazing even to imagine one, but to imagine hundreds is gratifying. So I read as one imagining others.” This stress on the imagination, on imagining herself not just as an Other (Rimbaud’s “I is an Other”) but as many others (the lower case “o” is more appropriate, I remember her cautioning me early on), is the route by which politics enters the field of Rachel’s poetics. Or, in the least, it is the means by which she attempts to make a place for politics in poetry, in making the Being of Oppen and Duncan more becoming, more multiple, more extensive.
Such becoming does not just occur in the nomadic sense of endless flows or a perpetual shedding of one’s skins. One must stop, too. Not all subject positions can be imagined, let alone assumed. And every position one finds one’s self in is a location, a stopping-ground. Even Deleuze and Guattari write about those nodal points breaking up the lines of flight, where one engages meaning and sense, so as to start off again on a new tack. When RBD stops, and knows she is stopping, she is processing/procès-ing the situation. She produces the possibility for this stop-and-go, by formally crossbreeding Oppen’s silent seriousness (discrete series, measured and marked by silences) and Duncan’s open duplicity (open series, garrulous and riming with double meanings). The result: her continuous poem, Drafts. Let’s not give “it” or “What Is” the last word, she implicitly proposes. Let’s see if “it” can talk itself out of a bag — over and over. In this way, her poem doesn’t have just one opening. (Does any body?) Instead, language is compelled to speak, repeatedly. The poem as a process of drafting opens multiple shifting possible political or politicized spaces she and I, one of her readers, can inhabit. We don’t have to make a political space sui generis; we don’t have to assert our personality. Rather, spaces open and we migrate into them to fill, to occupy, them. Such political aims are double-edged swords, though: in any poetry, politics often becomes an egoistic staking of claims. Invested in a search of places to occupy we imitate the modality of imperialism and neoliberalism. With all these openings, then, her poem-in-draft also gets mighty drafty. Who can say, then, if this space of political possibility is at all habitable?
Intermittently, I’ll test these waters. Getting my feet wet, as they say, from the start of Drafts. One day at a time.
October 25, 2010: Close listening
Of the closed pages, tightly closed, packed against each other
Exposes the new day,
The narrow, frightening light
Before a sunrise.
— George Oppen, “Of Being Numerous”
It’s troubling — this image of a book as the embodiment of openness in closure. Not just shut, rather “tightly closed.” Suffocating, claustrophobic. Yet, possibility — slim, like Oppen’s own volumes before they were collected, yet still disturbing — is glimpsed in a sliver of light escaping from the closed book. Not that the light originates in the book. The preposition — of — has the utmost importance, as most of the “simple” words do for Oppen.
Moments like this are what attract me to whatever political possibilities poetry has. The derision I’ve heard from friends and colleagues and readers, even a few of the smarter and more cynical students, about my audacity for believing not just that poetry has value but that hope does, too. These critics also find unthinkable one of my articles of faith: that poetry’s value owes to the fact that it’s a vehicle of hope. A mode of transport. True, my attitude is romantic. Yet, if both poetry and hope are worthless: why read?
Forget the old question, Why write? Why read?
Clearly, few people are reading. I’m not concerned with statistics, which actually show that more people are buying, maybe even reading, books in different forms, whether digital books or “P-books” as librarians now call the heavy old print things, according to Nick. What I am most concerned with is RBD’s concern, too: not just reading, but really reading. Paying attention. [February 24, 2011: How did this not occur to me then? A closeness to remedy closure. A close reading that, in attending a text, is a form of opening, of undoing the claustrophobic closure and of letting loose the hope Oppen imagines in his tightly shut book.] These two related faculties — reading, attending — bring Oppen and Duncan into conversation. Both demonstrate an incredible care for what’s there, object or word … even phoneme. And that’s where the lesson, or the hope, lies. Listening closely to Oppen’s “Of Being Numerous,” though, we rediscover that hope is actually strange and unsettling. My boldness only lies there — in knowing (not believing) that good reading is close listening: aud — the morpheme from the Latin for “bold” is at the root of both audacious and audible. If a poem were not bold, it could not be heard.
There are ways to smother boldness, though. Overcooked cuisine. Stewed poetics. That new world is almost (important qualifier) shut up, tight. To hear it, we must be on the lookout. Reading as synaesthesia, then: where vision must aid audition.
Back to Oppen’s simple preposition — of. It begins, and proliferates throughout, “Of Being Numerous.” Of often appears at the beginning of his lines. It is a hinge or a connective tissue, easing us through his enjambments and carrying us along. Through the title, it even carries us from this world and onto the world of the page, connecting both. Yet, it also announces a breach. The definition of an ideal numerousness starts here, with the titular of. Each appearance of the preposition at the head of a short line turns that line into a fragmentary proposition which, in its very lightness, bears ontological weight: “Of an infinite series”; “Of the mineral fact”; “Of anything that happens”; “Of the singular” … to cite but a few. Continuity and breaking: the discrete series’ definitive quality. One might see it as the space of interruption, an eventful space in Badiou’s sense. That would make sense, for there is room for Oppen’s series in the work of a philosopher who derives his ontological, ethical, and political work out of set theory. For Badiou, the event is the site where a militant ethics irrupts, intruding upon the logic of the established set; and in its demanding the militant’s fidelity, it heralds a political shift. This metapolitical event is not only unpopular but also dark, apocalyptic, signaling an endtimes shift in the world-as-we-know-it. In many ways, there is a consistency between the idea of the mathematical philosopher and the vision of the poet who cites the mathematics. However, Badiou does not see an event as multiple. It is utterly singular. It sets into motion a singular truth-procedure. In addition, for him, as I understand him, there is but one set, one monotonous reality, interrupted by the event.
So, despite their mathematical affinities, there is a major difference. Oppen’s world is a series, not a set. There seems more room for multiple singularities and events, for multiplicities, more than what Badiou allows for. The poet proposes that the singularity is the individual herself; to some extent she determines the meaning of of, rather than must be faithful to a meaning coming from the eventful irruption. (I’ve always felt that, despite his CPUSA membership and activism, Oppen was more of an anarchist. More like Rukeyser, an anarchist communist or anarchist socialist since the advent of the Popular Front. So different from a Maoist May ’68-er like Badiou.) And that meaning can change, thus multiplies. If this of is a space, it cannot unilaterally demand our fidelity (too much like “fealty”) or make its claims on us. The space is not the One. That is, after all, the trouble with the nation-state, with the cityscape, with any authentic or exclusionary set:
We are not coeval
With a locality
But we imagine others are,
We encounter them.
If that locality is an event, we believe we “encounter” it and those who belong to it. (Thus is the rhetoric of the imagination of extremist jihad and of mainstream Western/US imperialism.) But if this event, this “locality,” moves and shifts individually with those who experience it, then the possibility is always multiplying, opening up, over and over again.
RBD attends to Oppen’s tricky preposition and proposition early in her Drafts and she — like him before her — tries to make the word of do so much. Mostly, though, she rejects his ontological register. For RBD, of is a more material matter than even when Oppen gives it substance by setting amidst these prepositional phrases a simple date — “‘1875’” — a date that is actually set in stone, the date marker on the Brooklyn Bridge’s Manhattan Tower. Here historicity and materiality enter the poem, both monumental and grounded (via the reader’s understanding that the significance of this date) and adrift (yet another signifier, a detail on the page). RBD, in contrast, tries to give the word of even more of a material existence, and does so by pushing it beyond its possessive denotation. In Drafts, of is a synecdoche for the space of the objectivist’s city, the silent placeholder of the inviting thing-in-itself. But this space is not for resting in; rather, she’s gotta keep on walking.
A silent space (I
walk here) populous.
RBD’s is an ambulatory of, then, able to be detached from signification overly determined by possessive relations. In this walkabout, though, she’s not looking for a vision. Or, at least, I don’t think she should be. (She herself doesn’t rule out that possibility.) It would be more exact to say that she’s trying to put reality into motion.
So, RBD’s of, as a spatial entity, has more of a materiality to it than Oppen’s; yet, curiously, it floats about more than his does because she refuses it to be a sign of attachment, possession, even objectification. His of is embodied as a sort of stone-seizing Excalibur, mid-river outside Brooklyn, native to both him and her; thus, his of comes to be more One though it’s outside — while inside — city limits, between the boroughs where they grew up and where my husband and I now sometimes live. Yet, although her of is not possessive, its placeholding function anchors it. RBD is akin to Mme Bovary, then, or, Walter Benjamin. She is our flâneuse, strolling the arcades. She anticipates this move, too, with her essayistic wandering through, and wondering about, the prose units she dubs “arcades” in “Blue Studio: Gender Arcades.” This is her open letter response to Barbara’s questions, which themselves seem to originate in a concern that echoes Heidegger, with a crucial distortion: What is a feminist for? In “Draft 3: Of” (Toll), RBD names this topology the feminist poet surveys and wanders the “langdscape” (20). It’s a too-awkward pun I can’t wrap my mouth around. But she’s not window shopping. She belongs to this space, is of it; yet, in keeping with the dual properties of this preposition, she is also disconnected from, and set adrift in, this language-scape which cannot possess or make any claim upon her (or her upon it).
Hard to get home; but this is, this travelling
The streets the malls a homey homeless home
ahung with things. (21)
For some reason, I cringe at how this “home” degenerates in its proliferation (“homey homeless home”), now awkwardly reattached to the “things” of consumer capitalism. The placelessness of this exile in late capitalism is hopelessly grounded, attached to relations of possession by the very space of of, the preposition that set her free.
Ironically, then, the poem’s political hope, as announced here, is in opening spaces that always foreclose opening, in trying to move beyond but keeping tied to, in relation, to the socius we wish to escape. If only we could cut the fucking cord! But RBD knows, her Drafts signal upfront, that it’s not as easy as that. For the opening pages of “Draft 3: Of” is bracketed off, and running vertical in the left margin is one word: “Cut” (19). Yet, she can’t (or won’t?) make that excision. They still are on the page before us. An abandoned edit, though the desire to enact it is still signaled. It’s not the content that matters — it is that these lines are of this poem, just as she is of the land of malls and city streets that both beckon to and disgust her with their unrelenting commercialism. Commodities all “ahung” in plain view, a perversion calling to mind a pornographic “The Night Before Christmas.” (What if it weren’t “stockings” that “were hung by the chimney with care …”? What if something else, something signaling a sizeable endowment, were hung in those windows? As if our Mme. Bovary were strolling past Christopher Street’s sex shops …) That “ahung” (ahem) also has me keeping an ear out for the ache, or perhaps the tsking chk, that seems to be needed to be articulated here, to make this ahung an Achtung: Attention! This hurts! Or, Paying attention hurts!
Navigating this “langdscape” entails recognizing the doubled and duplicitous nature of language, the only tool at our disposal. Our ofs can connect us and set us free. But they also tie us to that from which we would be free, especially when our ofs bring us back to our hankering for possession (and possessives). Which side we land on depends on how we attend to the language. Is this cause for lamenting? For mourning the loss of political possibility? For scorning those who dare to hope? Nah. It’s simply realistic. Funny word to describe a poet, huh?
November 2, 2010: “Between what and what” … or is it just “what”?
But there is an aspect of that realism RBD herself doesn’t attend to. For, despite herself, her work tends to forget the dual nature of of, transposing it. That is, the specificity of the word to signal connection and disconnection often goes unheeded, and instead RBD forces poetry to signify liminally. Her sense of the “blue” — that space of hope in contending with the painful particulars of the situation one finds oneself in — is interstitial. When writing of the specific kind of realism (“urrealism”) of the poets under whose sign she thinks and writes — Niedecker, Guest, Oppen — RBD notes that they work “between vision and the real, between a spiritual dimension and a material(ist) one — a between that one might imagine as unstable, constantly under construction, difficult to sustain.” However, putting that mode of engaging reality, that modality of realism, in some interstitial “between” space is not an urrealism but a kind of irrealism or an unrealism that risks or aspires for transcendence. Well, it’s transcendent insofar as moving in this between is proposed as a means of moving beyond limits. As RBD writes in “Draft 18: Traduction”:
dans le passage
et de l’autre
à l’outre […]
The strangeness and stranger of the language one inhabits or seeks out (l’autre) serves as the passage (significantly, a Duncan word — the Duncan of the open series Passages) to the outside (l’outre), with which otherness rhymes — phonemically and meaningfully.
This outside is related to her concerns with a particular kind of materialism, as modeled by Adorno. RBD is fond of quoting him. “How many times can I cite Adorno!” Some of that fondness comes from a desire to write poetry, an activity she finds, as a cultural Jew, freighted with a particular difficulty and responsibility. She embarks on this writing sensitive to, but challenging of, Adorno’s belief that poetry is forever impossible after the Holocaust: “To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today.” But Adorno specifically judged lyric to be impossible, and, if we want to be sticklers, he actually judged all lyric, at least since the advent of late modernity and the rise of capitalism, to always be impossible. This is true because modern lyric, in a capitalist age, before Auschwitz and long after, is always already social. “My thesis is that the lyric work is always the subjective expression of a social antagonism,” and “A collective undercurrent provides the foundation for all lyric poetry.” RBD is not exactly writing lyric, but, then again — this is partly what Oppen and Duncan bequest her — she’s not exactly not not writing lyric, either. She’s aware of the subjective mediation — personal, yet also collective — that stands in the way of aspiration of “the highest lyric works” in which the subject recedes and “language itself acquires a voice.” Whether it is factually correct or not is immaterial for my understanding of the poem. I have begun to date for myself the advent of Drafts with the following statement from “Otherhow,” an essay first drafted in 1985, the year before the date RBD attributes to the first Drafts’ composition:
(No more poems, no more lyrics. Do I find I cannot sustain the lyric; it is no longer. Propose somehow a work, the work, a work, the work, a work otherhow of enormous dailiness and crossing. All the “tickets” and the writing. Poems “like” essays: situated, breathless, passionate, multiple, critical. A work of entering into the social force of language, the daily work done everywhere with language, the little flyer fallen to the ground, the corner of a comic, a murder, burning cars, the pouring of realization like a squall green amber squall rain; kiss Schwitters and begin)
Drafts does not abandon lyric, not as RBD announces that intent here; but the poem does stay true to the spirit of this pronouncement, it does register the impossibility of an idealized “pure” lyric. “Kiss Schwitters and begin.” Hers is a feminist poetic version of Schwitters’s merzhaus. Hers is an assemblage forming a household built out of love, out of detritus, out of the unnoticed and quotidian. And, as the poem comes to deal with it more and more as the first volume, Toll, progresses, it is a poetic structure also constructed out of the forgotten and the silenced. Such an assimilation is the responsibility of the writer: “who can be witness / after the eclipse of witness // cannot not speak.” RBD’s thinking about the materiality of (lyric) poetry — a materiality that intervenes in the disappearance of the subject (both the author’s self and history’s “others”) and of letting language just speak of its own accord, “a work of entering into the social force of language” — anchors her critical work, too. She even gives it a name — social philology — and uses that concept as the matrix through which to explore gender, race, and religious culture in modernism.
This kind of materialism — I’m fond of it, too, but let’s call it what it really is: immanence. Adorno does not give up his Hegel. (For that matter, neither does Benjamin, whom RBD’s also fond of referencing.) This is more than an academic, genealogic point. And it’s more than the residua of Marxism, Adorno as merely a continuation of a historical materialist tradition of standing Hegel on his head. For the Frankfurt School, especially for Adorno and Benjamin, metaphysics must inflect materialism … especially when it comes to art. Lyric poetry might be impossible, but we still long for language to have its own say, to pronounce itself, no matter how barbaric or irresponsible such a wish is because it causes us to willfully turn away from social justice and human depravity and criminality. Art lies to us insofar as it encourages this wish. But that is a necessary lie, Adorno reflects (he calls the lie art’s autonomy), since it is under this cover that it ushers in a World Spirit, supplies the truth whereby discourses and systems are disrupted, transformed, re-formed. What is more, the lie about art’s embodiment of ahistorical truth lets its historical (dialectical) content serve as the very substance whereby truth enters the scene, disrupting us and the systems or orders to which we belong. Thus, art lays bare — calls into question — the logics of a regime of truth, as Rancière would put it, by showing us what we’ve forgotten. We must then be faithful to the truth that emerges there, Badiou would say — and so, in our fidelity to the vision it embodies, art becomes political.
But Rancière helps us see the limits of immanence à la Adorno or Benjamin or of the event à la Badiou (for his event is no immanence of truth-content but is a truly disruptive procedure): truth exists only in regimes. To believe there is an irruption or irruptive emergence, an intrusion of truth, via art is to believe that art is a portal through which a monistic truth can affect all parts of our experience. It is to conflate the work of art with the work of politics, thereby erasing the fact that the art and the politics are both struggles, but they are only analogous struggles. That is Rancière’s useful reminder. Politics may elucidate art, and vice versa. But they are not the same. The two are and should be related. But it is a risky business to conflate them. RBD’s “between” is a between-times — between now and future, social pain and political redemption. One might think the between is a placeholder, marking a space or a gap between two like but not identical terms. But if the between is a space of immanence, the space through which the truth enters and thus transforms the poetic and the social worlds, it actually risks a dangerous conflation.
I wish I had my copy of Aesthetic Theory here with me now. (The danger of writing at a remove from most of one’s library for weeks at a time …) At one point, if I remember it correctly, Adorno tries to talk himself out of the immanence corner. To say that art presents the structures of difference from which we (in reading or viewing the aesthetic text) glean difference, possibility, hope. Thus, it is materialist. But how did that structure get there? Adorno (after Marx) says it is the World Spirit. And this is when my Marxist students get angry with me, because I reply: “Nonsense. That’s not materialism. That’s religion.” That is, that’s Marxism-in-spite-of-Marx. That is, you were taught to believe the World Spirit is materialist when it’s stood on its head. It’s not. It’s still monistic, the stuff of theology. Reality pluralizes. If we are to believe that there is a materialism in this scenario, this stuff of immanent vision already has to have been there, was already real, was part of the structure of the life lived. And this is where the supposedly odious “metaphysics” of a William James or Whitehead or Dewey — Duncan’s chief influences, my pragmatists — pop up. Those structures already were part of the fabric of organic and social life itself. Artists, not art — makers, not the made — bring those sites of difference into the realm of their art. Through that art, they come into the fields (plural) of readers’ consciousness. Whitehead’s word, the one to which Duncan gravitates: the difference is apprehended, and thus folded — a concept RBD gravitates to — into consciousness, and thus changing reality which is recursively constituted by subjects and objects that work on one another, through material interaction and through the participation of ideas — offering up data, receiving and processing data, re-visioning the word through the data, the newly re-visioned world sending forth new data, ad finitum. Rarely is any exchange a major change. Miniscule, but not insignificant. The process demands a constant working and reworking, a seeing and re-seeing. In an important but forgotten essay, Duncan, writing of Woolf’s aesthetic politics, beautifully calls it “an alchemy of in-formation.” (RBD would appreciate his thinking through Woolf. But his Woolf is the author of Three Guineas and hers is, primarily, the author of A Room of One’s Own.)
When we’re so much of that slowly transforming field of consciousness, we can’t be between here and there, now and future, pain and utopia. We just are. The future seeds the present, as does the past. We just work the ground.
As my mentor, RBD instilled in me my suspicion of rhetoric. Now I tell my students simply this: Every poem fails, and that is why they all are generous gifts. For their failures open opportunities for our thinking. She may say she’s working on a beyond in between, but that’s only because she’s invested in seeing her poetics and politics as similarly invested in using that between to get outside. That is to say, her project is still one of liberation. I’m just as much Foucault’s pupil as hers, though. Freedom need not be, in fact never can be, liberation. Foucault addresses this when speaking not about the second-wave feminism with which RBD was allied but instead about its sister movement, the movement that made my thought — indeed, my very life — possible: the American Gay Liberation movement. It’s no exaggeration to say “my life.” If it were not for the GLF, the GAA (the Gay Activists Alliance), or later Queer Nation and ACT UP and GMHC (Gay Men’s Health Crisis), or any number of post-Stonewall movements and organizations, I surely would be dead by now, another statistic of a self-loathing gay suicide, a hunted down faggot loathed by the world, or another victim of the Plague. Yet, I also recognize politics’ limits. I do not believe in liberation or the thought of any outside, even if it is only an enclosed outside between two defined spaces. (Philosophy, like poetry and politics, does come down to an article of faith. The will to believe — William James here — depends on what we can believe, on what’s observed, studied, experienced.)
I must see where in Drafts RBD’s thought betrays itself, goes against the logic of the outside/between, against the poem’s implicit romance of liberation in its romance of the between. That is where the politics of poetry is complemented by an ethics, the substrate of the political where collectivism meets individualism. In Drafts, one (liberation) is more conscious and declared and formulated, and the other (freedom) less conscious (not necessarily un-) and so more inchoate and grasping (a word culled from Duncan’s notebooks, when he was trying to make Olson speak to Whitehead, to make “apprehending” a physical and conscious affair).
December 7, 2010: Pause
In these last few days, I’ve returned to Drafts. Just in time to accompany RBD as she, too, returns to what she had already written so as to execute her folds. A confession, though: It’s difficult to sustain the concentration needed to attend the poem closely. I realized today that in length alone the four published volumes are longer than Pound’s Cantos. Excluding notes, though, they’re approximately the same: 800 pages. I am starting to suspect that I won’t read through the entire poem for this essay. My pages quickly (relatively speaking) fill up. At least whatever I produce here will be a beginning, a way of breaking the ice by asking uncomfortable questions and by demonstrating deep appreciations. But I’ve also been moving too slowly through the poem. In part, the work demands it, but I am also too distracted by my other studies — my chapters on Duncan for the anarchism book, my reading of Riding and Jolas (my present, nearly inexplicable obsessions — a few months ago it was Dahlberg). The questions these studies force are similar to what I’ve been asking about RBD’s between, though. Given her disdain for “pure poetry,” just how much is Riding’s conception of poetry actually a divorce from sociality, a metaphysical celebration? Even her post-poetic telling is rooted in sociality somehow — if for no other reason than the fact that strives for a critique of the masculine, in all forms of discourse and social being? Is Duncan’s construction of a space between prophecy and objectivism a metaphysic or an attempt to ground visionary experience? Is RBD’s between an unconscious opening from a social field onto a metaphysical other, or visionary, field? Similar, but different.
December 20, 2010: “the ethics of poetry being that fold”
For some time — a few weeks, a month perhaps — I’ve been going over the last half of Toll to make sense of my notes in and about that portion of the first thirty-eight Drafts. What promising possibility lies behind, or obscured by, RBD’s problematic between? Reviewing my marginalia, I have found that my scribbles note my distance from, and critique of, “the game,” as I keep referring to it. Those instances are contrasted with my jottings and notes about “connection” or simply “here” — about those moments in the poem I am most drawn to because there and then I do not feel the need to perform as critic. Instead, I can just be RBD’s reader. “The game” is her self-conscious play, where the method is not only laid bare but also part of the poem’s polemic. Frankly, “the game” is where I get bored: it’s all so intellectual, self-reflexive. Boredom is not necessarily bad: it is a condition of the postmodern, or at least of my experience of the postmodern. It is where my intellect gets carried away, in both senses of the phrase.
There is something about boredom in how Barthes discusses the text of bliss, which so often resembles what RBD’s Drafts are after. “Bliss is unspeakable, inter-dicted.” It arises from the between places, and it depends — much like Drafts does — on a kind of shadowy haunting: “The text needs its shadow; this shadow is a bit of ideology, a bit of representation, a bit of subject: ghosts, pockets, traces, necessary clouds: subversion must produce its own chiaroscuro.” Unlike the text of pleasure, to which it is related, interchangeable though not synonymous, the blissful text is asocial, struggling with its sociality. It only traffics in and produces traces of the social — making the quotidian the material with which it works, thus pulling them into the shadows and the shadows into plain view. How like RBD’s “shadow things inside behind the said”!
This kind of postmodern text is the product of an avant-garde attitude, of a gaming that, in the end — at least for me — results in a kind of boredom, of an awareness that I’m being carried along by something else. This is its own kind of pleasure (rather: bliss or ecstasy, ek-stasis, standing beside one’s self so that the intellect can play freely). RBD engages her readers and calls upon us to recognize when this game is happening: “To pass beyond words / yet construct linkage, s meaning, s in unspoken space” (197 [sic]). But in the end it’s just aburrido. The real pleasure is had by the writer, when she is exerting her agency and engaging the language consciously. We, the readers, are left with the linguistic bliss. RBD’s the only one who can go “beyond words.” It seems that earlier I underestimated the degree to which she sets aside her authorial agency, the personhood of our experiences of writing. Here, I’m aware just how much the social traces are manipulated, and I am called upon to witness the performance. It’s not exactly authoritarian: there is no overt polemic or didacticism here. Still, all I, as reader, am left with after she’s had her full of play with meaning are the words themselves. The detritus, the leftovers of her game.
Let’s push this Barthes connection a bit more. The text of bliss “may well be, once the image-reservoir of speech is abolished, neuter.” And the neuter is a category with which Barthes would struggle for the rest of his days, particularly after his mother’s death a few years later. Losing her made him revaluate bliss. His mourning produced a condition he described as “painful availability: I am vigilant, expectant, awaiting the onset of a ‘sense of life.’” In lectures written soon thereafter when he was still in mourning, his concept of the neuter in the diaries would transform into a theory of the neutral, of subjectivity between action and passion. (Despite the slight change of name, though, Barthes is not immured to the gendered condition — or lack thereof — of this subjective attitude.) For him, the neutral becomes a means of dealing with living, with surviving. “Neutral: would look for a right relation to the present, attentive and not arrogant. Recall that Taoism = art of being in the world: deals with the present.” In moving from neuter to neutral, Barthes is merely moving along the spectrum connecting bliss and mourning. They are not dissimilar. Both attend death: one (neutral) the death of the author, the other (neuter) the death of the mother. And both attempt to put one into relation with the present, which is, in the end, an impossible condition to articulate.
In those aforementioned moments where I noted “connection” or “here” in the margins of my copy of Toll are those moments where I came closest to empathizing with that moment of neutrality. And those are the moments when RBD stops; that is, those are the places where the game stops. Instead of self-consciously playing, those are the instances where she mourns. Or, perhaps she is just resting. (May she rest in peace.) After all, she does resist the characterization of her work as elegizing (“It is not elegy / though elegy seems the nearest category of genre / raising stars, strewing flowers ….” ). Instead, she is working, as she insists in the aptly titled “Draft 19: Working Conditions”:
The condition of work being struggle in time.
And with these random findings. (124)
Or later in the same canto:
This is the work
This is the work
form as experienced
struggle, over the mark.
And over the effacement[.] (128–29)
This category of “work” is very important for me, as it is for her. But for RBD it has a doubled significance, and for me it has only one. Her first: The significance of the game, of construction, of putting her will into it. Her second (and my only): The craft that we go about, more often blindly than not. Struggling not with the materials (“the mark”) but over the void that those materials open out upon (“the effacement”).
And it is in the second sense — call it mourning, call it work, call it what you will — that she stops trying to go beyond, stops being so postmodern, and instead is caught up in the neutrality — and the neuter — of the writing. As she writes in “Draft 33: Deixis,” in my opinion the keystone of Toll:
is how to make poetry
constructed of It. (231)
And that “It” — capitalized — she borrows from our Duncan, our man who stressed so much the blindness of our craft. (For Oppen, I think, it would be less of a capital affair. Being, even when it’s eventful, is so much more common for him.) In a curious footnote nearby, Rachel points us to a passage from Duncan’s “The Self in Postmodern Poetry” that marks “it” as “The play of first person, second person, third person, of masculine and feminine and neuter[.]” The feminist who gravitates to a voice wherein gender is not so much called into question as it is … lost. Or perhaps it is irrelevant? This neuter, this neutral of writing, is simple the ineffable present making Itself heard, if only for just a moment. “I would want to argue that it speaks in and through the now, perhaps just as it flicks into the then,” she writes in another note (Toll, 232n20). She’s not doing the speaking in these moments. The game ends so It can speak:
speak out of the it
speak out It.
Let It speak
Make it know and no. Now.
Make It (what) Knew. (230–31)
And when the game ends, so does the postmodernism. Pound creeps in (Make it new), inflected by Duncan (who only could make it old). Never a postmodernist (remember that is Olson’s neologism), Duncan thought himself merely a belated modernist. “I am far from that scene — far, indeed, it seems from [sic] me, from that scene — from being part of the New Poetry — for it has always been my imagination to be or take my allegiance from the Old.” But producing that knowledge via derivations of how It’s found in what’s around requires some surrender of agency. One must give It priority over one’s self: “Let It speak.”
Rachel marries (yes, a gendered term and, in my experience, a heteronormative one, too; I have wed, but in the eyes of the state I’m not married) that tentative and mourning permission of working in a neutral condition, conscious of what one has lost and what others have lost (including their lives), with the more active gaming and joyful self-consciousness of willfully enacting a procedure. And that procedure is? The fold. It is a measured selection, a correspondence between drafts to bring “the out-there” to “the over-here,” so as to produce an “ethical indistinction / between out-there and over-here.” This comes about through a deictic procedure, an indexical matter of compiling and pointing. But I believe RBD’s description of the fold’s ethical nature is misleading, giving all the credit to the game that alienates me (let’s be honest), the game engaged only for her (or any post-modernist’s) pleasure: “making deixis the process of the between” (234). This folding helps me articulate the problem of the figure of the between. Rather than putting the between into process, folding, as RBD executes that procedure, is a coming into an ineffable and undiscoverable space. (The cross-gendering in my figure of coming into virgin territory, of penetrating a labial fold, is not to be overlooked.) That is to say, in folding, I don’t think she ever really points at It. It’s no definite object, and It’s not between her and her object or between me and mine (or between her and me, for that matter). No amount of pointing will ever suffice. Poetry can only wave its hands about to gesture at the general proximity of that in where It resides. Or poetry walks up to the hole and looks on it. Not able to see in. Just the surface.
But poetry also knows that there is an in there. Folding, or RBD’s game, is crucial for bringing her readers’ there here, into/onto the page. We may get carried away by the game, but the game also helps us know that It is so and that It is in there. And this understanding brings that there a bit more here. It makes that there more properly of here (to return to an earlier thread in my reading, to Oppen’s preposition). And so Drafts is not just a game of folding, rendering language into a new sculptural form as if writing were an exercise in intellectual origami. Rather, Drafts is also a poem of familiarities and intimacies, a process of bringing close what we’ve forgotten or held at bay. That process is trying at times, and it involves passing judgment: but mostly on our selves.
What Barthes knows, and what RBD knows, too, is we don’t just mourn the other that is lost. We work so as to mourn the loss of some part of ourselves that we had found in that other, over there. Barthes on mourning his mother: “Suffering is a form of egotism. I speak only of myself. I am not talking about her, saying what she was, making an overwhelming portrait[.]” Working through that loss of some part of our selves, working to excavate where we are in the work, is not just the underlying motivation for the ethics of the fold, as RBD announces: “Thus. To be so. In is.” Perhaps it is also the first step in making ourselves worthy, or of healing our selves, so that we — both the writer, who mourns, as well as the reader, who perhaps recognizes herself as that displaced subject whose lost-ness and distance of there-ness the author mourns — can be prepared for a politics.
Perhaps I’ve had it all wrong all along, and have failed to recognize the space from which I write. Perhaps the political nature of poetry owes not to its utopic vision, its serving as a vehicle for hope and for the possibility of joy. Perhaps the politics of the art does, after all, owe to the poem’s capacity to mourn, to provide us an opportunity, a preparation, and a companionship as we work through losses, injuries, even injustices. Writing from a queer position within the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the heterosexist and homophobic violence exacted upon those perceived as exhibiting gender and sexual difference, I should have been able to recognize it as such. Many who share a similar subject-position have noted that loss has been an appealing, if not the necessary, premise for a politics, especially for queer subjects. I, clinging stubbornly to hope, have militated against others’ presentation of this conclusion as the only possibility. In the end, perhaps loss is where ethics intersects with politics, where hope becomes more realistic and grounded in the present. After all, having lost something, anything, is a precondition for hoping that a change may one day come. And that change attends our working and reworking the conditions with which we are presented, in the company of those with whom we share our efforts.
I think it is time to draw this record of my thinking about and my reading of RBD to an end. Reading Drafts, I have not found any ready or ultimate answers to the question of the political in RBD’s poetry, let alone “all” poetry. But it has all been a process to come to this point, then: I can now think of politics as, at least in part, a condition of mourning — of objects, of others, of unknowns, of our selves — and a condition of mourning a work or the work (working through the grief, the loss, the fracture of self, the self-displacement to make us present to our selves). Always at a loss, we remain open, persons in process. There still is a promise, then. But that eye to the future is matched with a responsibility not just to the past, but also to the fragility of the present, the tenuousness, even the mortality, of presence. Openness — a facet of what I have long thought of as “passion” or “vulnerability” — is the very principle wherein a poetic politics and a poetic ethics can intersect. Having worked with RBD to come to this articulation, I am now prepared to draw this opening of Drafts to a close.
It is hard to know why
this site is so implacable
but it is, clearly it is.
post-face: March 26, 2011
Talisman: Tattoo 2 (Cariye Hamamı, v.2: When the lyric fabric deteriorates …)
… and recalling the dead skin men sloughed
off: it, too, this sooth, this law, born of song,
in book shut tight, sweat
and unyielding devotion
bleeding now then
forever on the margins
of this runic caftan
in the gridwork between
circumscribed Solomonic stars
where the Sultan’s breasts
would have streamed milk
had he sense enough
to mark textiles
with Tiresias’s semi-
June–September 2010; February–March 2011
1. Eugène Jolas, “Proclamation (‘Revolution of the Word,’ June 1929),” in Eugène Jolas: Critical Writings, 1924–1951, ed. Klaus H. Kiefer and Rainer Rumold (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1929), 111–14.
2. See H.D., End to Torment: A Memoir of Ezra Pound, ed. Norman Holmes Pearson and Michael King (New York: New Directions, 1979); Robert Creeley, A Day Book (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972); George Oppen, Selected Prose, Daybooks, and Papers, ed. Stephen Cope (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).
3. January 15, 2011: Familiarity in my reading might be thought to introduce asymmetrical gender dynamics, male author daring to address female subject too intimately. Returning to the essay, I have struggled with this issue, but have decided to leave it as is. [February 24, 2011: After a month of further reflection, I have decided to change it. Yet, it is important to both our projects, our mutual investment in the politics of writing gender and sexual difference, that some trace of this genuine struggle be left, as a kind of imprimatura (distinct from imprimatur), an underlying base (as in painting) upon which the rest is set. Not a palimpsest, for I do not wish to erase it by adding another layer. Any address of politics in Rachel’s work must begin with intimacy. And it is curious, and significant, that I have been so concerned with exactly this question of how to relate the intimacy of our intellectual bond and her mentorship, both rather queer. — ek] The word “Rachel” need not be problematic [February 24, 2011: … but it is — ek]: my relationship with her — as writer, critic, thinker, creator — has always been mediated by queer intimacies and familiarities. Moreover those intimacies have been inflected by our mutual self-consciousness about the conflicting simultaneity of normative and queer tendencies of each of our gender roles. I have toyed with the idea of translating each instance into “RBD” — but that is too heavy-handed. [February 24, 2011: Alas, it is not. — ek] “This will not be my RBD Book,” I keep joking (protesting?) to myself. Yet, in some ways, it is, at least insofar as this essay develops a reading and a writing that nakedly sorts out my own poetics through a mentor’s work, a queer male writer looking toward a female and feminist precedent. When fitting, the names of others will remain as I know them — as intimates —, though most are public figures, writers and academics of note. These friends, in my day-to-day living rather than in my role as institutional reader, have influenced my reading and thinking about Rachel’s work, at this time.
4. January 17, 2011: When analyzing Kafka’s fictions, Deleuze and Guattari note that the Czech treats desire as a force tied to writing connecting the literary page to the social world and transforming the subject so that she can test boundaries, to pursue justice instead of the law: “Writing for Kafka, the primacy of writing, signifies only one thing: not a form of literature alone, the enunciation forms a unity with desire, beyond laws, states, regimes. Yet the enunciation always historical, political, and social. A micropolitics, a politics of desire that questions all situations.” See Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1975), trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 42. Later: “One’s goal is to transform what is still only a method (procédé) in the social field into a procedure as an infinite virtual movement that at the extreme invokes the machinic assemblage of the trial (process) as a reality that is on its way and already there. The whole of this operation is to be called a Process, one that is precisely interminable” (48; Deleuze and Guattari’s emphases). My theoretic understanding of process is an amalgam of process philosophy (à la Whitehead) and the assortment of thinkers and writers he influenced, Olson and Duncan and their poetic heirs as well as Deleuze and his philosophic ones.
6. February 24, 2011: It is somewhat disingenuous to represent this decision not to actively pursue publication of my poetry as an autonomous one. As a tenure-line professor, RBD herself had experienced an institutional resistance to the writing of (feminist) poetry and, worse, (feminist) poetic essays. Though the case has not been as extreme with me, and though I had received encouragement before tenure from Lynne, Pierre, Don, and others to ignore the institutional hierarchy to pursue my “real work,” it is still difficult as an academic to wear two hats. And even though I now have tenure, my own unstable institution has rendered this safeguard to intellectual or creative (not just “academic”) freedom nearly meaningless by announcing a decision to “deactivate” five humanities programs, thereby eliminating the positions of many tenured faculty, some world-renowned and several recognized and awarded by the same university in recent years as “distinguished” teaching or research faculty. Often now I feel vulnerable, committed as I am to the teaching of poetry, of creative thinking and philosophy, of issues related to our common humanity. Poetry continues to be a dangerous business, though it offers little by way of a material social revolution: its practitioners are usually the ones who suffer the most danger.
8. Ibid., 195. The printed version of this same lecture on Oppen also includes a footnote where RBD explicitly notes the intersection of objectivism and projectivism: “This is the point — poems tracking the graph of thought — at which a ‘projective’ poetics as in Olson, Creeley, and, differently, Duncan and Blaser meet the ‘objectivist’ tendency” (273n10).
9. January 17, 2011: One-half of my book in progress on anarchism and modernism (tentatively titled Life, Love, and War) is devoted to a revaluation of the shifting anarchist politics underlying Duncan’s process poetics between 1945 and 1970. The other half deals with the anarchist pacifism of Patchen and Rukeyser, as read through a collection of concepts related to political or politicized visionary poetics.
12. January 17, 2011: Oppen: “And actualness in prosody, it is the purpose of prosody and its achievement, the instant of meaning, the achievement of meaning and presence, the sequence of disclosure which comes from everywhere, life-styles, angers, rebellions — I am not apolitical, and it is possible to mock poetry, it is certainly possible to mock poetry just as there are times when one is sick of himself, but eventually, I think, there is no hope for us but in meaning” (“Statement on Poetics,” in Selected Prose, Daybooks, and Papers, 49; Oppen’s emphasis). Duncan: “The end of masterpieces … the beginning of testimony. Having their mastery obedient to the play of forms that makes a path between what is in the language and what is in their lives. In this light that has something to do with all flowering things together, a free association of living things then — for my longing moves beyond governments to a cooperation; that may have seeds of being in free verse or free thought, or in that other free association where Freud led me to remember their lives, admitting into the light of the acknowledged and then of meaning what had been sins and guilts, heresies, shames and wounds” (“Ideas of the Meaning of Form” (1961), in A Selected Prose, ed. Robert J. Bertholf [New York: New Directions, 1995], 24, Duncan’s ellipsis).
13. March 26, 2011: Heidegger’s question was first asked by Hölderlin, and it is a question concerned with the intersection of a romantic commitment with what the German poet had saw as the “destitute” condition of an emerging modernity that devalues romanticism. See Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 91–142.
16. December 10, 2010: Careless readers often miss the fact that reterritorialization is inevitable in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of nomadism and romance of deterritorialization. It can’t be more explicit than where they write in Anti-Oedipus (1972), “In short, there is no deterritorialization of the flows of schizophrenic desire that is not accompanied by global or local reterritorializations, reterritorializations that always reconstitute shores of representation. […] Our loves are complexes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization” (Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983], 316).
18. January 17, 2011: “[…] the sincerity of the I and the we, it is a tremendous drama, the things that common words say, the words “and” and “but” and “is” and “before” and “after.” Our true faith is said in the simple words, for we cannot escape them — for meaning is the instant of meaning — and this means that we write to find what we believe and what we do not believe […]” (Oppen, “Statement on Poetics,” 49).
19. January 25, 2011: Jeffrey tells me that the publishing world is now concerned that people are just accumulating e-books, like so many unheard MP3s, rather than reading them. Now, as a culture, we are increasingly engaged in an electronic version of hoarding. Perhaps it is just a less cumbersome and space-demanding version of the sort of hoarding I, and so many other “book lovers,” already are guilty of.
20. January 16, 2011: It turns out that Oppen would not have appreciated this thought about audacity. A curious note I just found in RBD’s selection of Oppen’s correspondence, this in a letter he happened to write her while drafting “Of Being Numerous” (October 4, 1965): “There’s nothing very complex, nothing requiring tremendous aesthetic argument: we need courage, not ‘audacity’ — Pound’s word — but plain courage. To say what it’s like out there … out here” (The Selected Letters of George Oppen, ed. Rachel Blau DuPlessis [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990], 122, ellipsis in original). His preferred term “courage” reminds me of Arendt’s adherence to the same word, as the basis of a politics founded on communication and individuals’ making and sharing a world. (See especially Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998]; Arendt, The Promise of Politics, ed. Jerome Kohn [New York: Schocken Books, 2005]). But I wonder if Oppen had too much faith in the fact that one simply has to report on conditions “out there”/“out here” to establish that common, communicative ground. I don’t know what RBD wrote him to prompt this response about courage, but I do know that Drafts exhibits less of an easy faith in the reportage or in the sense that one will ever be heard. Courage to speak must be matched with a boldness to make oneself heard, all while listening well to what’s to be said. As RBD notes in her early essay “Language Acquisition”: “What writes listens. Listening is one of the major social and intellectual skills necessary for signification” (The Pink Guitar, 100). Perhaps that’s what the gendered difference comes down to between audacity and courage: knowing that it’s more audacious for a writer to stop and listen, rather than continuing to assert herself. Funny, though, that, if we are to believe Oppen’s letter, RBD learned that lesson about audacity from Pound, not from Oppen himself.
In the end, such audacity is not to be confused with authority or authoritarianism. RBD has such a precarious relationship to authority, both seeking it and divesting herself of it. This ambivalence comes from gendered lessons about the extent to which one has a self to assert. For instance, note how she writes of H.D.’s palimpsest form, which anticipates her own practice in the Drafts she would begin to write in the same year this study was published: “Palimpsest may have suggest the metonymic chain, a series of tellings of something with no one ever having final dominance, an evocation of plurality and multiplicity, lack of finality. This suggests the porousness of H.D.’s style, its unauthoritarian, constantly exploratory quality, despite this firm appeal to a final truth, saved from the embarrassments of authority precisely by being perpetually hidden as well as being exactly different from what dominant culture offers” (DuPlessis, H.D.: The Career of That Struggle [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986], 56). In Drafts that unauthoritarian stance would come in privileging listening, collecting or gathering. For the most part, authorial agency is limited to pointing. Just note how for one Draft she uses a sentence from Wlad Godzich to define authority as an instance of deixis, of pointing (in DuPlessis, Drafts 1–38, Toll, 219). That itself is a performance of listening, of pointing, to another authority to define the basis of one’s own authority in listening, in pointing.
But I suspect that Duncan was the greatest influence here, at least in terms of how he connected attention and listening to a kind of poetic audacity. He exhibits great anxiety about his own writing when he, the ever-chatty one, had been talking far too much, caught up in “my own goings-on, going-too-far,” at the cost of paying enough attention to others. A remarkable moment of self-consciousness about this tendency arises in The H.D. Book: “But I was talking — would I ever hear what she [H.D.] had to say?” (Duncan, The H.D. Book, ed. Michael Boughn and Victor Coleman [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011], 266, 265; Duncan’s emphasis). A field poetics is premised on the prioritization of listening, even for Olson. But for Duncan — as for RBD — that listening is not just a means to connect with the day’s American idiom, but instead the means of connecting, fully, with one’s social context and the language itself so as to re-vision one’s self.
Is “listening”? The ear
another listening in its
— sound’s alembic —
the equilibrations enter in.
(Duncan, “Everything Speaks to Me,” in “Ground Work Before the War” and “In the Dark” [1984 and 1988], ed. Robert J. Bertholf and James Maynard [New York: New Directions, 2006], 105.)
I discussed this poem in my dissertation, using it to signal what I called then Duncan’s “passive” or “passionate” subject-position as author. After I had shown her a draft of the chapter, RBD spoke to me about what I had done in my reading of the line and of the particular wonderfulness of Duncan’s phrase “sound’s alembic,” the alchemy wherein listening and attending to one’s world enables a kind of action, a creation of one’s self and one’s poem. A similar kind of audacious listening finds its way into her poem as a disappearing of her self to let the here be all the more present:
For disappearance is the subject
of whatever I do.
If not disappearance,
then what is here.
(DuPlessis, “Draft 19: Working Conditions,” in Drafts 1–38, Toll, 127)
22. See especially Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (1993), trans. Peter Hallward (New York: Verso, 2001), and Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (1997), trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
27. January 17, 2011: Looking back now, “trying” seems to be the key word in this sentence. Not just in the sense of attempting, but also putting her self and language on trial. What I find fault with below is addressed later in Drafts, when — in her wandering and folding back on herself — RBD moves outside aestheticized commercialized zones. Indeed, looking ahead to where “Draft 3: Of” folds in the sequence of the poem, in the meditations in “Draft 22: Philadelphia Wireman” (Drafts 1–38, Toll, 141–44), she moves to consider the noncommercial outsider work of the artist known only by that moniker given in RBD’s title. Here, we find RBD really working out this idea of writing as opening a procedural and processual space. “Be in the OF / and MAKE deep spurts from depths of cursive scrimmage” (143; DuPlessis’s emphasis). This localized writing allows her not only to wonder about the identity of the mysterious artist (“WHO DID the work?” ), but also to think about the present-ness of those conditions informing and permitting any aesthetic work, including her own (“HERE. and HOW.” ). What is curious for me, in light of my argument below, though, is that in topically turning outside (through the Wireman, to outsider art), Drafts still treats this space of procedure, this field of working the language, as a space outside institutional definition. In actuality, not even the outsider artist is fully outside the museums, galleries, markets of the art world. Some knowledge usually inheres, and, as is the case with the local outsider artist I know best, personally, the one in the town where I now live, one can be connected to the artworld via a simple desire to be known and to recognize the fact that painting obscene, childlike pictures of animal-human hybrids may be a means of feeding oneself and getting dope — especially if petty bourgeois [sic] folks like myself keep buying them.
29. DuPlessis, Blue Studios, 10. The concept of “urrealism” is implicitly developed through three essays: “Lorine Niedecker, the Anonymous: Gender, Class, Genre, and Resistances”; “The Gendered Marvelous: Barbara Guest, Surrealism, and Feminist Reception”; and “‘Uncannily in the open’: In Light of Oppen” (139–205).
31. January 17, 2011: Duncan’s open series Passages grow out of derivations from others’ lines and texts (one denotation of the word passage), and become interminable routes (another denotation of passage) through which he journeys (still another, now signaling the route of passage in an intransitive verb) in the intersecting course of his individual life and the poetic tradition. As he writes in his introduction to Bending the Bow, where the series first appears, “Passages of a poem larger than the book in which they appear follow a sentence read out of Julian. I number the first to come one, but they belong to a series that extends in an area larger than my work in them. I enter the poem as I entered my own life, moving between an initiation and a terminus I cannot name” (Duncan, Bending the Bow [New York: New Directions, 1968], v). Elsewhere, he describes the series as an engagement of an idea of poetry “having no bounds, being out of bounds” (“March 6, 1970. Preface to a Reading of Passages 1–22,” MAPS 6 : 53).
33. January 17, 2011: While pursuing research on Rukeyser, I recently encountered an essay by RBD I had not known about, on cultural Jewishness and her poetics. Here, she speaks implicitly to the “Jewishness” of Drafts as owing to a sense of responsibility to the diaspora and to the Holocaust: “Recurrent motifs and materials in many of these works are: home, homelessness, and exile, the death and the dead linked to the living, political grief and passion, including an attempt to look at the many corpses of the twentieth century. There is also silence, speaking and crying out, the sayable, the ineffable or unsayable. In many of these poems I speak of the enormousness of the universe, and the enormities of what has happened in our milky corner of it. I feel, increasingly, as the work goes on, that I am being spoken through, almost as if I were single-handedly building into existence some of the works of the lost” (DuPlessis, “Midrashic Sensibilities: Secular Judaism and Radical Poetics (A personal essay in several chapters),” in Radical Poetics and Secular Jewish Culture, ed. Stephen Paul Miller and Daniel Morris [Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010], 211).
What I find most compelling about her discussion of Jewishness in this essay, though, is RBD’s claim to have gravitated specifically toward the story of Jacob and the Angel as an allegory for the struggle attending her writing: “When one enters such a gigantic task as a long poem, it is difficult not to think of being called and of struggling with something large, multidimensional, and fundamentally unknowable by which you have been touched” (213). This complicated struggle, mixed with vocation and being “touched” by the unknowable, speaks to the core of a politicized ethics, a giving of one’s self over to what is foreign and unknowable, in the service of a human good and a human justice. Such an ethic is not just Jewish, of course. As RBD reminds us: “And it is not ‘the Jews’ / (though of course it’s the Jews), / but Jews as an iterated sign of this site” (“Draft 17: Unnamed,” in Drafts 1–38, Toll, 111). This ethical struggle may be iterated through a cultural Jewishness but it is also related to her feminism, as is clear in her landmark essay “For the Etruscans,” from decades earlier. What she notes there about the experimental essay form speaks just as well to her poetics in Drafts: “The work is metonymic (based on juxtaposition) and metaphoric (based on resemblance). It is at once analytic and associative, visceral and intellectual, law and body. The struggle with cultural hegemony, and the dilemmas of that struggle, are articulated in a voice that does not seek authority of tone or stasis of position but rather seeks to express the struggle in which it is immersed” (DuPlessis, The Pink Guitar, 13).
34. Theodor W. Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society” (1949, 1967), in Prisms, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson and Samuel Weber (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 31. December 10, 2010: RBD takes up “the stark curse” of “Adorno’s verse” in “Draft 28: Facing Pages” (Drafts 1–38, Toll, 184), and matches it to his strategy of finding resistance in writing anyway, despite the impossibility of fully realizing an effective political resistance through writing.
37. January 17, 2011: Echoes of this passage can be heard in “Draft 29, Intellectual Autobiography,” a canto written for the tenth anniversary of beginning Drafts: “Propose a work, the work, a work of enormous dailiness, vagrant / responses inside the grief of a century” (Drafts 1–38, Toll, 186). In her notes for this poem, RBD indicates that she began writing Drafts in 1985 — the year of “Otherhow” — and not in the year that the first poem is dated. “I had been composing Drafts for ten years, for they began in early 1985” (Drafts 1–38, Toll, 275n). Significantly, the original lines from the essay “Otherhow” are transformed into a meditation on the poem’s relationship to grief and mourning in her appropriating them for this anniversary canto. As I discuss below, that grief has everything to do with the poem’s passionate nature, with what I value most in Drafts: its ethical revaluation of agency so as to refigure our language for and thinking about politics. It is telling that RBD did not come to, or at least did not announce, this understanding herself until she was well along — ten years — into the process of writing the poem. As poets, how can we be expected to fully recognize or even claim the struggles in which we are immersed, those struggles defining our work and of which our work is a living part?
41. December 10, 2010: “The reality of artworks testifies to the possibilities of the possible. The object of art’s longing, the reality of what is not, is metamorphosed in art as remembrance. In remembrance what is qua what was combines with the nonexisting because what was no longer is” (Adorno, Aesthetic Theory , trans. and ed. Robert Hullot-Kentor [Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997], 132).
43. See especially Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (2000), trans. Gabriel Rockhill (New York: Continuum, 2004); Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents (2004), trans. Steven Cocoran (New York: Polity, 2009); and Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, trans. and ed. Steven Cocoran (New York: Continuum, 2010).
44. December 10, 2010: I may have been reaching for the following passage, which is not exactly a talking-out-of-the-corner but an attempt to redefine the difference between immanent critique and metaphysics (or, aesthetic absolutism). It’s complicated, so worth citing at length:
[…] Art becomes something social through its in-itself, and it becomes in-itself by means of the social force of production effective in it. The dialectic of the social and of the in-itself of the artwork is the dialectic of its own constitution to the extent that it tolerates nothing interior that does not externalize itself, nothing external that is not the bearer of the inward, the truth content.
The dual nature of artworks as autonomous structures and social phenomena results in oscillating criteria: Autonomous works provoke the verdict of social indifference and ultimately of being criminally reactionary; conversely, works that make social univocal discursive judgments thereby negate art as well as themselves. Immanent critique can possibly break through this rigid alternative. (Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 248)
So, immanence enacts the dialectic between the two halves of “the dual nature of artworks” — at once metaphysical/autonomous and social.
What’s especially interesting here, and what I seem to have forgotten or overlooked earlier (how?), is the role that theory (“critique”) plays in restoring to our clear sight the social and autonomous. Adorno does not trust the artist to theorize himself. But what RBD (and most contemporary poets worth their salt) do is theorize their praxis and fold that theorizing into their praxis. The question of immanence, when read in this light, seems more palatable. But I am still uneasy with the idea that there is a single (not singular: read, multiphasic, pluralistic) truth-content. And it is strangely akin to Laura Riding’s idea that the only reality is that one truth (the truth of the human) that poetry perceives and brings into the world (see Riding, Contemporaries and Snobs [New York: Doubleday Doran, 1928], and Anarchism Is Not Enough, ed. Lisa Samuels [1928; repr., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991]). Like Adorno, too, though, she judged absolute or pure poetry impossible; so even the most poetic (i.e., lyric) of poets’ attempts to render the truth perceptible becomes a struggle against the unrealities of the social that are judged to be “real.” Her poet, and later (after her abjuration of poetry) her storyteller ([Riding] Jackson, The Telling [Harper and Rowe, 1972]), enacts the dialectic (she calls it a struggle) to negate the social with the poetic. I have long struggled with Adorno, and only recently with Riding. And though I am attracted to their overt (Adorno) or understated or downplayed (Riding) acknowledgment of the sociality of poetry, I am distrustful of the single truth they feel counters social power. This is why I am also ultimately distrustful of Rancière and Badiou: they all share a monistic faith, the faith in the One. With that One comes a belief that the subject is indivisible (individual as in-dividual, as not-divisible). And for me, that is but a step away from claiming an equation of subject and person, rather than seeing life and experience as amounting to these two quantities as held in, put into, and seen through various tensions.
46. Does the word “liberation” recur in RBD’s work — criticism, essays, poetry? I must admit: Just looking quickly, I can’t find it. But that does not mean Drafts does not exhibit a desire for autonomy, does not construct poetic politics out of this desire for autonomy.
47. See Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom” (1984), in Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth: The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954–1984, Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. P. Aranov and D. McGrawth (New York: New Press, 1991).
49. January 17, 2011: Perhaps it should be admitted that, in writing this, I was conflating my experience of a pleasurable, languorous boredom in reading postmodern literature with Lyotard’s classic description of postmodernity as the end of metanarratives, a proliferation of language games, and the production of several knowledge-forms. As his last sentence in The Postmodern Condition predicts: “This sketches the outline of a politics that would respect both the desire for justice and the desire for the unknown” (The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979), trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984], 67). Drafts certainly self-consciously flirts with both of those categories in this postmodern politics — justice and the unknown. It is the self-consciousness with which RBD engages this procedure or process of writing as a game that is so strikingly characteristic of the postmodern. Yet, it is also an element of Drafts that her modernist investment in the “unknown” (à la Duncan and Oppen, both) puts into tension.
52. Elsewhere, Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text informs much of my reading of Cuban queer writer, visual artist, and theorist Sarduy’s poetics, which I then use to read Barthes against the grain to move toward an articulation of a queer poetic ethics (Keenaghan, Queering Cold War Poetry: Ethics of Vulnerability in Cuba and the United States [Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2009], 116–42). There, I go into more detail about the how bliss and pleasure are related to one another, and how Barthes uses them interchangeably though respects their differences, which preclude a synonymous relation.
55. Barthes, Mourning Diary: October 26, 1977–September 15, 1979 (2009), ed. Nathalie Léger, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 80; Barthes’s emphasis. Barthes’s Mourning Diary, a non-collated pile of note cards left behind after his mother’s death, is another as yet unacknowledged text informing the form of my appreciation of RBD’s work here. As he writes in The Pleasure of the Text about texts of bliss, they are “impossible” and thus “outside pleasure, outside criticism, unless it is reached through another text of bliss” (22; Barthes’s emphasis). If Drafts does, indeed, move along this spectrum between bliss and mourning, perhaps this essay is a meditation in the style of a text of mourning — trying to touch RBD’s where I feel most drawn by and to it. This essay is my asymptotic attempt at criticism of her Drafts.
56. Barthes, The Neutral: Lecture Course at the Collège de France 1977–1978, ed. Thomas Clerc under the direction of Eric Marty, trans. Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis Hollier (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 83.
57. February 24, 2011: I don’t know what to do with it now, but I cannot help but compare that agency to another cultural Jew, Allen Ginsberg, who felt compelled to close his own political poem “America” with the line: “America I’m putting my queer shoulder to the wheel” (Ginsberg, Howl and Other Poems [San Francisco: City Lights, 1956], 43). The mark of a queer or feminist writer often assumes a taking or assertion of agency. Yet Ginsberg’s poetics, somewhat like RBD’s, are typified by a blissful or pleasurable spontaneity and passion. Perhaps this is the crisis queer poets share with feminist ones: just how much can we let the passion speak, let ourselves be agents of rather than sui generis agents, without betraying our own political purposes?
60. October 29, 2011: We are now actually married in the eyes of New York state (via Connecticut, before the legalization of same-sex marriage was passed at home). The other state — the nation-state — of course still clings to DOMA and refused to recognize our contract … and thus our humanity.
64. For example, see Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: Verso, 2004); Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004); Douglas Crimp, Melancholia and Moralism: Essays on AIDS and Queer Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); Heather Love, Feeling Backward: Loss and Politics of Queer History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).